

# The AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

SPRING, 1961

THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF  
CATHOLIC THOUGHT

DON LUIGI STURZO'S CONTRIBUTION TO  
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Discussion of Timasheff's Article

Discussion of Timasheff's Article

PARENTAL OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE

NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

NOTICE TO CONTRIBUTORS

PRELIMINARY 1961 CONVENTION  
PROGRAM

BOOK REVIEWS

*John L. Thomas*

*Nicholas S. Timasheff*

*Robert M. MacIver*

*Victor Gioscia*

The Official Journal of the American Catholic Sociological Society

VOLUME XXII, NO. 1

# THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

*Official Publication of the American Catholic Sociological Society*

## *Editor*

PAUL J. REISS

*Marquette University*

## *Book Review Editor*

DONALD N. BARRETT

*University of Notre Dame*

## *Associate Editors*

Frank J. Atelsek	<i>Marquette University</i>
Thomas K. Burch	<i>Marquette University</i>
Frank A. Cizon	<i>Loyola University</i>
Jack H. Curtis	<i>Marquette University</i>
John D. Donovan	<i>Boston College</i>
William D'Antonio	<i>University of Notre Dame</i>
Joseph P. Fitzpatrick, S.J.	<i>Fordham University</i>
Bela Kovrig	<i>Marquette University</i>
William F. Kenkel	<i>Iowa State University</i>
Raymond H. Potvin	<i>Catholic University of America</i>
John L. Thomas, S.J.	<i>St. Louis University</i>
Sr. Frances Jerome Woods, C.D.P.	<i>Our Lady of the Lake College</i>

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW is published by the American Catholic Sociological Society quarterly in Spring, Summer, Fall and Winter issues. Annual membership in the American Catholic Sociological Society: Constituent, \$8.00, Student \$4.00. Subscription to THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW: \$8.00 per year, single copies, \$1.50. (Subscription is included with membership in the Society.) Address all communications concerning membership, subscriptions, and other business to The American Catholic Sociological Review, Marquette University, Milwaukee 3, Wisconsin.

Address all editorial communications to:

Paul J. Reiss, Editor, American Catholic Sociological Review  
Marquette University, Milwaukee 3, Wisconsin

Address communications concerning book reviews to:

Donald N. Barrett, Department of Sociology  
University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana

Printed by the Marquette University Press

© 1961 The American Catholic Sociological Society







# The AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Volume XXII

Number 1

Spring 1961

## Contents

THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CATHOLIC THOUGHT	3	John L. Thomas
DON LUIGI STURZO'S CONTRIBUTION TO SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY	11	Nicholas S. Timasheff
Discussion of Timasheff's Paper	32	Robert M. MacIver
Discussion of Timasheff's Paper	34	Victor Gioscia
THE PERCEPTION OF THE INFLUENCE OF PARENTAL OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE	39	John E. Hughes
NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS	50	
NOTICE TO CONTRIBUTORS	53	
THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY CONVENTION PROGRAM	54	

## Book Reviews

Grier and Grier: Privately Developed Interracial Housing: An Analysis of Experience	56	Robert H. Amundson
Laurenti: Property Values and Race: Studies in Seven Cities	56	Herbert F. Leis, S.M.
Rohrer and Edmondson: The Eighth Generation	57	John G. Masterson
Read: Children of Their Fathers. Growing Up Among the Ngoni of Nyasaland	58	Sr. M. Inez Hilger, O.S.B.
Geertz: The Religion of Java	59	Sr. Mary William, I.H.M.
The National Bureau of Economic Research: Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries	60	William J. Gibbons, S.J.
Kephart: Races of Mankind. Their Origin and Migration	62	Virginia Watson
Simpson: Sociologist Abroad	63	Bela Kovrig
Tillich: Theology of Culture	65	Joseph B. Schuyler
Bourret: Ghana — The Road to Independence	66	N. S. Timasheff
Mintz: Worker in the Cane: A Puerto Rican Life History	66	Allen Spitzer

<i>Stein et al.</i> : Identity and Anxiety	67	Rudolph E. Morris
<i>Cleveland et al.</i> : The Overseas Americans	69	Cyril O. Schommer, S.J.
<i>Von Borch</i> : Die unfertige Gesellschaft	70	Rudolph E. Morris
<i>Ruttenberg</i> : Self-Developing America	71	Robert M. Barry
<i>Curti</i> : The Making of an American Community.		
A Case Study of Democracy in a Frontier County	71	Joseph W. McGee
<i>Talpalcar</i> : The Sociology of Colonial Virginia	72	Sr. Mary Lois Eberdt, C.H.
<i>Argyris</i> : Understanding Organizational Behavior	74	Edna M. O'Hern
<i>McGregor</i> : The Human Side of Enterprise	74	Paul B. Marx, O.S.B.
<i>Landsberger</i> : Hawthorne Revisited	76	Leonard Townsend Morse
<i>Bell and Vogel</i> : A Modern Introduction to the Family	77	Walter F. Zenner
<i>Brim</i> : Education for Child Rearing	78	Charles J. Fabing
<i>Stokes</i> : Voting Research and the Businessman in Politics	79	Donald N. Barrett
<i>Hazard</i> : The Soviet System of Government	79	William T. Liu
<i>Webster</i> : The Cross and the Fasces, Christian		
Democracy and Fascism in Italy	80	Nino Maritano
<i>Hebert</i> : Les Temoins de Jehovah	81	Mother M. Rosanna, O.S.U.
<i>Ermecke</i> : Zur Ethnischen Begründung der		
Todesstrafe Heute	82	Theresa Mueller
<i>Bowman</i> : The American Funeral	83	James J. Conlin, S.J.
<i>David</i> : National Manpower Council — Education		
and Manpower	84	Paul E. Lang
<i>Smuts</i> : Women and Work in America	84	Joseph B. Schuyler, S.J.
<i>Capes</i> : Communication or Conflict	85	R. Cletus Brady
<i>Macgregor</i> : Social Science in Nursing:	86	Sr. Mary Christopher
Applications for the Improvement of Patient Care		O'Rourke, R.S.M.
<i>Cronin</i> : Social Principles and Economic Life	87	Sr. Loretta Maria Sheehy
<i>Green</i> : Sociology: An Analysis of Life in Modern		
Society	88	John S. Harrington, S.J.
<i>McDougall</i> : An Introduction to Social Psychology	89	Comas Girard, O.F.M.
<i>Rogers</i> : Social Change in Rural Society	89	William F. Kenkel
<i>Ross</i> : Sociology and Social Problems	90	Sr. M. Chrysostom, O.S.F.
<i>Horton and Leslie</i> : The Sociology of Social Problems	91	Titus Thole, O.S.B.
<i>Weinberg</i> : Social Problems in Our Time	92	Clement S. Mihanovich
The National Conference on Social Welfare:	92	Br. D. Augustine
The Social Welfare Forum		(McCaffery), F.S.C.
<i>Junker</i> : Field Work: An Introduction to the		
Social Sciences	93	Robert H. Amundson
<i>Queen et al.</i> : The American Social System	93	Margaret M. Bedard
<i>Kurtz</i> : Social Work Year Book	94	Br. D. Augustine
		(McCaffery), F.S.C.
<i>Terruwe</i> : The Neurosis in the Light of Rational		
Psychology	95	Joan Backscheider

# The Sociological Implications of Catholic Thought

John L. Thomas, S.J.

Institute of Social Order

*One of the expressed purposes of The American Catholic Sociological Society is to present the sociological implications of Catholic thought. This aim assumes the existence of a set of sociologically relevant conceptions of an identifiably Catholic derivation. An analysis of social and religious systems indicates that these conceptions are related to a distinctive Catholic definition of the human agent and supply the ultimate premises of values or social goals which a system should strive to achieve. By studying the social means required to implement these goals, sociologists throw considerable light on the social nature of man and on the junctional exigencies of his essential social needs.*

Inasmuch as we are currently considering certain changes in the Constitution of The American Catholic Sociological Society, I felt it might be helpful to turn to this document in seeking a *point de départ* for my considerations in this paper. Article II of the Constitution assigns four major purposes to this society as follows: "to stimulate concerted study and research among Catholics working in the field of sociology; to create a sense of solidarity among Catholic sociologists; to present the sociological implications of Catholic thought; and to encourage its members to recognize their professional responsibilities as sociologists.

The first and fourth purposes require no comment since it should be obvious that the stimulation of study and research, as well as the recognition of professional responsibilities, are germane to an association of scientists. The second purpose implies that Catholic sociologists have special shared interests that justify the fostering of solidarity among them. This assumption merits further comment, but it need not delay us here inasmuch as it is closely related to the third purpose with which we shall deal explicitly.

This third purpose, "to present the sociological implications of Catholic thought," appears highly significant for the development and growth of our society, yet to the best of my knowledge, I cannot recall that it ever has been subjected to careful analysis or discussion. Although I

\* Presidential address read at the annual meeting of the American Catholic Sociological Society, September, 1960.

would not presume to attempt an official interpretation, perhaps I can make some contribution toward a more adequate understanding of this purpose by offering a few observations concerning what I consider to be its scope and significance.

#### TWO BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

It should be apparent that the phrase, "the sociological implications of Catholic thought," implies two basic assumptions: first, that there exists an identifiable set of specifically Catholic concepts or propositions relevant to man's social life; and second, that these conceptions have significant sociological implications. Although these two assumptions are closely related, we may consider them separately for purposes of the present analysis.

Let us start with the assumption that Catholic thought includes a set of specifically Catholic concepts and propositions pertinent to our discipline. To rule out one possible source of confusion from the start, I think we can agree that the term *Catholic thought* in the present context does not signify merely the social thought of Catholics, for this obviously always has sociological implications—though one may question whether it is always Catholic. In the present context, the term *Catholic* appears to signify a quality that is distinctive of the concepts or propositions held by a specific religious group, though not necessarily exclusively so. In other words, individual thinkers outside the group may develop or maintain roughly similar conceptions without identifying these as distinctively Catholic. Briefly, what we are trying to say is that the term *Catholic thought* in the present context implies the existence of socially relevant conceptions of an identifiable religious derivation. If such conceptions exist, what they are, and to what extent they may be relevant to Catholic sociologists are questions that call for further discussion.

But let us consider briefly the meaning of the second assumption we have mentioned, namely, that Catholic thought has significant sociological implications. This assumption may be interpreted in two different ways. We may take it to mean that values are so inherently related to both concepts and research problems in the social sciences that there will be as many distinctive approaches to theory and practice in sociology as there are distinct value systems held by individual sociologists. It follows that if Catholic thought involves a set of socially pertinent conceptions of a specifically religious rather than empirical derivation, the sociological approach of Catholic scientists will differ from that of others. I feel that few social scientists would accept this interpretation. Considered *qua* sociologists, all must follow similar procedures in studying social phenomena regardless of the various values they may embrace. They must employ acceptable methods of observation, attempt to de-

velop generalizations on the basis of these observations, and if they are sufficiently optimistic, may even aspire to formulate a general theory.

On the other hand, it must be admitted that the *de facto* situation in sociology has not always reflected this strictly scientific character. For a variety of reasons some sociologists have apparently found it difficult to distinguish between their implicitly philosophical preconceptions and empirically derived propositions, while the temptation to shift from sociology to social philosophy, involving as it does a sorry confusion between the "is" and the "ought," appears endemic to our discipline. Hence it cannot be denied that unexpressed value judgments have sometimes dictated the sociologist's approach, though it is generally assumed that such lack of scientific awareness is on the decline.

#### SOCIOLOGY AND CATHOLIC THOUGHT

Now if the phrase *sociological implications* as used in the present context does not mean that Catholic thought commits Catholic sociologists to a distinctive approach, what does it mean? It seems to me that an adequate answer must include the following considerations. Since man is not man except in groups, that is, the quality of being social is constitutive of human nature, men can realize their true stature in the proper fulfillment of the characteristic functions of their nature only through interaction with others. Thus men come together in various types of association to fulfill their numerous needs, and it is the aim of sociology to study man within the complex web of relationships generated by membership in these varied societies, institutions, or associations. By developing and extending scientific knowledge in this area, therefore, sociologists can make a highly significant contribution to all the other disciplines dealing with various aspects of human nature, for if the social is constitutive of this nature, it must necessarily affect every aspect of it.

This point seems so obvious that we almost hesitate to make it, yet a glance at the development of Catholic thought indicates that the point must be made and made forcefully. For various reasons, Catholic thinkers have tended to ignore the social implications of their conception of man. Hence the propositions they formulate relative to the social aspects of human nature tend either to be inadequate or to be identified with specific cultural manifestations, while their programs of action in the practical order either consist of little more than mere statements of general principles or remain ineffective through failure to take into account the social requisites that the adequate implementation of such principles necessarily involves.

This third purpose of The American Catholic Sociological Society is so significant, therefore, because in presenting the sociological implica-

tions of Catholic thought, sociologists not only can make a substantial contribution to our understanding of the social aspects of human nature, but can present the social facts judged pertinent to the formulation and effective implementation of practical programs of action. Indeed, in his latest book, *Du Droit Naturel A La Sociologie*,<sup>1</sup> Prof. Jacques Leclercq maintains that the development of the science of sociology and of the sociological approach constituted one of the major break-throughs of the human spirit. Men have long recognized the profound significance of the social; sociology offers them the means of studying it systematically. It would seem to follow logically that the science of sociology should be included in any balanced curriculum of education. Since this is obviously not the case, we must conclude that the sociological implications of Catholic thought are not yet adequately recognized.

However, this failure is not our major concern at present. In discussing the term *Catholic thought* we indicated the need for further clarification. As we suggested, emphasis must be placed on the adjective, *Catholic*, that is, on the assumption that there exists a set of socially relevant conceptions of an identifiably religious derivation. There are several reasons why I feel that it is a matter of crucial importance for sociologists clearly to identify both the content and relevance of these non-empirical conceptions. Failure to identify the specifically religious elements in their programs has led some Catholic social thinkers in the past to confuse ultimate principles or premises of values with their relative cultural approximations, thus leading the faithful to defend patently outmoded social forms as if these were somehow essentially Catholic. At the opposite extreme, some contemporary leaders of Catholic action seem quite unaware that a rational program of action always represents a conclusion based on the prudent application of pertinent premises of values to a set of relevant social facts; in other words, that a mere statement of principles does not constitute a practical program.

Let me state at once that I do not wish to infer that the members of this Society are tainted with these misconceptions. However, I do feel that there has been some failure in communication. Thus far we have not succeeded in convincing our coreligionists that the science of sociology can make a substantial contribution to our understanding of human nature, or that, together with the other social disciplines, it furnishes the indispensable knowledge required for the adequate formulation of effective programs of action. Furthermore, perhaps because of an understandable reticence associated with our minority status, we have been somewhat remiss in helping our fellow sociologists develop the critical acumen needed to distinguish between their non-scientific preconceptions or implicit value judgments and their empirically derived concep-

<sup>1</sup> Paris: SPES, 1960.

tions or propositions. As Catholic sociologists we must deal with this distinction constantly and should therefore be well prepared to help others acquire an awareness of its significance.

#### THE CONTENT OF RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS

How can we identify the specifically Catholic, pertinently sociological elements in Catholic thought? As I see it, we can discover these elements by analyzing how a religious system affects or makes its impact on a cultural system and its institutions. Let us review briefly what such an analysis reveals.

As I use the term here, a religious system represents the complex of creed, cult, and code of conduct constituting a group's total conception of their relationships to the transcendent and of the practical consequences that stem from these relationships. Furthermore, whether we are discussing religion among the so-called primitives or in higher civilizations, it is well to note that manifestations of the sacred do not appear as segmented, relatively isolated phenomena. Rather, they are part of a more extensive system, including the various religious theories frequently embodied in those rituals, symbols, and myths which explain the origin of man and the world, the major characteristics of the human situation, and the speculative basis of approved moral norms.

Hence the primary elements of a religious system include a set of concepts or beliefs concerning the transcendent, viewed either as an entity or entities having a significant relationship of supremacy over man and the human condition. The content of this creed is expressed in dogmas, myths, and symbols; while religious festivals, ceremonies, and rites guarantee its purity and continuity in the group. Moreover, in addition to the distinctively religious acts prescribed by creed and cult, a religious system tends to furnish the basic principles underlying the group's major value-orientations and moral codes of conduct.

In other words, a religious system tends to determine the individual's status or position in the cosmic order by defining his essential relationships to space and time (both sacred and profane), to nature, to his fellow men (in terms of age, sex, ingroup and outgroup), and to the transcendental. Although the degree and extent to which different religious systems define these relationships may vary considerably, it should be noted that explicit definitions of the "sacred" involve implicit definitions of the "profane," so that the group's attitudes toward the "secular" are necessarily conditioned by their religious beliefs and practices.

#### THE CULTURAL STRUCTURE

If we turn now to an analysis of any cultural structure, we discover the following elements of primary importance. First, we find a basic,



underlying set of values, ideas, or ideals constituting the culture's ultimate goals. These goals are defined in terms of the elemental doctrines concerning the origin, nature, and purpose of man held by the group. Hence at least in their original formulation, these essential cultural goals imply a common, shared image of man, the human agent.

Second, further analysis reveals various sets of derivative values and purposes. These represent specific institutional objectives, that is, the culturally devised applications of the group's ultimate ideals, gradually developed in the process of meeting its practical social needs: economic, political, sexual, social, religious, and so on. As a culture endures, many elements of these derivative values receive symbolic expression such as "the dignity of man," "private property," "the rights of man," "democracy," "equality," "the brotherhood of man," and so forth. Indeed, these vaguely defined, symbolically expressed values often acquire a quasi-autonomous existence, remaining operative in a culture long after the ultimate premises from which they were originally derived have been rejected or are no longer recognized as pertinent.

Third, further analysis uncovers the complex of institutional means or behavioral patterns routinely associated with the concrete actualization of specific goals. These represent the uniformly acceptable procedures, the specific sets of social relationships established for the more or less effective implementation of the group's shared institutional objectives.

It should be obvious that if a given cultural system is to endure, its ultimate goals, specific institutional objectives, and implementing behavioral patterns must maintain some degree of integration, that is, they must be logically and functionally supportive. In practice, this means that the behavioral patterns of the group must facilitate or at least make possible the practical realization of its shared institutional objectives; and these specific objectives, in turn, must be so formulated as to render possible the fulfillment of its ultimate goals. Because change may be introduced at each of these three interrelated levels, and the institutions of advanced societies like our own tend to move toward increasing functional differentiation, the maintenance of some degree of integration presents a perennial challenge in large complex societies.

#### THE CULTURAL RELEVANCE OF CATHOLIC THOUGHT

How does a religious system affect a cultural structure? As our analysis has indicated, when a religious system is operative, it supplies the essential elements for the group's definitions of the origin, nature, and destiny of man, and consequently furnishes the indispensable ideological foundation for the system of ultimate goals and ideals constituting the essential core of its cultural system. In the final analysis, both ap-



proved norms of conduct and culturally defined institutional objectives imply an underlying image of man. By articulating the moral implications of this shared image, a religious system plays an essential role in the genesis of cultural goals, the formulation of specific institutional objectives, and the choice of behavioral patterns.

Our analysis of religious and cultural systems indicates that the specifically Catholic, pertinently sociological elements in Catholic thought are derived from the distinctive conception of the human agent and his position in the cosmic order formulated by the Catholic Church. In other words, the specifically Catholic content of Catholic social thought comprises primarily the ultimate cultural goals or premises of values on the basis of which specific institutional objectives and implementing behavioral patterns are to be developed. Because ultimate cultural ideals or values have functional exigencies, that is to say, if these goals are to be actualized in a given society, derivative institutional objectives and implementing behavioral patterns must be so constructed that group members can achieve them, Catholic social thought tends to include both ultimate values and their assumed functional requisites. Nevertheless, these latter are related to the former as means to ends. Hence they are not specifically predetermined by these ultimate goals except where there is only one means available for achieving a given end. When this necessary relationship between means and end does not exist, man, as a rational creature, can devise many different means for achieving a proposed goal. In a given cultural situation, the means used to attain specific ultimate goals will depend on the character of related institutions, the past experience and customs of the group, and their resources in nature and in technological skills. We need only call attention to the varied types of political, economic, or family systems that have existed in different Christian communities to demonstrate the point we are making here.

It follows that Catholic thinkers cannot *a priori* deduce the details of the structure of human relationships from their conception of human nature and its ultimate purposes. Social institutions, together with the manifold implementing behavioral patterns associated with them, stand as means in terms of these ultimate goals. In constructing our social systems we are consequently faced with the unending, arduous task of developing means that will adequately assure the realization of our ultimate goals. At best our efforts will represent little more than "cultural approximations" of the Catholic ideal. They will be approximations because their very relatedness to a given social milieu limits them to being but one expression of the ideal. They are subject to modification, inasmuch as changes in the total social system may render ineffective some established patterns and call for the substitution of others.

## CONCLUSION: A ROLE FOR CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGISTS

These considerations bring us back to our initial concern with the meaning of the phrase, "the sociological implications of Catholic thought," contained in the third aim of this Society. As I have suggested, "Catholic thought" in this context includes the ultimate cultural ideals, principles, and premises of values based on our Christian conception of man and society, while its "sociological implications" represent the functional exigencies or requisites of this thought, that is, the derivative institutional objectives and implementing behavioral patterns consonant with its effective actualization in a given social environment.

In carrying out this third purpose the contribution of Catholic sociologists will be twofold. First, offering a careful analysis of the constitutive elements of social institutions and systems, they will enable Catholic thinkers to distinguish between absolute, unchanging premises of values and their relative, culture-bound applications, thus avoiding the seemingly perennial error of identifying absolute principles with their cultural approximations. Second, by clarifying the functional exigencies of specific ultimate values, they will provide the knowledge and understanding of social facts needed to establish effective programs of action in the practical order. This latter contribution is highly significant since some Catholic actionists apparently assume that a statement of principles constitutes a rational program of action.

In conclusion, this third aim of The American Catholic Sociological Society constitutes a definite call to action. Considered in a wider context, it defines the important contribution sociologists can make toward the development and maintenance of a Christian society. As Pius XII reminded us, we must work ceaselessly at "constructing the solid foundations of society" and at "building up the powerful structures of human relationships." This work can be accomplished effectively on two conditions. We must develop a clearer understanding of the nature and interrelationships of the basic elements of social institutions and cultural systems. We must also be capable of devising adequate social means for implementing our cherished values. By steadily adding to our knowledge of social facts and by developing a serious concern for the logical application of this knowledge in programs of action, Catholic sociologists will live up to the high demands of their profession. Their work is so essential today because a new world is in the process of being constructed. Either we prepare ourselves to become competent builders, or other hands will take over the task as they have already done in so many instances.

# Don Luigi Sturzo's Contribution to Sociological Theory

Nicholas S. Timasheff

Fordham University and Marymount College

*Don Luigi Sturzo is well known throughout the world as a prominent statesman and the author of numerous works in the field of political science and politics; but he is rather unknown as an outstanding sociologist. The purpose of this paper is to summarize his theory of society in a systematic form making it comparable with the work of other great sociologists of the 20th century and to show its place in the general stream of sociological thought.*

A great master in sociology, Don Luigi Sturzo, passed away in Rome on the 8th of August, 1959. Of course, he was much more than a sociologist; he was also a great statesman, a forceful labor organizer, a philosopher, a poet. But here we are interested only in Sturzo the sociologist.<sup>1</sup>

The first fact to be noted is that Sturzo, a master in our field, still can be called Sturzo the unknown. In such country-by-country surveys of sociology such as that of Gurvitch and Moore<sup>2</sup> or that of Barnes and Becker,<sup>3</sup> his name does not appear. Even in books of Catholic inspiration one finds very little about him. In the index to M. Williams' *Catholic Social Thought*,<sup>4</sup> one finds fourteen references; but turning to the corresponding pages of the text, one is disappointed because there is nothing to be read except that Sturzo said something about something—the

\* Paper read at annual convention of the American Catholic Sociological Society, September, 1960.

<sup>1</sup> This paper is based on 1) the three sociological treatises of Don Luigi Sturzo, namely *Essai de Sociologie*, Paris: Librairie Bloud and Gay, 1935; *True Life*, Paterson, New Jersey: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1947; and *Del Metodo Sociologico*, Milano: Istituto italiano edizioni atlas, 1949; 2) relevant chapters in *The International Community and the Right of War*, London: G. Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1929; *Les Guerres Modernes et La Pensee Catholique*, London: Editions de l'Arbre, 1942; *Spiritual Problems of Our Time*, New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1945; *Nationalism and Internationalism*, New York: Roy Publishers, 1946; 3) "The Influence of Social Facts on Ethical Concepts," *Thought*, 20 (March, 1945); and "History and Philosophy," *Thought*, 21 (March, 1946).

<sup>2</sup> Georges Gurvitch and Wilbert Moore, editors, *Twentieth Century Sociology*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1945.

<sup>3</sup> Harry E. Barnes and Howard Becker, editors, *Contemporary Social Theory*, New York: Appleton Century, 1940.

<sup>4</sup> M. J. Williams, *Catholic Social Thought*, New York: Ronald Press, 1950.

content of his statements is not summarized. Sturzo's views are summarized by Kilzer and Ross<sup>5</sup> in two insignificant footnotes. There exists no literature on his sociology, except two papers by Paul Furfey and R. Pollock published however only in Italian translation,<sup>6</sup> and a score of book reviews; even in the *Scritti*<sup>7</sup> published, again in Italian, to honor his 80th birthday, one finds surprisingly little comment on his doctrine.

#### PROBLEMS IN THE STUDY OF STURZO

There are two main reasons why Sturzo is unknown. First, Sturzo has insisted on the necessity of introducing into sociology propositions known only from revelation, which seems to place his doctrine outside the scope of sociology commonly understood to be an empirical science of society. Second, Sturzo has written his sociological works in a difficult language, full of neologisms and elliptic, sometimes cryptic propositions; and often the individual statements on a particular subject are apparently inconsistent. This is aggravated by the fact that his works have appeared not in their original Italian version but in French or English, and in one case, German, translations. These are poor translations which tried to reproduce the master's statements almost word by word, with no regard for the enormous differences in the ways of expressing ideas in these languages.

The second obstacle is not insurmountable. Later on, at least some of Sturzo's works appeared in Italian also. Better translations could be made if there were more interest in his work. The meaning of elliptic and cryptic statements can be deciphered, and apparent inconsistencies resolved into coherent systems.

The first obstacle is more serious. The total thought system of Sturzo about society cannot be translated into terms of an empirical science—the two are incommensurable. But from that total system one might separate a portion which would be commensurable with sociology, today a well established science. The question is—what would be the result—a “dissected corpse,” according to Sturzo's own expression; or a system of propositions, both original and opening new insights into the science of human behavior in society where so many facts are accumulating, but their intelligible and enlightening arrangement is so rare? This was the crucial question which posed itself before my mind when,

<sup>5</sup> E. Kilzer and Eva Ross, *Western Social Thought*, Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1954.

<sup>6</sup> Paul H. Furfey, “La Sociologia di Don Luigi Sturzo,” in Luigi Sturzo, editor, *Del Metodo Sociologico*, Milano: Istituto italiano edizioni atlas, 1949, pp. 125-168; Robert Pollock, “L'uomo Nella Società e Nella Storia,” in Luigi Sturzo, editor, *Del Metodo Sociologico*, Milano: Istituto italiano edizioni atlas, 1949, pp. 171-268.

<sup>7</sup> *Scritti di Sociologia e Politica in Onore di Luigi Sturzo*, 3 Vols., Bologna, 1953.

about three years ago, I started working on Sturzo's sociological theory. I came to the result that, putting aside Sturzo's social philosophy which deals with first causes and the ultimate ends of an "immanent process," i.e., the social and historical process, and systematizing Sturzo's statements about the latter scattered through numerous sociological and semi-sociological works, one finds not a dissected corpse, but a self-contained and beautiful structure.

To summarize a sociological theory in all its implications and ramifications is always a difficult task. Such a summary of Sturzo's sociology will now be offered. It must be repeated that what will be summarized is not the totality of Sturzo's views on society, but only that part which can reasonably be assumed to be based on observation, both historical and participant. The former, i.e., the selection and interpretation of historical facts, is especially emphasized by Sturzo who liked to call his sociology "historicist"; the latter is obviously at the foundation of many propositions about struggle which are the more valuable as Sturzo was immersed in different kinds of struggle. It must be emphasized that Sturzo never derived sociological laws or constants from theological or philosophical propositions and was always eager to emphasize that his sociology was based on empirical material.

Nevertheless, he denied the very possibility of a sociology on a level below "the total social phenomenon" which, for him, includes the impact of the supernatural on human history. His denial is based on the postulate that sociology is the only science of society in its totality (in the concrete, according to his somewhat misleading terminology). This is counterpart to Comte's postulate that sociology, a science built up on the "positive," i.e., empiric level, was the only possible science of society. There is no reason to accept either postulate; sociology, integral as Sturzo calls his, or positive, as Comte called his version, cannot pretend to be the only science of society. At this place, the problem is not what is true but what is adequate. From this point of view, the most adequate solution is this: sociology is an empiric science of society, but cannot pretend to absorb all knowledge about society. It is more adequate because on that background a universe of discourse can be easily created among the students of society which is impossible if either the Comtean or the Sturzian postulate is chosen.

This postulate is obviously incompatible with Sturzo's intentions. But let us not forget that, once expressed, ideas start living a life independent of their originators. Probably, Kant would not have recognized his own theory in the works of the neo-Kantians. Today, one may study what Kant really meant and what the neo-Kantians elaborated on the foundation of his theories. I do not offer any counterpart to neo-Kantianism. What I am doing is only this: I limit my study to a definite part of

the Sturzian legacy and try to show that the part selected is valuable *in se*.

# I.

## A SUMMARY OF STURZIAN SOCIOLOGY

After these necessary preliminaries let me return to the task of offering a summary of Sturzian sociology reduced to the empirical level.

For Sturzo, sociology is the science of society in its totality, as given in immediate experience, not yet analyzed into sectors corresponding to the economic, political, religious, domestic and other aspects of social life. This is a translation of Sturzo's statement, often misunderstood, that sociology is the study of society in the concrete. Thus translated, Sturzo's view largely agrees with those dominant in contemporary sociology.

## COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

For Sturzo, society is a plurality of individuals durably pursuing common ends and united by social, or collective, consciousness which is tantamount to the coalescence of the associative components of the members' individual consciousnesses. Sturzo's theory on the subject may be summarized as follows: In the consciousness of every individual one may, analytically, discern two elements or components, the purely individual or personal, and the collective or associative. The personal component is *this man's* thought and will; it is the consciousness of the thinking subject, inasmuch as he relates it to himself, to his thoughts, aspirations and activities. The collective component, by contrast, is formed of thoughts, aspirations, achievements, activities of the individual so far as they are related to thoughts, aspirations, achievements, activities of *other human beings* forming with him a society. Even more than that: Sturzo explicitly warns of a strictly intellectual (cognitive) interpretation of consciousness: its stream contains also emotional experiences and volitions.

Collective consciousness is first of all expressed in the conviction of every individual that he belongs in a certain fashion to others, as others belong to him, not only in the present moment, but also in the past whence comes the today in which we live, and the future which is prepared in our today for its own being of tomorrow. Between the participants in collective consciousness there is communion, consciousness of the society in which they live. We could add to Sturzo's statement that the group members manifest that consciousness of belonging together when uttering the remarkable verbal symbol "we." Using "we," one asserts his identity with a larger social unit of which others are also parts. Using "we" to refer to each other, group members express the existence of group consciousness, the so-called "we-feeling." The unity of the group exists in the minds of the members and is independent of the fact

of whether it is or is not observed by an investigator. This means that the unity is real.

Awareness of belonging together manifested in communion and its corollaries such as solidarity and friendship, are real phenomena going on in the associative components of the individual consciousness. The processes going on there are not parallel, but interrelated. This interrelation is established through a mechanism which Sturzo calls projection, tantamount to Sorokin's objectification, connoting the expression of ideas in "vehicles" making them knowable to the fellow men of the originator. A better term would be externalization, by contrast to internalization connoting the incorporation, by an individual, of ideas reaching one's kind by means of vehicles or projections in which they have been expressed. The projection of the associative components of individual consciousness onto the social plane is multiple, simultaneous and continuous. Through interaction, a unification of projections is achieved, though never completely. In this way a compound is formed, the collective consciousness which, as has been stated, is the resultant of the composition of the associative components of individual consciousnesses and is not something standing apart from concrete individuals. This compound, the individual-social consciousness, possesses so-to-speak a dual nature. It is rooted in the individual consciousnesses, forms an inalienable part of them; and it is something which has inner unity which transcends the individual participants. This individual-social consciousness is the force which holds together every society, "a conjoined coexistence of several persons in their understanding, willing and expression . . . participation in ideas, sentiments, affections, values and interests."

#### SOCIAL MORPHOLOGY

Sturzo's doctrine of collective consciousness is the very foundation of his theory about the relationship between society and the individual. It differs from sociological personalism which ascribes primacy to the individual; and from sociological collectivism which ascribes primacy to society. Sturzo's position is that of sociological harmonism or synthetism: society does not exist outside of individuals, and an individual is unthinkable outside society. Today this is the prevailing view; it was not so in 1935 when Sturzo was publishing his *Essai de Sociologie*.<sup>8</sup>

The individual is treated by Sturzo as a self-determining agent who is never mechanically compelled to do or not to do something; but he is conditioned in his decisions by his physical and social environment. Thus, although free, man displays in his social behavior a number of uniformities. These uniformities may be expressed as sociological laws which are more flexible than the laws of inorganic nature. Already

<sup>8</sup> *Essai de Sociologie*, 1935.



Comte knew this, but somehow the proposition went astray during the century which has passed since his death.

Among the sociological laws, two are basic: 1) the law of motion toward rationality and 2) the law of a cyclic movement of social organization from a pluralism of social nuclei through duality to unification and then back to pluralism which is however intrinsically unstable; this is a statement diametrically opposed to Spencer's teaching on the instability of the homogeneous.

In addition to the two basic laws (Sturzo does not use this term) Sturzo formulates a number of secondary laws and of sociological constants. The latter cover social phenomena which one may expect to find everywhere and at any time (except perhaps at the primeval stage of human development). Among these constants, there are "the three fundamental forms of sociality," namely the family, the polity and religion, and an indeterminate number of secondary forms. Sturzo denies the possibility of an exhaustive enumeration because human creativeness is unbounded. Translated into common sociological language, Sturzo's forms of sociality represent types of which concrete societies are specimens.

In describing human relations in the framework of groups Sturzo emphasizes a few forces not imposed on men, but generated by them, which keep them close to each other and therefore may be called forces of cohesion; he prefers the term "synthesis" which he however uses also with different meanings. The main syntheses form two pairs, liberty-authority and morality-law. Emphasis on these forces places Sturzo among the "normativists" in the sociology of our day, *vs.* the relationists and functionalists. In one of his earlier works Sturzo unfolded ideas which might have developed into relationism; but he did not pursue this line of thought. As to functionalism, Sturzo comes close to it when he insists on the finality of human action not only in the meaning of *finis operantis* but also in the meaning of *finis operis*.

But after all Sturzo is neither a normativist, nor a relationist, nor a functionalist. He is first of all a psychologizing sociologist. Interesting similarities could be found between him and Russian subjectivism, a school of sociology silenced and probably killed by the Communist suppression of all non-conformist thought. One could find also affinities between Sturzo and Cooley, perhaps also Lester Ward. But he differs entirely from such psychologizing sociologists as G. Tarde, W. I. Thomas, Max Weber, Pareto or Talcott Parsons.

Syntheses, according to Sturzo, integrate men not only within social groups but, by mechanisms only briefly explored by him, bring about the coalescence of smaller social groups into larger social units. A majestic pyramid is thus built, beginning with small functional groups and



their multi-level syntheses, going through "total societies" (a term approximately corresponding to all-inclusive societies like the nation-state) and culminating in civilizations binding such societies together in different manners, but in the final account on the basis of religious affinity. This last idea was recently rediscovered by Arnold Toynbee in volumes VIII and IX of his *Study of History*;<sup>9</sup> in his earlier series<sup>10</sup> "universal religions" had been treated as products of the breakdown of a civilization. Sturzo emphatically denies the existence of a society corresponding to humanity, because humanity as such is not unified by a specific collective consciousness.

#### SOCIAL DYNAMICS

Such is Sturzo's morphology. Much more important, for Sturzo, is social dynamics. In Sturzo's words, in addition to the structural dimension, societies possess a processual, or temporal, or dynamic dimension. This means that society as given in immediate experience cannot be understood as something stable; like everything around ourselves, it is in constant flux, the present tense being only a spark between the past and the future. Many elements of the past disappear without a trace; other ones do not and are instrumental in the structuring of the present. Sturzo never offers a survey of the surviving elements, but uses examples distributed among all the realms of culture—material, ideational, esthetic and behavioral.

On the other hand, the future, or more exactly, the anticipation of the future, affects the present. Man has an irresistible urge to act and to achieve, in order that the future be better than the present. Moreover, man has to act and does act to preserve "the conquests" already made, in other words, to prevent the deterioration of the *status quo*.

The moving spring of social dynamics is rationality, one of the key concepts in Sturzian sociology. He has so much to say about rationality that, to give full value to his statements and at the same time prevent the semblance of inconsistency (of which there is none), one must distinguish in it three levels. There is, first, inner or personal rationality which appears as a human faculty or capability. The second level is historical or social rationality which is tantamount to what is rational or deemed rational here and now and is correlated with the associative aspect of human consciousness. The third level, pure or absolute rationality, is the limit to which men strive without ever being able to attain it. The terminology is not Sturzian, but the distinctions are clearly expressed in his work.

Sturzo's general view on the trend of social dynamics may be called

<sup>9</sup> *The Study of History*, Vols. 8 and 9, London: Oxford University Press, 1954.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, Vols. 1-6, New York: Oxford University Press, 1947.

moderate progressivism. In general, though with periods of stagnation and setbacks, man is improving his environment, physical and social. A comparison of man in the earliest stages of his history on earth (so far as we can reconstruct it) and man as he is today is rightly used by Sturzo as the decisive argument. Sturzo's cautious and qualified progressivism is in full agreement with the partial, but conspicuous revival of social evolutionism in our day.

#### A SOCIOLOGICAL TRIAD

Sturzo's social dynamics is tantamount to the unfolding of the idea that society has a temporal dimension just as his morphology is the unfolding of the idea that it has a structural dimension. In discussing the temporal dimension, Sturzo succeeds in unifying "the total social phenomenon" (a term he does not use). To the three tenses which show up when the temporal dimension is considered, there corresponds the triad culture (again the term is not Sturzian), social organization (or men's organized coexistence at any particular time, more especially in the present), and social ends and ideals. And just as the historical process is the synthesis of past and future in the present, human coexistence in organization is a synthesis of the elements relegated by the past (culture) with elements pointing to the future (social ideals and ends). The three elements of the sociological triad are innerly united, since all are immediately given in human consciousness which is "individual-social" acting nowhere but in the individuals and still by far transcending the potency of the particular individuals. Sturzo never juxtaposed his statements in the manner just offered; but I firmly believe that the reasoning above can be logically derived from his discussion of the temporal dimension of society and social dynamics. I believe also that Sturzo has given us one of the most penetrating and impressive views on the total social phenomenon ever offered.

Moreover, this particular aspect of Sturzo's sociological theory complies with an important desideratum addressed to any theory, namely its ability to direct and fructify research. From what has just been said, it appears that in addition to the two partial theories forming the central core of sociology, one of culture and another of social organization (system), a third should be unfolded, a theory of social finality. For its development we already possess these elements: 1) the theory of invention centered around the phenomenon called "creative act"; 2) the underdeveloped theory of social ideals, started by Durkheim, but never systematically treated; and 3) the functional theory which, in its existing form, is separated by a chasm from the theory of subjective ends, but receives a more satisfactory treatment in Sturzo's sociology. To this point we will return toward the end of this paper. Let us conclude this

survey by saying that the tentative theory of social finality should, if possible, take over the place of "personality" in the great sociological triad, personality as such being obviously a predominantly psychological problem.

## II

### CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

The summary just offered was a necessary preliminary step introducing us into the main topic of this paper, Don Luigi Sturzo's contributions to sociological theory. What follows will cover only a few of the salient points singled out in the summary; a complete discussion would require much more time and space than available.

### SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

Individual-social consciousness is one of the key concepts in Sturzo's sociology. It is the starting point of his theory about the relationship of society and the individual according to which both, taken in isolation, are mere abstractions, so that society and the individuals are merely two views on the same reality, in the image of the convex and concave sides of a lens. It is noteworthy that these ideas appeared in Sturzo's mind rather late and were first expressed in his *Essai de Sociologie*,<sup>11</sup> while earlier, in *International Community*, he said: "Every human society is nothing than a relationship between individuals, in some way grouped together."<sup>12</sup> Later on, Sturzo came to the conclusion that an analysis of society in terms of relations was superficial, as seen from his criticism of a passage in MacIver's *Society*. To reach a real understanding of society, one must dig deeper; then, one finds individual-social consciousness which is an irreducible phenomenon.

Since then, Sturzo never changed his mind. His insistence on individual-social consciousness is rather amazing since, for him, Durkheim with his collective consciousness was scientific enemy No. 1. Of course, the meaning of social consciousness in Sturzo's work is quite different as compared with Durkheim's interpretation: in Sturzo's work, social consciousness never appears alone, but is always tied with individual consciousness. Sturzo boldly unfolded his theory in days when the concept of "group mind" (a variety of collective mind, or collective consciousness) was on the decline toward eventual oblivion. It is true that, three years after the publication of Sturzo's *Essai*, G. Gurvitch, another outstanding sociologist of our day, in a work entitled exactly as that of Sturzo,<sup>13</sup> took collective consciousness under his protection and since then has continued to use the concept which, though in a somewhat

<sup>11</sup> *Essai de Sociologie*, 1935.

<sup>12</sup> *International Community and the Right to War*, 1930, p. 23.

<sup>13</sup> G. Gurvitch, *Essai de Sociologie*, Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1938.

weaker form, appears in the latest of his books, *Determinismes sociaux*.<sup>14</sup> Again, the meaning of collective consciousness in Gurvitch's work is at variance with the Sturzian concept. For Gurvitch, collective consciousness is the deepest layer of all social phenomena; it is opposed not only to individual consciousness, but also to that inter-personal consciousness which is achieved through symbolic communication; positively, it appears as a fusion of minds through intuition independent of symbols.

The quintessence of Sturzo's doctrine on individual-social consciousness has already been reported. At this place, an attempt will be made to show that, in somewhat modified form and couched in modified terms, the doctrine could greatly contribute to the solution of the difficult problem of the reality of social groups. Despite all differences in terminology and emphasis, many authors agree that the reality of a social group is immediately given and experienced in human interactions. But then the problem arises: what happens when interaction is discontinued? Does the group cease altogether to exist? Or is its existence intermittent, flashing on and off like a traffic light? Does a family, for instance, cease to exist when all its members are asleep, or is a college non-existent when the students and faculty are off the campus during vacations?

The questions answer themselves. Clearly we must look beyond interaction to something that endures even when group members are not interacting. What remains are attitudes, i.e., learned tendencies to behave in specified ways under specified conditions, and values, i.e., the relatively stable objects of orientation of the attitudes. At this place, only attitudes will be considered; we will return to values in a later section of this paper. Attitudes are relatively stable bio-psychic phenomena while interactions, by necessity, are intermittent since at any given moment man can carry out only a limited number of actions (*ergo*, interactions).

The relative stability of attitudes is almost self-evident on the psychic level: when man acquires an attitude, an infinitesimal change takes place in his psychic dispositions. Recent advances in the knowledge of brain physiology point in the same direction. According to Dr. W. Penfield, a leading authority on the subject, a mechanism seems to exist which permanently records the stream of consciousness, preserves it in detail and, under certain conditions, especially if similar impressions are repeated, plays the record at a later time in a manner analogous to the replaying of a wire or tape recorder.<sup>15</sup> It is noteworthy that a specialist in brain physiology uses the term "stream of consciousness" which so

<sup>14</sup> G. Gurvitch, *Determinismes Sociaux*, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1955.

<sup>15</sup> Communication at a meeting of the National Academy of Science, Nov. 1957; cf. *New York Times*, Nov. 19, p. 38 and Nov. 24, section 4, p. 11.

many sociologists try to discard. It is obvious that the mechanism of recording is the foundation upon which stable behavior tendencies can be built. As shown above these anticipatory adjustments of body and mind—i.e., the attitudes, are not intermittent; the group member is ready to act according to the direction of his attitude until he changes it or loses it.

The continuous reality of the social group is founded, then, not upon intermittent interaction, but upon the lasting possession by its members of interrelated attitudes which initiate, under specific situations, interactions that are appropriate to membership in a particular group.

Attitudes bring us closer to the understanding of the reality of social groups than do interactions. Still more understanding can be reached if we apply to the theory of attitudes, especially of interrelated attitudes, some propositions appearing in Sturzo's doctrine on individual-social consciousness.

First of all, attitudes, as bio-psychic phenomena, can be predicated only of individuals: here is individual X and these are his attitudes; there is individual Y and those are his attitudes, maybe similar or even identical with those of A, but nevertheless attitudes of Y.

Second, the attitudes of the individual can be divided into self-oriented (corresponding to the individual component of consciousness in Sturzo's terminology) and other-oriented (corresponding to the associative component); among that second class of attitudes perhaps a subclass of group-oriented attitudes could be formed. The other-oriented attitudes are most specifically expressed in the sentiment of belonging together (the "we-feeling").

Third, these other-oriented attitudes are by necessity externalized and communicated; in other words, they pass from one stream of consciousness to another. This passage is multiform, simultaneous and continuous.

Fourth, the result is actual convergence of ideas, sentiments and values. A compound is thus formed which Sturzo calls collective consciousness and for which other sociologists have no generic term; relative to larger groups (especially ethnic groups and their divisions and subdivisions) we apply the terms culture and subculture; but we lack any term to designate the concretization of culture on the level of functional groups, such as the family, the school, the parish, the business corporation, the State, etc. The Gluecks, in *Unravelling Juvenile Delinquency*, speak of "culture under the roof"<sup>16</sup> to designate the specific content of inter-mental processes crystallized in each particular family; the expression is however cumbersome. But there is, in contemporary

<sup>16</sup> Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency*, New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1950, pp. 115-16.

sociology, a definite inclination to use the term "institution" to designate the patterns of behavior prevailing in such groups; sometimes one speaks of "institutionalized behavior" without defining precisely what is an institution. Because of the lack of a more appropriate term, let us use the term institution to connote the elements of a culture concretized in the life of a functional group.

Fifth, forming a compound, the converging other-oriented attitudes do not cease to be parts of the streams of consciousness of the individuals forming the group. They preserve their bio-physic reality and also the double nature predicated by Sturzo of individual-social consciousness. This is only a sketch of a theory of attitudes yet to be unfolded on the foundation of Sturzian ideas. The enterprise seems to be very promising.

Should we, therefore, recommend the use not only of the Sturzian doctrine of individual-social consciousness, but also of the very term? Perhaps not. After the publication of Sturzo's *Essai* and the earlier works of Gurvitch, a great though peaceful revolution has taken place in sociology and cultural anthropology. Since that revolution, it has become the common opinion that what unites men in society is not the identity or similarity of their *states of consciousness*, but the identity of the *patterns* of thinking, feeling and acting. These patterns are engendered by interacting men, in a manner predicated by Sturzo of the genesis of individual-social consciousness, and then, through externalization and socialization, are internalized by the individual group members, become part of their personality and work not from without, but from within, a proposition to which Sturzo probably would subscribe. We could perhaps abandon the awkward term pattern, and, following Sorokin, replace it by the term norm which better than pattern conveys the idea of the oughtness of conforming conduct. These norms are embodied in the attitudes and interactions of the individuals forming a specified society, large or small, and therefore are real. Since attitudes and norms are items in the streams of consciousness, one sees that, although the Sturzian terminology could be modified, the quintessence of his thought about the reality of social groups could and should be maintained and elaborated.

#### STURZO AND NEO-SYSTEMATIC SOCIOLOGY

In the preceding discussion the term, group, has been used and that of system avoided, because Sturzo has explicitly rejected the few specimens of neo-systematic sociology with which he was familiar. The next problem to be discussed will, however, be this one: is there in neo-systematic sociology anything really incompatible with the Sturzian thought system and, if there is not, could not Sturzo's sociology bring about some refinement in the neo-systematic theory of society?



Is this however not a preposterous idea? Sturzo studied Pareto, the spiritual father of the trend, but nowhere in his work does he even mention Pareto's famous theorem that society is a system in dynamic equilibrium. He met a modality of the neo-systematic approach to sociology in the work of Hauriou, one of the French institutionalists and bluntly rejected it because it superimposes society on the individuals as something distinct from them.

There is however in Sturzo's work a passage which, when carefully explored, suggests the idea that Sturzo could have easily and profitably incorporated the notion of system and all that it implies. In *Spiritual Problems* he states: "Our knowledge turns upon reality. . . . But to know is nothing but to systematize. There can be no knowledge of a fact or datum that cannot be brought into a system. . . . Only through finding place in a system does a fact or datum become knowledge."<sup>17</sup>

Had Sturzo spoken of ideas (for example, those forming the Platonic or Hegelian philosophy), this would have been inconsequential. But he speaks of knowledge of facts and does not exclude social facts. He asserts that to be realistic knowledge of facts must be systematic, or else there is no knowledge. In other words, knowledge must be expressed in terms of concepts and these concepts must form a system.

At this place one may introduce an auxiliary proposition, namely: concepts representing elements of reality (and Sturzo is emphatically a realist, abhorring ideas void of referents in reality) may form a system only if the segments of reality themselves have a systematic structure, i.e., form wholes consisting of interdependent parts. This postulate is the very foundation of the whole procedure of scientific conceptualization: facts are conceptualized according to their nature; the concepts are submitted to logical operations such as comparison, classification, induction, deduction, synthesis and so on. The final result is more or less explicitly reconverted to the level of reality (or of referents). In other words, what has been found to be true by manipulating concepts is asserted to be true of reality. Whether this is or is not the case, can and must be verified by confronting theoretical results with facts. What interests us at this place is the proposition: if concepts derived from facts can be submitted to systematic synthesis (and this is what Sturzo means in the quotation above), the segment of reality under study has systematic structure.

In asserting that a plurality of objects forms a system, one does not necessarily postulate a reality standing apart from that of the particular objects. The systematic sociologist asserts only that reality under study is one of a whole consisting of interdependent parts. We can speak, in systematic terms, of a mechanical system, e.g., of an automobile or of

<sup>17</sup> *Spiritual Problems of Our Time*, 1945, p. 9.

celestial bodies. Thereby we do not assert that we have discovered two realities: one of a car and another tantamount to the sum total of the parts, say, the wheels, the motor, the carburetor and so forth; or one consisting of the central body, the planets and their satellites, and another corresponding to the whole. We assert only that the structure of reality under study is such that it consists of individual parts plus their relations making out of them a whole.

The same is true of the systematic view of organism or society. A systematic sociologist does not discover a substance different from, and superior to, the individuals. He asserts only that the segment of reality chosen for observation and analysis has a systematic structure. The reality of a system differs from the reality of the parts taken one by one in that the former covers not only the reality of the parts but also their relations, without hypostasizing or reifying them.

Sturzo's adverse attitude to neo-systematic sociology seems to be based on the opposite assumption, namely on the assumption that it ascribes to the systems (wholes) a reality independent of the parts. This is however not verified by the writings of the majority of neo-systematists.

Systematic structure is structure of so high a level that the relationships between the elements may be most diversified, except the trait contained in the definition, namely that the parts observable in a segment of reality chosen for exploration are interrelated or interdependent. In what this interdependence consists insofar as we are concerned with social systems, is a problem which has not yet found a commonly accepted solution. Here again Sturzian ideas could help. Before unfolding some tentative ideas on the subject, let me state that Sturzo's rejection of the two specimens of that sociology with which he was familiar could be interpreted just as the rejection of the particular specimens. Hauriou's views<sup>18</sup> based on Platonic idealism could not appeal to Sturzo because they belong to the "idealistic sociology" which he hated; and MacIver's position<sup>19</sup> was in the style of relationism, an approach to the basic concepts of sociology tried by Sturzo in *International Community*, but later on rejected in favor of moderate normativism combined with a psychologizing approach. He never had the opportunity to formulate his opinion about later, and more typical specimens of neo-systematic sociology.

In an earlier part of this paper we have discussed the reality of social groups—now we will use the term system—down to the level of norms. Let us dig deeper. The clusters of norms which form culture, subculture,

<sup>18</sup> M. Hauriou, "Theorie de l'institution a de la Foundation," *Cahiers de la Nouvelle Journée*, No. 4 (1925).

<sup>19</sup> R. MacIver, *Society, Its Structure and Changes*, New York: R. Long and R. R. Smith, Inc., 1933, p. 9.



institution, may emerge and endure only on the foundation of definite bonds between group members. The bonds are obviously mental; they are in the minds of the individual members and of outside observers and are tantamount to the awareness and feeling of the individuals of belonging to others accompanied by the awareness and feeling of the fact that others somehow belong to them. The content of the awareness varies depending on the type of social groups (social forms, in Sturzian terminology). The bond may be marital, or of filiation, or of selective affinity as in friendship groups, of cultural affinity as in ethnic groups, of functional affinity as in economic organizations, schools, and elsewhere, and even of compulsion as is partly so in the State. The feeling is, however, always the same; it is well expressed in the term "we-feeling" differentiating real social groups (systems) from nominal groups or categories. What is subject to variation is its intensity, depending on the type of group and on the personality type of the individuals involved.

If we accept the statements above, we may accomplish a task to which great importance was ascribed by the late Italian master: in place of abstract schemes or perhaps behind these schemes, we perceive living and tangible reality.

But why should we insist on the combination of Sturzian with neo-systematic sociology? Because the advantages of a systematic view of sociology are great. It is instrumental in the unification of sociological knowledge which suffers badly from being scattered, i.e., appearing in unrelated terms. The sociological specialties of which Sturzo is somewhat skeptical may receive full meaning only through systematic synthesis.

There is another, still greater advantage of a systematic treatment of sociology invigorated by the infusion of some Sturzian ideas. If the reasoning above is accepted, culture appears to possess the same kind of reality as the social system: the converging attitudes of group members are manifested both in the identity or similarity of shared norms, and in durably recurring specified interaction. Thus the reality of culture is shown to be of the same kind as the reality of a social system, and the basic triad of modern sociology—society, culture, personality—appears to be homogeneous, whereas in the view of many sociologists and cultural anthropologists culture is an abstraction, a mental construct which obviously cannot form a system together with the concrete social system and the real personality.

As has been mentioned in an earlier part of this paper, the inner structure of the great triad is illuminated by another phase of Sturzian sociology, discussed *apropos* of his theory of the temporal dimension of society. According to Sturzo, social organization, manifested in the existence and operation of social systems, may be conceived as a synthesis of culture, as a legacy of the past, and of man's irresistible urge to act

in view of a better future. This urge is an actualization of the creative capacity of the individuals which concept corresponds to one of the phases of Sturzian rationality. A complete integration of systematic sociology can be thus achieved.

#### RATIONALITY

Let us now shift to Sturzo's doctrine on rationality, one more key concept in his sociology. As has been explained, above, the term rationality, with which Sturzo never was satisfied, connotes three things: on the personal level, a human capacity to distinguish good and evil, true and false, and an inclination to act under the impact of this distinction; on the social and historical level, rationality is tantamount to what is rational or deemed rational here and now and is correlated with the associative aspect of human consciousness; on the third level, rationality is a limit which men strive to attain without ever being able to do so.

Explanations in terms of human capacities or faculties—this is what Sturzo is doing when speaking of rationality on the personal level—may be understood as a return from the positive (empirical) to the metaphysical stage of knowledge, to use Comte's terminology. Sorokin vigorously attacks such explanations.<sup>20</sup> According to him, they are tantamount to reasoning in a circle. Observing behavior, we infer the existence of specified capacities which we then plant into man, and finally declare that an action under study is fully explained by reference to the capacity. Sorokin's objection is fully valid when addressed to paired or alternative capacities (instincts) which were prominent in social psychology some 50 years ago; then, for every action there was a verbal explanation in terms of one of the alternatives; but the real question remained unsolved—why has just this, and not the antagonistic capacity been operative in the concrete case? But contemporary sociologists explain actions only by reference to specified but permanent or dominant traits of human beings.<sup>21</sup> Sturzo's rationality in the first meaning is assumed to be a personal trait which is always operative; everyone always strives for something which he assumes to be good (perhaps, only to him). Semi-rationality and pseudo-rationality which Sturzo often mentions pertain to the higher levels of rationality: an action which cannot but be personally rational may be pseudo-rational when objective standards are applied.

What Sturzo explains in terms of rationality, contemporary sociologists interpret in terms of values. The entrance of that concept into

<sup>20</sup> Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, New York: Harper and Bros., 1928, pp. 615, 646.

<sup>21</sup> F. Paul Lazarsfeld, "Problems in Methodology," in Robert Merton, Leonard Broom and Leonard Cottrell Jr., editors, *Sociology Today*, New York: Basic Books, 1959, pp. 39-78.

sociology has been almost surreptitious, but now seems to be generally accepted. One of the contributors to a recent symposium on sociology, W. H. Werkmeister, says: "Explanation and prediction in the social sciences are impossible without reference to the basic value commitments of those involved."<sup>22</sup> Another contributor to the same symposium, A. Edel, acknowledges the fact of the wide use of the value concept and expresses his regret about the turn in sociological theory in these words: "Norms and values may function as a last refuge or surrogate of spirit, in the sense in which the older dualistic philosophers used it as a mode of explanation."<sup>23</sup> He concedes that it is too late to drop the concept of value, a curious statement indeed; in science, it is never too late to correct an error or to discard an erroneous view. His guess about the "last refuge" corroborates my contention that, in building up the value theory, contemporary sociologists try to restate in empiric terms certain truths which Sturzo has discussed under the label of rationality.

Just as in Sturzo's doctrine of rationality, in the contemporary value theory one may discover a trichotomy. There are, first, personal values which we may establish by observation of an individual's predominant, perhaps even constant choices. We may assume that the recurrence of specified choices is a sufficient reason for the assumption that there exists a causal tendency of agents of type X to make, under conditions Y, choices of the type Z. The inference may not be fully warranted but still possesses a reasonable degree of probability (plausibility). Logically it is then permissible to assume that it belongs to the nature of type X to effect Z; the particular aspects of the nature of X are however his traits whether properties or faculties.

That constant causal tendency located in the individual may be defined as the capacity and inclination to make choices according to more or less stable criteria which may be utilitarian, logical, ethical or esthetic. This is the trait called personal or inner rationality in Sturzo's work. In contemporary sociology the trait remains nameless while the products of the trait are called values.

Personal traits or capacities interest a sociologist only if they more or less consistently recur in individuals forming social groups. On the basis of observation and comparison of the value systems of individuals we are able to establish social values, in the sense of their prevalence in the choices made by the group members. Repeating the reasoning above, we may ascribe to the social group, as a system, the capacity or

<sup>22</sup> W. H. Werkmeister, "Theory Construction and the Problem of Objectivity," in Lleylyn Gross, editor, *Symposium on Sociological Theory*, Evanston: Rowe, Peterson and Co., 1958, p. 499.

<sup>23</sup> A. Edel, "The Concept of Levels in Social Theory," in Lleylyn Gross, editor, *Symposium on Sociological Theory*, Evanston: Row, Peterson and Co., 1958, p. 191.

trait to direct toward uniformity the development of personal value systems. The content of socially and culturally conditioned criteria of choice may be identified with the sum total of behavior patterns which, here and now, are considered most adequate, again, from the utilitarian, logical, ethical or esthetic points of view. Here we meet Sturzo's rationality on the historical or social level.

Since the operation of selection and comparison may be repeated on several levels, social values on different levels could be formulated. Again, the systems of social values can be compared. When comparison is carried out on the highest level involving states, ethnic groups, even civilizations (in Toynbee's and Sturzo's meaning of the term) we find a few common elements, mainly among logical and ethical criteria. The values thus selected can be called human values. The concept partly corresponds to Sturzo's absolute rationality. On the purely empiric level, the counterpart to Sturzo's absolute rationality would be the postulate of a hard-core value system the gradual acceptance of which by men is a functional prerequisite of tolerable conditions of life in society. More concrete statements on the subject can be found in Sorokin's<sup>24</sup> and Redfield's<sup>25</sup> works.

Contemporary sociology will hardly accept Sturzo's terminology; the concept of value is here to stay. But a very important idea could and should be borrowed from the Sturzian doctrine on rationality, namely the dynamic aspect of what Sturzo calls rationality, at least on the personal and social levels. As has been already stated, no ready terminology is available. Tentatively we could speak of the value producing trait of individuals and of the value unifying trait of social groups. Since these traits are dynamic, their products, the values, must be dynamic also. Modern sociology often emphasizes "changing values" but in general is unaware of the fact that values as such are urges to action and consequently to change, statements reducible to Sturzo's doctrine on rationality. In this way, an important link between the theory of values and the theory of sociocultural change could be established.

#### SOCIAL FINALISM

To conclude this survey of those among Sturzo's contributions which may open new perspectives in the development of sociological theory, let me emphasize some aspects of his "social finalism." Of course, the theory of rationality belongs hereto, but does not exhaust the subject.

First of all, let us locate the place of the doctrine of finality in his

<sup>24</sup> Pitirim Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, N.Y.: American Book Co., 1937, Vol. 2, p. 577.

<sup>25</sup> Robert Redfield, "Anthropological Understanding of Man," *Anthropological Quarterly*, 12 (1959), pp. 12-13.

remarkably well-integrated sociological theory. The finalistic aspect of society is expressed in the formula: "society is organico-finalistic." The first attribute mentioned in this formula points to the fact that society is essentially organized—Sturzo uses the term organization in a rather broad meaning and does not distinguish between organized and unorganized groups. What is denoted as organization in a formula appearing in an earlier work, *The Inner Laws*,<sup>26</sup> appears in one of the last works of the master as society's structural dimension juxtaposed with the temporal dimension. Consequently, society is asserted to possess three dimensions: temporal, structural-organizational and finalistic. If, considering the temporal dimension, we concentrate on the past, or more exactly, on the impact of the past on the present and, through it, on the future, we encounter culture. The triad: culture, organization, and finalism (i.e., ends and ideals) reappears once again; as we know, this is the triad into which, according to my interpretation of Sturzo's theory, the total social phenomenon may be analyzed *prima facie*. Consequently, the study of social finalism must form one of the main divisions of sociological theory.

Initially, finalism appears in Sturzo's work in a form similar to the means-ends scheme of many earlier authors. Sturzo's statements can be summarized as follows. The social forms (groups) do not appear as aimless systems of motion, in our case of human activities. They are permeated by finalism since they are instrumental for the attainment of human ends. In them individual finalism becomes social finalism. The particular types of social forms correspond to the main types of human ends to be achieved; this correspondence is the *raison d'être* of any social form although in practice there may be discrepancies.

As a consequence of his sociological synthetism, Sturzo does not assume that the special forms would arise by inner necessity ingrained in the forms themselves; they are created by men more or less aware of their utility for the attainment of their ends. Therefore, Sturzo is enabled to say that originally the social forms appear as ends of human activities (*finis operantis*). But starting with finality as orientation of actions to the goals pursued by the actors, Sturzo penetrates deeper in the functional performance of social groups into the meaning of *finis operis*, i.e., the objective contributions of specific groups to the survival and well-being of society. Here are a few examples:

"The fundamental requirements of human nature are the preservation and development of the individual and species. This postulates social life as necessary and coexisting with individual life from the time of the first appearance of human life on earth. . . . Whenever a social form exists, there is, of intrinsic necessity, a function of order and de-

<sup>26</sup> Sturzo, *The Inner Laws*, New York: P. J. Kenedy and Sons, 1944.

fense. . . . Liberty and authority are necessary and therefore original elements of social life"; Sturzo calls their copresence "a law of necessity."

These statements are in the style of modern functionalism which, at the time of Sturzo's writing, was only beginning its triumphal march. But there is a great difference. Modern functionalism is inclined to impose a taboo on the reduction of objective functions of a group to the subjective ends pursued by the members. For Sturzo, subjective ends are projected on the social plane in the same way and meaning as other elements of individual-social consciousness are. In this way, individual finality becomes social finality which is not independent of, or imposed on, individuals in pursuit of their ends; social ends are interrelated and shared ends of individuals forming a society. We could speak of a complex composition of forces the individual bearers of which are often unaware of the resultant of the composition and still more frequently do not care for it.

Sturzo does not offer any definite methodology for the reduction of objective functions to subjective ends—but poses an important problem to be investigated. A partial answer can perhaps be found in R. Merton's distinction of manifest and latent functions.<sup>27</sup> A hint in that direction is made in the following statement of Sturzo. Once arisen, "the social forms (groups) are consolidated in ever closer correspondence to human needs, organized as more or less permanent means for the attainment of further ends and transformed if they are not adapted to changing conditions of human activities."<sup>28</sup>

It should be noted that Sturzo's ideas on the relationship between subjective ends and group functions could not be interpreted as the return to the doctrine of the utilitarians already denounced by Durkheim in 1895.<sup>29</sup> That doctrine was satisfied to make evident the utility of an activity or institution and took for granted that such a demonstration was tantamount to the discovery of the cause of the very existence of the phenomena under investigation. Sturzo is too well aware of semi-rationality, pseudo-rationality or even irrationality in human conduct to fall into this error.

Summing up, we can say: Sturzo invites us to resolve an objective function into a composition of forces represented by a multitude of activities each of which may be interpreted according to the scheme of individual means and ends. Whenever we do so, we are on the level of meaningful interpretation, of Max Weber's *verstehen*.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>27</sup> "Manifest and Latent Functions," in *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Glencoe: Free Press, 1957, pp. 19-84.

<sup>28</sup> Sturzo, *The Inner Laws*, p. 25.

<sup>29</sup> Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Trans. Solvay and Mueller; George Callin, editor, Glencoe: Free Press, 1950, pp. 89-97.

<sup>30</sup> Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, Trans. A. M.



Recently, Karl Mannheim<sup>31</sup> has suggested that the functional approach could replace the Weberian *verstehen*. Sturzo's work allows us to offer another, more satisfactory solution because he discusses social phenomena from three points of view: 1) causality (rather probability, since his sociological laws are "flexible"); 2) the meaning of human actions in society for the actors (*finis operantis*, Weberian *verstehen*) and 3) the significance of human actions in society for the survival and development of the latter (*finis operis*).

#### CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I would like to say that a survey of Sturzo's sociological theory and the confrontation of some parts of the theory with modern sociological thought allows one to contend that he has made important contributions to sociological theory on the highest level. He has masterfully unfolded that particularly difficult approach to the understanding of society which has been here called sociological synthetism or harmonism. His theory of individual-social consciousness was an anticipation of the modern theory of culture as one of the elements of the triad; in that regard, his theory about the temporal dimension of society is of highest importance. His theory of rationality was an anticipation of the later development of the value theory. His presentation of the historical process under the impact of rationality was an anticipation of the revival of moderate evolutionism.

Of course, a fair judgment about the significance of Sturzo's contributions can be made only if they are confronted with the state of sociology in the middle thirties when his meditations were objectified in *Essai de Sociologie*. But even if one compares Sturzo's masterwork in sociology with the state of sociology today, the judgment should not be that it is obsolete and superseded by more recent theories. As has been shown in this paper, some of Sturzo's contributions may be appraised as anticipations of many recent and important developments in sociology and as indicators of ways of their further refinement and integration.

Nevertheless, it is hard to expect that a new, Sturzian, school of sociology would ever emerge. Our time is no longer propitious to the formation of new schools. The present and the immediate future belong to a movement of convergence in sociological theory. The admirers of Sturzo's work should not stay apart. They should join the mainstream and, by their contributions, prove that it is worth while to know and to use the ideas of the great Italian master. Thus they could perhaps con-

Henderson and T. Parsons, New York: Oxford University Press, 1947, pp. 89-112.

<sup>31</sup> *Essay on the Sociology of Culture*, New York: Oxford Press, 1956, pp. 75-77, pp. 75-77.

vert some of those who are not satisfied with the superficial propositions so abundant in sociology which often offer more information than knowledge and understanding.

Recently, in a thoughtful paper,<sup>32</sup> John Donovan has expressed the idea that modern sociology is split between two trends, the natural science trend and the humanistic. Of course, the difference is only in emphasis; both recognize the necessity of understanding social phenomena on the levels both of causality and meaning. Sturzo's work is one of the noblest and most brilliant contributions to humanistic sociology. The great master is dead; but his legacy could and should inspire many among the younger generation of sociologists to formulate a really humanistic theory of society incorporating the progress made in our science during the past two decades.

## Discussion of Timasheff's Paper

Robert MacIver

Columbia University

At the outset I would congratulate Dr. Timasheff on the balanced and comprehensive account he offers of Don Sturzo's work. Dr. Timasheff makes his points with fine perception and his comments are not only illuminatory of Sturzo's positions but also unflinchingly expose the problems that at points may trouble the reader of Sturzo.

I have myself always had a feeling of congeniality with the work of Don Sturzo, and at one time we exchanged some very pleasant letters on certain agreements and differences between us. He liked an early work of mine, I think largely because of its proposition that sociality and individuality develop *pari passu*, and he was able to interpret that viewpoint in a way that met some of the difficulties it encounters. Our disagreements seemed to me, anyway, to be quite secondary and they certainly did not lessen my admiration for Don Sturzo's work.

One aspect of his approach that especially appeals to me is the broad perspective in which Sturzo views the data and the problems of sociology. His stress on the individual as the agent in the creation and operation of institutions and organizations repudiates the confusions created by resorting to the misleading analogies of the "social mind" and the "social organism" doctrines. From this premise he is able to harmonize the importance he attributes to social conditioning as the basis of social

<sup>32</sup> John Donovan, "New Directions In Sociology," *American Catholic Sociological Review*, 20 (Spring, 1959), pp. 2-14.



unity with the postulate of non-determinism, viz., that there still remain open significant alternatives for individual choice.

One aspect of his approach that especially appeals to me is the broad perspective in which Sturzo views the data and the problems of sociology. His stress on the individual as the agent in the creation and operation of institutions and organizations repudiates the confusions created by resorting to the misleading analogies of the "social mind" and the "social organism" doctrines. From this premise he is able to harmonize the importance he attributes to social conditioning as the basis of social unity with the postulate of non-determinism, viz., that there still remain open significant alternatives for individual choice.

I feel Don Sturzo would have received more adequate recognition but for his tendency to lay down some maxims which antagonized various groups of readers, but which, nevertheless, do not affect the actual course of his sociological arguments or the conclusion to which they lead. The most imposing of these maxims is that sociology must be studied "in the light of the contribution of the supernatural," while he accepts as a datum that the supernatural "does not exist in nature and cannot be proved by reason." In its sociological import, Sturzo meant no more than that the part played by religion and religious authority in the social process is very significant—a proposition that no unbiased thinker would reject.

Nevertheless the logic of his initial dictum beguiled Sturzo into an occasional concession that is at odds with the tenor of his sociological teachings. A salient example is his apparent denial of the possibility of a general sociology. Sturzo's insistence on the concrete, his sense of society as a changing and timebound system based on the activities of conditioned individuals, very properly led him to stress the distinctiveness of every particular civilization and, indeed, of every phase of that civilization. But distinctiveness does not imply the absence of common or universal characters any more than the distinction of species is the denial of a common genus. So while, on the one hand, Sturzo negated the possibility of a general sociology, on the other, as Dr. Timasheff points out, he himself has offered a system of general sociology.

I attribute this contradiction mainly to the influence of his primary dictum: Western society is Christian in origin; other societies have different creeds. Therein lies, for Sturzo, the paramountcy of the difference between the societies, as though no primary principles of social behavior were common to them. Each is *sui generis*. The excessive relativity of this position is, in my judgment, in conflict with the role assigned to reason by Sturzo. If reason pervades human society to any degree, then surely to that degree a social universal also exists.

Sturzo's sociological contribution is many-sided, but has scarcely

entered into the stream of sociological thought. Aside from an appreciative study by Monsignor Paul Hanley Furfey which, nevertheless, recognizes the primary difficulty I have been discussing, and the favorable comments of a few other sociologists, he has been ignored as unimportant. As I have suggested, Sturzo himself has made it more difficult for sociologists in general to appreciate the scale of his contribution; his polemical attitude towards other sociologists whose views were akin to his own was no doubt also responsible. He was an effective critic but, as Dr. Timasheff points out, overinclined to consider other theories only in their more extreme interpretations. His own somewhat confusing views of certain conceptions, such as abstractionism, further help to give the reader an inadequate sense of the breadth of his sociological teaching. If he had been less concerned with the labels on the packages, the contents would have been valued more highly. There is an inner consistency based on clear insight in the specific formulations that constitute the intrinsic body of his sociological thought.

## Discussion of Timasheff's Paper

*Victor Gioscia*

Fordham University

A. N. Whitehead points out in *Science and the Modern World* that all observation is selection. This raises the question: "From the total social-historical world of immediate experience, what criteria are selected and what data are chosen for confrontation with similarly selected and chosen hypotheses?" In the context of this study, the question becomes: "Has Timasheff chosen and selected the same criteria as Sturzo in his edition and systematization of Sturzo's sociology?" The question includes but transcends differences in basic imagery since it involves what sociologists of knowledge call "cognitive orientations." If there were some differences in cognitive orientation, it follows that these might be sought out as measuring instruments to help evaluate Sturzo's contribution to our theoretic capital.

When Timasheff separates a portion of Sturzo's thought, systematizing Sturzo's statements, may he yet claim to have "found . . . not a dissected corpse but a self-contained and beautiful structure," when Sturzo "denied the possibility of a sociology beneath the total social phenomenon?" Timasheff himself points out that such an attempt is ". . . obviously incompatible with Sturzo's intentions" since "for Sturzo, soci-

ology is the science of society in its totality as given in immediate experience, not yet analyzed into sectors. . . ."

The question then becomes, not whether one theorist may legitimately restrict himself to a small portion of another's vision, but whether the theorist who so restricts himself does not necessarily transmute his material into a foreign substance, so that there arise not only differences, but misinterpretations, and possibly, even misrepresentations.

Cognitive orientations are particularly intangible variables which in addition to their intangibility are characterized by generality of scope and content, making them difficult not only to work with but to communicate effectively. Yet a theory invests each of its special terms with its whole meaning, much as a language requires an accent, so that, when measuring theories, the variables to be observed are their terms, just as when measuring, let's say, religious bigotry, the variables are particular role-patterns.

I will try to show that Timasheff has looked at Sturzo through the cognitive orientation of a neosystematist, which, while rewarding, should not be regarded as the only vantage point from which this great theory can be appraised, since it involves specific differences which give Timasheff's study a uniqueness and character all its own.

The method employed is simple. A list of Sturzo's central terms was constructed, and the equivalents in Timasheff's language were paired with them. Hypothesizing that the differences in meaning were due to differences in cognitive orientation revealed significant and instructive findings. The following examples should be considered representative but not as exhaustive.

When Sturzo speaks of a "dialectical synthesis of moments," Timasheff speaks of a "coalescence of elements into a compound." Sturzo's terms reveal a certain affinity to the philosophy of Hegel, whereas Timasheff's terms reveal a certain resemblance to the chemistry of Newton. This does not take on its full significance until it is recalled that for Sturzo, philosophy is necessary as an illumination of science, whereas for Timasheff, as for Furfey, philosophy is a metasociological discipline. From Timasheff's perspective, Timasheff's Newtonianism is eposociological; that is, less than sociological. This difference could be described in other terms: one could speak of Irenism and reductionism, or of supra- or sub-scientific thinking. Whatever the terminology, the issue remains: there is a detectable difference in the cognitive orientations of the two theorists, the one illuminated by a specific philosophical point of view, the other on a point of view no less philosophic but much less explicit. For, when Sturzo speaks of syntheses, he is trying to describe how relationships are constitutive, but when Timasheff speaks of coalescence, he implies that the elements so combined do not have an interior necessity

of just this combination and no other. Newtonian elements can be combined in the laboratory in any number of ways, but dialectical moments can only be synthesized with each other.

Similarly, Timasheff will refer to relations as "bonds" which can be added up to a sum total. Thus he can substitute the term "total social phenomenon" for Sturzo's "society in the concrete." Again, this difference is fundamental, since again it implies that relations are not internal and necessarily constitutive, but external and only arithmetically additive. For Sturzo, the term "society in the concrete" bears exactly the opposite meaning, where relations are the very stuff and fabric of a society, not its secondary characteristics. To use other terms, it could be said that for Sturzo, relations are the substance of society: for Timasheff, they are the accidental configurations. Or that for Sturzo, relations are primary; for Timasheff, secondary.

In this context, it becomes predictable that Timasheff will feel that MacIver gives unnecessary precedence to relations, overstressing their importance, as it were. Yet to this writer, MacIver's point of view comes closer to Sturzo's with respect to this emphasis on the internality and fundamentality of relations.

A further demonstration of their different cognitive orientations can be found in Sturzo's use of the term "organism" for which Timasheff substitutes the term "compound." Here again the issue of relation is central. In an organism, each of the so-called "cells" requires the entire organism for its functional continuity, whereas the elements of a compound can readily be disassociated without damage. On the sociological level, this means that for Sturzo, the members of a society require each other for their continued living, such that, were they not present in each other, they could not be. But Timasheff's view implies that were the members not present in each other, they would not be members, but would live on as something else.

Sturzo describes the meaning of his term "rationality" in such a way that it comes to mean the very life of a society. "Society in the concrete" means a society which is concretizing rationality; i.e., a people whose unity is internal to each of its members in such a way that the felt goals and aspirations of the members are not merely shared but require the other members necessarily. As the outgrowth of their mutual reflection on their collective past, and their collective aspiration towards their own particular future, they work toward the achievement of what they believe is good for them; i.e., rational. Their view of what is rational is based on their reflection on their own past and their own future, so that, on the one hand rationality varies with each society to the extent that its experience varies, while, on the other hand, it resembles other societies insofar as their experiences are alike.

But the key aspect to be noted here is the temporal one. The basis of rationality for Sturzo is reflection on past experience in terms of future expectations, and in this way rationality, already described as the life of a society, is now described as processive, or, in process. Here is the central intuition of Sturzo's sociology. Yet it is the most difficult to describe, precisely because it is so central, so basic, and of such sweeping generality.

The notion of process includes what has been said about relations as internal, necessary, and constitutive. It includes not only the temporal relations of past and future, not only relations of experience found in the collective consciousness of the members of a society, but it rests specifically on Sturzo's own reinterpretation of the terms "dialectical synthesis of moments." It is not a philosophical borrowing, nor a meta-sociological dilution, nor an eposociological hybrid. To say the least, it is a new vision of major size, distinctly sociological. Its primary characteristic is the notion of process, which embraces a radical temporalism, more sophisticated by far than the nineteenth century temporalisms of Hegel, Marx, Durkheim, or of Sturzo's own contemporary, Bergson.

It is a new conception of time as the basis of social life which contains the seed of a sociological relativity, the social equivalent of Einstein's magnificent general relativity.

Short of this comprehension, Sturzo's term "historicist" cannot be understood, since historicism means nothing else than the necessity for the sociologist to comprehend society in the concrete, in its time-space, i.e., as an historical process of concretizing rationality in social forms. It means that the understanding of social life must base itself on participating in the actual experience of a society as it unfolds and develops. In the words of Sturzo, "To fulfill its scientific purpose, sociology should carry the study of society in the concrete into the fourth dimension, that of Time."

If my hypothesis is functional, and if the notion of process is central to Sturzo's thought, then the difference between Timasheff and Sturzo should be widest at this point. And so it seems. If Timasheff has presented a study which translates Sturzo's insight and new vision into the established terms of neo-systematism, that theoretical perspective should receive, so to speak, equal time. Unfortunately, I cannot claim to move as easily in that perspective as the dictates of scholarly justice demand. But this much seems obvious: the central intuition of systematism, after Pareto, and neo-systematism, after Timasheff, is unsurprisingly the notion of system. This seems to mean that it is necessary for the theorist to analyze the social phenomena under observation into elements and components, to intellectually separate one portion of reality *at a time*, so that the pieces of the puzzle can best be put back together after they

are understood in isolation. But this methodology, like Newton's, rests on the illusion of simultaneity; that is, it assumes that the other pieces of the puzzle will hold still while one is being examined. This is unfortunately unverifiable. As Reisenberg showed in physics a few years ago, modern science includes the very act of observation in what is observed.

To put the matter differently, neo-systematism assumes that it can study first the structural, or spatial, and then the dynamic, or temporal. It assumes that it may hold first one and then the other constant while varying the other. It is claimed that the separation is "only mental," and that "in reality" the entirety of the system is being studied. But this Newtonian distinction between time and space represents a philosophical assumption that the "natures" of time and space are discrete. It is no longer tenable.

This does not require scientific method to abandon the isolation of variables to permit controlled observation, but it suggests that the least separable aspect of social life is the inexorable flow of time, so that it is no longer feasible, nor practical, nor scientific to hope that time will stand still while we carry out the other aspects of our research design. This necessitates a new approach, not the translation of a new approach into a pre-existing one.

Does this mean that there is no possible rapprochement between neo-systematism and Sturzo's sociology? On the contrary, it seems to me that one of the most fruitful meetings which could conceivably take place in the great hall of modern sociological theory is just such a confrontation. For many, Sturzo's vision will foster the impression of fluidity, flux, and impermanence, while for others, neo-systematism is synonymous with heaviness, meticulous structure, and turgidity. It is my definite belief that neo-systematism can be much widened and deeply enriched by accepting the vision of Sturzo's sociology, which is rich in new approaches and vistas. The contrary seems to be much less promising.

#### CONCLUSION

It seems that there are definite differences in cognitive orientation between Don Sturzo and Professor Timasheff. Sturzo's notion of process is new and bold and contains the seed of a sociological relativity. Timasheff's perspective is somewhat more Newtonian but has a long and honorable history in the traditions of sociological theory. The interpenetration of these two points of view cannot fail to be interesting, and might prove to be a major landmark in the development of human insight.

# The Perception of the Influence of Parental Occupational Prestige

John E. Hughes

University of Notre Dame

*Using a self-administered schedule and a selected sample of 888 high school and college students, it was found that the respondents tended to perceive the value aspect of their father's occupation as an important influence upon their lives. While the interpretation of prestige influences varied with the respondents' backgrounds, the prestige level of their fathers' occupations are seen as generally determining their own original prestige positions and the types of associations they experience. They see their background style of life as a significant source of influence upon their lives and, more important, they perceive their fathers' occupational prestige as providing a profoundly important standard for both the setting of their own occupation objectives and their judgment of their own occupational success or failure.*

Beginning with George S. Counts' pioneering effort in 1925,<sup>1</sup> there have been numerous investigations of the prestige of occupations. Most such research has concerned itself with securing ratings of occupations in an attempt to assess their prestige.<sup>2</sup> Attention has been concentrated upon the development or verification of some prestige ranking of occupations. Very few studies which have gone beyond the description of an occupational prestige structure have explored the perceptions of occupational characteristics which serve as a basis for the imputation of differential value.<sup>3</sup>

\* Revised version of paper read at the Twenty-Second Annual Convention of the American Catholic Sociological Society, Fordham University, New York City, New York, August 31 - September 2, 1960.

<sup>1</sup> George S. Counts, "The Social Order of Occupations," *School Review*, 33 (1925), pp. 16-27.

<sup>2</sup> Since 1925, there have been over fifty published studies of occupational prestige.

<sup>3</sup> The following studies may be mentioned as offering data in this area: W. A. Anderson, "The Occupational Attitudes of College Men," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 5 (1934), pp. 435-465; S. E. Asch, H. Block, and M. Hertzman, "Studies in the Principles of Judgments and Attitudes," *Journal of Psychology*, 5 (1938), pp. 219-251; J. H. S. Bossard, *The Sociology of Child Development*, New York: Harper and Bros., 1954, pp. 275-276; W. S. Mason and N. Gross, "Intra-occupational Prestige Differentiation: The School Superintendency," *American Sociological Review*, 20 (June, 1955), pp. 326-331; L. W. Kay, "The Relation of Personal Frames of Reference to Social Judgments," *Archives of Psychology*, (1943), No. 283; R. R. Kelsey, "Occupational Status," *Peabody*



Over the past several years, the author has been engaged in a study of the perceptions of occupations and their relationship to occupational prestige judgments. The study involved an attempt to discover the prestige levels which college and high school students assign to their fathers' occupations, and to relate this valuation to the prestige levels which they assign to various occupations in our society. Further, an effort was made to discover what variables influence the prestige judgments and what perceptions of occupational characteristics form the basis for the expressed valuations.<sup>4</sup>

Between September 1953 and June 1955, the author and several of his colleagues collected 965 completed schedules of the type described below. Of that number 77 were not used for various reasons. The remaining 888 cases constitute the study population. 524 of the schedules were completed (during the regular classroom period) by students in two large private universities—one in the Middle West and one in the Middle Atlantic Region—while 364 were completed by students in three public high schools in a large midwestern city. The obtained cases do not constitute a "representative" sample of any survey population. They were collected and analyzed on the premise that occupational prestige is a significant general attitude in our society. If this assumption is correct, and this is the general conclusion of the literature of occupational prestige, then such attitudes should be present and observable in any segment of the population. The cases collected, then, constitute a study population whose members differ in various characteristics which are potentially relevant to the perception of occupational prestige.<sup>5</sup>

*Journal of Education*, 32 (1954), pp. 83-89; C. E. Osgood and R. Stagner, "Analysis of a Prestige Framework by a Gradient Technique," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 25 (1941), pp. 275-290; R. B. Stevens, "The Attitudes of College Women Toward Women's Occupations," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 24 (1940), pp. 615-617; M. Young and P. Willmott, "Social Grading by Manual Workers," *British Journal of Sociology*, 7 (1956), pp. 337-345.

<sup>4</sup> See the author's unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, "The Social Valuation of Occupations: A Study of Occupational Prestige" (University of Pennsylvania, 1960).

<sup>5</sup> The background characteristics of the respondents are important, not insofar as they approximate the distribution of such characteristics in the general population, but as characteristics possibly related to differential attitudes. The mean age of the study population was 19.9 years. The age of individual respondents varied from 16 to 36 years, but the great majority—almost 98 percent—were between 16 and 24 years of age. All respondents were white and 198 of the 364 high school students were female. The respondents' home localities were distributed all over the United States, although the majority were from the Middle West and the East. Most were residents of cities although a few did come from small towns and farms. The group of cases covers the whole range of occupational backgrounds, although the proportions obtained do not represent the national distribution and certainly not all occupations were represented. The largest proportion of the respondents—42 percent—were children of Proprietors, Managers and Officials. About 17 percent of their fathers were Professional,

The questionnaire utilized in this research was divided into three sections. The first section presented a series of questions regarding the respondent's background characteristics, the most important of which was his description of his father's occupation. In the second section of the schedule, the respondents were asked to compare their fathers' occupations with each of one hundred occupational categories and to judge whether they considered the presented occupation as higher, the same, or lower in prestige than their fathers' occupations. In the third section of the schedule three "open-ended" questions dealt with the difficulties which respondents experienced in making the required ratings; with the criteria of prestige they employed in making the prestige judgments; and with their perception of the prestige of their fathers' occupations as an influence upon their lives. These questions were inserted in an effort to obtain the respondents' view of the judgment situation—so as to uncover the distinctions they employed as bases for their prestige differentiations. The questions were open-ended so as to allow the respondents to give their own interpretations rather than to force their answers into a pre-determined mould.<sup>6</sup> In the present paper we will present an analysis and interpretation of the responses to the final question of the schedule—"Can you report any way in which the prestige of your father's occupation affected your life?"

#### THE PERCEPTION OF PRESTIGE INFLUENCE

In order to explore the interpretation which the respondents placed upon the value aspect of their fathers' occupations, they were asked to report any way in which their fathers' occupational prestige had influenced their lives. The purpose of this question was twofold. First, a few of the previous studies of occupational prestige and many statements in the general literature have suggested that the value level of the occupation of the individual's father forms an orienting feature of his social life and gives the individual an original prestige identity or status position.<sup>7</sup> The question sought to discover whether the respondents perceived

Technical and Kindred Workers. Seven percent were Sales Workers, while another 7 percent performed some clerical function. Only about one percent were farmers. Six percent of their fathers were Craftsmen, Foremen and Kindred Workers, while almost 14 percent were Operatives and Kindred Workers. Three percent were the children of Service Workers and another three percent the children of Laborers.

<sup>6</sup> It should be emphasized that the conclusions which can be derived from them are necessarily tentative and exploratory. The lack of structure in the questions, while designed to elicit "free" responses, also introduced a degree of incomparability and indefiniteness.

<sup>7</sup> For example, see: Elin Anderson, *We Americans*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937; J. Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*, New York: Harper and Bros., 1937; J. H. S. Bossard, *The Sociology of Child Development*, New

their fathers' occupations in this manner. Secondly, it was of interest to learn the interpretation which is given the term "prestige" when it is placed in a context relative to the respondents' personal lives.

A total of 61.6 percent of the students surveyed were able to describe some influence which the prestige level of their fathers' occupations had had upon their lives. In Table 1, the obtained reports are classified in terms of their dominant emphasis. Also, the frequency with which the different types of influence were reported, relative to the occupation of the respondent's father, is shown.

TABLE 1.  
*Type of Influence of the Prestige of Father's Occupation Reported  
by Respondents from the Various Prestige Backgrounds\**

Type of Influence	Percentage Frequency by Prestige of Father's Occupation				Total Group (N=888)
	Upper (N=231)	Upper Middle (N=286)	Lower Middle (N=244)	Lower (N=127)	
<i>Some Influence Reported:</i> . .	74.0	52.0	65.6	44.9	61.6
Influenced Style of Life	19.9	18.5	28.3	21.3	22.0
Influenced Vocational Goals	21.2	18.5	8.2	16.5	16.1
Influenced Associations	12.1	5.6	21.7	2.4	12.4
Transference of Prestige	20.8	9.4	7.4	4.7	11.1
<i>No Influence Reported:</i>	26.0	48.0	34.4	55.1	38.4
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

\* The prestige background classification employed is based upon a modification of Warner's occupational prestige classification. See: W. L. Warner, M. Meeker and W. Eels, *Social Class in America* (Chicago: Science Research Associates, Inc., 1949), pp. 131-159 and the author's unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, *op. cit.* . . .

Approximately 38 percent of the students were unable to describe any specific influence in this connection. About one-third of these respondents reported that their occupational background undoubtedly had a general influence upon their lives, but they were unable to describe any specific way in which this influence operated. Another one-third reported that they did not believe that the prestige of their father's occupations had had any significant influence upon them. The remainder of these respondents did not answer the question, or simply answered "no."

When the responses were classified in terms of the prestige level of

York: Harper and Bros., 1954; Jerome Davis, "Testing the Social Attitudes of Children in the Government Schools of Russia," *American Journal of Sociology*, 32 (1927), pp. 947-952; Raymond B. Cattell, "The Concept of Social Status," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 15 (1942), pp. 293-308.

the respondent's father's occupation it was immediately obvious that there was a relationship between the reporting of an influence and the prestige level of the father's occupation. Almost three-quarters of the respondents from high prestige backgrounds described some way in which the prestige of their father's occupation had influenced their lives. Fifty-two percent of the students from upper middle backgrounds reported some influence; as did almost two-thirds of those from lower middle backgrounds. About 45 percent of the respondents from low prestige backgrounds reported any such influence.

These results are closely related to the educational level of the respondents. In general, college students were able to report specific influences more readily than high school students. Regardless of educational level, however, there is a definite tendency for respondents from the higher prestige backgrounds to be more perceptive of the influence of occupational prestige. Sons and daughters of "prestigious" fathers seemed more aware of, and more impressed by, their occupational backgrounds and more able and willing to report its influence. On the other hand, respondents from the lower prestige backgrounds exhibited a tendency to describe themselves and their backgrounds as somehow average or "normal." To them, their backgrounds seemed to lack any particular sort of distinction and, hence, to have been relatively unimportant. The influence of positive prestige seems more apparent to students than that of negative prestige—or at least it is more readily reported.

This effect may be due to the students' perception of a lack of extremes in the levels of living in urban society. The sons and daughters of manual workers and laborers in the sample did not consider themselves or their backgrounds as at the "bottom of the heap." Somehow they placed themselves a little below average. Similarly, they tended to classify their families as "middle class." Not only was it difficult to get respondents to admit to lower class status but the tone of their reports indicated that they did not in fact perceive themselves as lower class in background.<sup>8</sup>

At the same time, those respondents from lower prestige backgrounds who sought an occupational level above that of their father became

<sup>8</sup> Twenty years ago when *Fortune* magazine asked a sampling of Americans what class they belonged to, some 47 percent said, "middle class" and only 15 percent answered "lower or working class." See: "Fortune Survey of Public Opinion," *Fortune*, (February, 1940). This does not mean that Americans do not recognize the existence of classes. When the sample was presented with a choice of classes, 51 percent of the respondents saw themselves as "working class." Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949, p. 77. Americans do recognize social classes but they tend to place themselves in the middle strata of the society.

quite vocal in regard to the influence of their father's prestige. One college student remarks, "I always remember that I am a laborer's son and am lucky to be in college." In other words, the influence of the father's occupation may not be immediately perceived by respondents from all backgrounds. Such influences may become clear only when they are placed in contrast with vocational aims and ambitions.

#### PRESTIGE INFLUENCE UPON STYLE OF LIFE

The effect of father's occupational prestige mentioned most frequently concerned its influence upon the respondent's general style of life. In such reports, students dwelt upon their material well-being; upon their opportunities for full and gracious living; upon their chances for educational and occupational advancement; and, in general, upon the type of lives they led as children of fathers occupying a particular occupational level. Over one-fifth of all respondents mentioned some aspects of their style of life and attributed it to the influence of their father's occupation.

In this type of report it is difficult to ascertain whether the respondent is considering the prestige or the economic aspect of his father's occupation. The emphasis is certainly upon the "nice things" which have been gained through the income level of the father's occupation, or upon the absence of material benefits. For example, a female high school student, daughter of a mechanical engineer, who was also vice president of his company, pointed out:

*It is because of my father's occupation that we live in the best part of town and have a big house. I have never been ashamed to bring my friends here. Because we live where we do and how we do, I am able to make friends with many of the nicer people in town. I can keep up with them.*

On the other hand, respondents from the lower prestige backgrounds noted that they "lacked many of the material things of life"; that "it had not been possible for them to do many of the things they had wanted to do"; and that their potentialities were severely limited. Respondents from middle prestige backgrounds emphasized that their background was neither definitely advantageous nor an absolute disadvantage.

The accent in these reports is upon the standard of living made possible through the rewards derived from the father's occupation. The question is, of course, whether this type of report can be construed to be a description of the influence of occupational prestige. When the reports are examined individually, the emphasis seems to be, not so much upon the "value" of the father's occupation, as upon the type of life associated with it and made possible by the father's income. Respondents seemingly find it difficult to distinguish between the style of

life and material well-being associated with their father's occupation and the prestige level it occupies.

Yet, it is obvious in the students' reports that, in their minds, there is a close association between occupational prestige and the social and economic characteristics of the incumbents of an occupation. It is through an assessment of the style of life of occupational incumbents that they arrive at some general evaluation of the prestige level of occupations. There seems to be a general tendency for prestige to be interpreted in terms of the advantages and potentialities which an occupation gives its incumbents rather than in terms of the specific characteristics which give higher or lower intrinsic value to the activity.

While it would be methodologically advantageous to separate the prestige aspects of occupations from their economic aspects, this did not seem to occur in the minds of our respondents. The rewards associated with the occupations serve to sketch the broad outlines of the prestige order. This prestige is based, not merely on an economic value, but on the associated style of life which serves as a symbolic indication of the value of the occupation.<sup>9</sup>

The students' reports imply that the more highly rewarded occupations are the ones with the highest prestige value. They obtain their prestige value, however, not through the simple calculation of dollars and cents, but rather in terms of the social recognition and social evaluation implied by superior rewards and greater advantages. Respondents feel that occupations which are highly valued in our society tend to be highly rewarded. When this association does not occur, in regard to specific occupations, they note the apparent conflict and it disturbs them.

#### PRESTIGE INFLUENCE UPON VOCATIONAL GOALS AND AMBITIONS

About 16 percent of our respondents reported that their vocational goals were profoundly influenced by the prestige level which they perceived for their father's occupation. In general, regardless of their prestige background, they saw their fathers' occupations as standards in relation to which they could judge their own achievements. They felt that they should strive for, and could measure their success by, the attainment of higher level occupations than those of their fathers.

A high prestige level of a father's occupation tends to set up, for the respondent, a minimal standard of what is *expected of him*. Not to meet this standard constitutes a species of failure. In a number of their statements, respondents indicated that they viewed this standard as a sort of burden. They felt that expectations were placed upon them to which they must measure up or face a certain loss of self-esteem. Further, in

<sup>9</sup> For an excellent discussion of the symbolic character of occupational rewards and its influence upon value conceptions, see: Mason and Gross, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-331.



many cases students expressed a desire to do better than their fathers. The implication seemed to be, that if they attained this prestige level, they would be doing merely what was expected of them and this would not constitute much of an achievement.

Respondents from the lowest prestige backgrounds also viewed their fathers' prestige level as an impetus toward higher achievement on their part. This influence was perceived differently, however. Their fathers' occupations were viewed, not as standards for achievement, but as something to be avoided and surpassed because of low value level. Their statements typically involved a recognition of the low prestige level of their fathers' occupations, and a consequent desire to rise above that level. When the vocational aspirations of these students were examined, it was found that many of them aspired to what might be considered only medium level occupations. In their eyes, however, this level of achievement, when compared with their fathers', would serve to significantly bolster their self-esteem.<sup>10</sup>

Respondents from the middle prestige backgrounds vary considerably in the interpretation they make of their fathers' prestige levels as standards for their own achievement. Students whose fathers' occupations were of upper middle prestige tended to emphasize their fathers' occupational prestige as a goal for their own achievement. Of all the respondents, it is those from the lower middle backgrounds who seemed most satisfied to maintain the prestige levels implied by the valuation of their fathers' occupations.

In general, fathers' occupational prestige levels serve as standards by which respondents set their own vocational aspirations and ambitions. Not one respondent expressed a desire to do less well than his father. All but those from the lowest background levels viewed their fathers' occupations as minimal standards for their own achievements. In their expressed vocational desires, they tended to rate the occupations which they sought to enter as at least the same in prestige, and usually as higher in prestige, than their fathers' occupations. There seemed to be a definite and generalized emphasis upon the maintenance or improvement of their vocational prestige levels with their fathers' occupational levels serving as standards for measuring achievement.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Very similar conclusions are reached by LaMar T. Empey in "Social Class and Occupational Aspiration: A Comparison of Absolute and Relative Measurement," *American Sociological Review*, 21 (December, 1956), pp. 703-709.

<sup>11</sup> It should be noted, that our respondents were all high school and college students. The above generalizations might not be true for respondents who had neither opportunity for nor interest in secondary or college education. However, the literature concerning vocational desires, does not seem to contradict our findings. See: Lawrence Thomas, *The Occupational Structure and Education*, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1956.



## PRESTIGE INFLUENCE UPON ASSOCIATIONS

About twelve percent of the subjects emphasized the influence which their fathers' occupations had had upon their social contacts and associations. These respondents felt that the prestige level of their fathers' occupations had influenced the acceptance afforded them by other persons and the opportunities which they had had to meet and know important or "better" people.

Respondents from the higher prestige backgrounds pointed out that, because of their father's occupational prestige, they were accepted by the "better" people in the community and were able, therefore, to travel in certain social circles. In their reports, respondents seemed to feel that this was not merely a matter of money, but a reaction, rather, to their occupational backgrounds themselves.

At the lower middle level, however, the emphasis is upon the establishment of a circle of friends and upon their acceptance by school and neighborhood friends of middle class background. For the respondents from the lowest prestige levels the influence of their fathers' occupations is seen as definitely negative. As the daughter of a factory laborer put it, "If my father were a lawyer or the owner of a big chain of stores, I would probably have more friends and be more popular." She hastened to add, however, "I don't want that kind of friends."

The prestige level of the occupation of the student's father is seen, in general, as fixing the social circles within which he moves. Also, it is seen as a positive or negative influence upon the degree of social acceptance which he receives. The higher the background of the respondent, the more he emphasized a positive social acceptance. The lower the background, the more a negative social acceptance was emphasized.

## THE TRANSFERENCE OF PRESTIGE

About eleven percent of the students stated definitely that they had been viewed and dealt with by others in terms of the identity conferred upon them by their fathers' occupational prestige. In many cases, they expressed the feeling that this was unfair, both in terms of the undeserved advantages or disadvantages which it implied. Nevertheless they saw a tendency for their fathers' occupational prestige to be transferred to themselves.

Furthermore, they mentioned many psychological reactions on their own part to such identification. Upper prestige background respondents mentioned a feeling of pride and confidence which resulted from their identification, by others, with their fathers' prestige levels. Lower background respondents mentioned feelings of shame and insecurity which resulted from their identification with their fathers' prestige levels.

The respondents from the highest background levels felt that they had received initially advantageous identification because of their fathers' positions. They felt that such positions had given them a recognition, a respect, and an influence over others which had little to do with their own actions or abilities. One student opined, "Thinking about it, I now realize that his position has allowed me to be accepted as a valuable member of the community without any real effort on my part. The people employed in his factory seem to feel obligated to be pleasant and to avoid trouble with me even though I have no real power over them." Respondents mentioned that they were granted favors, gained a certain political immunity, and were given special consideration and respect in the community due to their fathers' occupational positions.

Their advantageous position also has its responsibilities, according to respondents. A number of the upper prestige respondents mentioned the expectations placed upon them because of their background and their responsibility for maintaining their fathers' good names. Students from the middle prestige backgrounds emphasize the fact that they have never had to feel ashamed about their fathers' vocations. Respondents from the lowest prestige backgrounds emphasize the disadvantage imposed upon them by their fathers' prestige levels and the shame they frequently felt concerning their identification with such.

The data indicate that respondents perceive and appreciate the initial identification which they receive by virtue of the prestige levels of their fathers' occupations. While only eleven per cent of the respondents gave specific reports concerning this influence, the ratings and the reports combined indicate that students are relatively objective concerning the identification imposed upon them via their fathers' occupational prestige. There is a definite tendency, worthy of further study, for certain psychological traits such as confidence, security, and ambition to be related to the prestige level of the occupation of the individual's father.

#### CONCLUSIONS

While it should be emphasized that the selected sample upon which these data are based does not permit a broad generalization of our conclusions, the respondents do exhibit a clear and definite tendency to see their fathers' occupational prestige as an important influence upon their lives. The general conclusions of the study tend to support the suggestions in the literature, that the individual's prestige background serves as an orienting feature of his social life, vocational ambitions, and social identity.

Finally, the data of this study indicate that the perceptions and valuations which form the basis for prestige judgments are rather complex

and non-specific. The respondents manifested general and mixed perceptions rather than some perception of a specific value for an occupation. These still served as a rather firm basis for the mutual orientations involved in the perception of and reaction to occupations in terms of their relative value. Such results suggest that ratings of occupations will not give us knowledge concerning the social psychological basis for the ratings. Rather, attention must be given to the social psychological basis for prestige ratings of occupations before the meaningful import and influence upon behavior of the ratings can be understood.

## NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

*Assumption Seminary, San Antonio, Texas:* A course in Pastoral Sociology was recently completed in which seminarians at the deaconate level heard addresses by priests and laymen in areas of social action. Reverend James McHardy, CM, opened the series with a review of recent social encyclicals. Reverend James Brunner, superintendent of Catholic schools, emphasized the need for coordination between the schools and the parish priest. Director of the Catholic Welfare Bureau, Reverend Robert Walden, pointed out areas of his Bureau's action in the archdiocese. From St. Ann's parish, Reverend John Yanta and John Starch presented candid reviews of parish organizations from both the moderator's and layman's points of view. Principal of Holy Cross High School, Brother Harold Young, C.S.C., outlined the priest's role in the formation of Christian youth. John L. McMahon, president of Our Lady of the Lake College and San Antonio city councilman, led a discussion on the realization of the priest's role as a public figure. Roundtable discussions followed each of the talks.

*The Catholic University of America:* C. Joseph Nuesse has announced his resignation as Dean of the School of Social Science, to be effective at the end of the 1961 Summer Session. After a sabbatical leave during the first semester of 1961-62, he will return to research and teaching in the Department of Sociology. A workshop entitled *Philosophy and the Integration of Contemporary Catholic Education* is to be held at Catholic University, June 16-27, under the direction of Rev. George F. McLean, O.M.I. Conferences and seminars will discuss philosophy and the sciences, moral philosophy and moral life, and philosophy and education. A special seminar, directed by Alphonse Clemens, Director of the Marriage Counseling Center at C.U. and past president of the American Catholic Sociological Society, will discuss sociology and philosophical values.

*Loyola University, Chicago:* Gordon Zahn received a grant from the American Philosophical Society to cover summer research in Austria.

*Loyola University, New Orleans:* Rev. Joseph Fichter, S.J., is on leave of absence. He left in February to spend a year at the University of Santiago, Chile.

*Marquette University:* The department's graduate program leading to the Master's degree in Sociology is in its first year of operation. The annual Sociology Department lecture was given this year to an audience of about 500 by John Donovan of Boston College. He spoke about his recent research on the Catholic intellectual. Frank Atelsek will be on leave of absence for an additional year to complete his longitudinal study of social security recipients which he is conducting for the Social Security Administration. Rudolph Morris will spend the summer in Europe engaged in a study of educational programs of art museums and their role in their community. The museums will be compared in these respects with art museums in the United States. Jack Curtis will conduct a study during the summer sponsored by the Milwaukee County Mental Health Assn. on the social epidemiology of schizophrenia. Frank

Avesing of Fordham University will join him on this project for the summer. Paul Reiss with Rev. Bernard Cooke, S.J., of the Theology Department, is engaged in a study of religious values of Catholic college students. A questionnaire and interview program with Freshmen and Seniors will be conducted at several Catholic colleges and universities. The study will seek to determine the changes in religious values of students which occur during college years.

*Mundelein College:* Sister Mary Liguori, B.V.M., will be working at the Centre de Recherches socio-religieuses, in Brussels during July. She will be accompanied by Sister Mary Martinita, B.V.M., of Clarke College.

*University of Notre Dame:* During recent months John J. Kane, Department Head, addressed a meeting of the Association of Religious Coordinators at the University of Illinois; a meeting of ministers, rabbis and priests in the city of Indianapolis on Catholic Education; the Sigma Xi Symposium on the Population Explosion at Purdue University on political and religious values and the population explosion; and the County Council of Churches of Evansville, Indiana, on inter-religious relations in American society. John Kane has been appointed an Indiana delegate to the White House Conference on Aging and the Aged. The Department of Sociology in cooperation with the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend is conducting a survey of aging and aged Catholics in the Diocese. This will be a 25% random sample based on names obtained from parish lists. John Kane is directing the work and Jack Angus and Sylvester Theisen are assisting him. Items in the schedule, administered by a hundred women volunteers in the city of South Bend and in the city of Fort Wayne, cover such matters as health, income, voting, medical costs, religious activities and an attitude scale regarding personal reactions to aging. Frank Fahey is now completing research on the problems confronting matched pairs of delinquents and non-delinquents. He will deliver a paper at the Ohio Valley Sociological Society meetings in Cleveland on the methodological problems of doing research in the area of religion when the researcher is known to represent a religiously oriented university. Julian Samora was chairman of a Symposium on "The Responsibility of American Universities toward World Understanding and Cooperation," held at Notre Dame. He is presently conducting research on the social-cultural characteristics of patients. William D'Antonio delivered a lecture at St. Mary's College, Winona, Minn., on "The Catholic School System in Contemporary Society." He also delivered a lecture in the Leo XIII Lecture Series on Notre Dame Campus, March 14, on "The Christian Conscience and Race." Gordon DiRenzo is in Italy doing research on a grant by the Italian government on personality and role perceptions of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. Donald Barrett is editor of a book on *Values in America* to be published by Notre Dame Press in the summer, 1961. John Hughes delivered a paper in January at Villanova on "Science, Causality, and the Sociologist in Your Future." He has accepted an appointment as Associate Professor and Chairman of the Department of Sociology at Villanova, effective Sept., 1961. With Dr. Thomas Monahan he is conducting research on the relation of a number of population and ecological variables to mixed marriage. Hugh O'Brien has given lectures on Problems of Police Administration at Purdue University and at Michigan City, Indiana.

*Our Lady of Cincinnati College:* In February, Our Lady of Cincinnati College was host to an institute which premiered nationally a series of campus seminars on Communism. The all-day concentrated Institute on Communism was planned and arranged by Edmund D. Mason, special agent in charge of the local F.B.I. office. The Institute was conducted by a panel of experts headed by William C. Sullivan, chief inspector for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C.

*Our Lady of the Lake College:* Mrs. T. S. Liu has been named to the faculty of the Sociology Department. She is teaching a course in Current Social Problems. After receiving her bachelor of arts degree from Our Lady of the Lake, Mrs. Liu received her master of science degree from Western Reserve University's school of applied social sciences. Sr. M. Inez Hilger, O.S.B., of the College of St. Benedict, spoke at a general student assembly on the definition, scope and purposes of anthropology. Before meetings of student social science groups she gave more specialized lectures on her field work.

*The College of St. Benedict:* Sister M. Inez Hilger is the only nun taking part in the lecture program for outstanding scholars in anthropology. Participation is limited to fellows of the Anthropology Association—anthropologists with doctor of philosophy degrees who have done field work in anthropology. Sister Inez will visit colleges in Texas, Nebraska, Maryland, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Illinois and Indiana as part of the program.

*St. John's University:* Emerson Heynes has been granted another year's leave of absence to act as first assistant to Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota. Henri-Georges Belleau will leave to study for his doctorate in Economics at some eastern university. Replacing him will be Sylvester Theisen, Danforth scholar finishing his doctorate currently at Notre Dame University. Members of the Sociology and Social Science Departments panelled the basic ideas of the Social Encyclicals before the faculty and students of the Industrial Relations Center at the University of Minnesota on March 1.

*St. John Fisher College:* The College participated in Rochester's Human Relations Month by presenting a panel discussion of Housing for Minority Groups on February 8, 1961. The speakers were John Dale, Executive Director of the Rochester Rehabilitation Commission, and Lloyd Hurst, Deputy Legal Advisor to the County of Monroe. In January of this year, St. John Fisher College and Nazareth College launched a pioneering program which aims toward a coordinated curriculum. Edna M. O'Hern has accepted membership in the Family Service Corporation of Rochester, and has been appointed to the Executive Board of the Rochester Branch of the N.A.A.C.P.

*The Section on Teaching Sociology:* The Section is conducting a census on Sociology in Catholic Higher Education. Questionnaires have been sent to all Catholic institutions of higher education. The questionnaire is being administered and analyzed for the Section by Donald Barrett of Notre Dame.

# NOTICE TO CONTRIBUTORS

to THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

## *The Submission of Articles*

The normal length of a paper is approximately 4,000 words, although variations from this norm in both directions are expected when the nature of the article so dictates. Two copies of the paper should be submitted, typed, double spaced on standard (8½"x11") paper with 1½" margins on each side. An abstract of approximately 100 words containing the principal thesis and method of the paper should be submitted with the article. The full name and institutional affiliation of the author should be noted.

Footnotes should be numbered serially and placed on a separate sheet. A footnote to the title or author should be marked with an asterisk (\*). For the format of footnotes consult an issue of Vol. 22 (1961), or subsequent volumes of THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW.

Each table or figure should be placed on a separate page with tables and figures numbered in separate series. The appropriate location of a table or figure in the text should be noted.

## *Communications to the Editor for Publication*

The editor will receive for publication from readers, communications which are in the nature of comments, clarifications, or criticisms of articles or book reviews which have previously appeared in the REVIEW. Normally, communications of this nature should be sent to the editor within one month of the publication of the article or book review to which they pertain. The full name and institutional affiliation of the writer of the communication must be noted.

## *News and Announcements*

Institutions or agencies are responsible for the submission to the editor of news or announcements concerning their organizations or their members. Appropriate news or announcements include changes in staff, new appointments, promotions, resignations, retirements and deaths. Also desired are announcements of major changes in curricula, special programs, conferences, institutes, and the activities of staff members including the reception of grants, research projects and special studies. News of interest to the profession from any public or private agency will also be accepted.

News and announcements must be submitted by the following dates: Spring issue, March 1; Summer issue, June 1; Fall issue, September 1; Winter issue, December 1.

## *Book Reviews*

Book reviews should also be typed double spaced on standard (8½"x11") paper with 1½" margins on each side. The heading, reviewer's name and institutional affiliation, should be in the form employed in Volume 22 and subsequent issues.

All matters concerning book reviews should be referred to the book review editor, Prof. Donald Barrett, Department of Sociology, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind.



## EDITORIAL NOTE

This issue of THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW is the first published under the new editorial board appointed by the President of the American Catholic Sociological Society with the approval of the Executive Council at their meeting in November, 1960. The appointment is in accordance with the new constitutional provision for the appointment of an editorial board for a three year term of office.

At the time of this new appointment the Executive Council unanimously passed a resolution expressing the great debt of gratitude which the American Catholic Sociological Society owes to Rev. Ralph Gallagher, S.J., who served as editor of THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW from its founding in 1939 until 1954 and as managing editor from 1955 until 1960; to Paul Mundy, who served as editor 1955-1958; to Rev. Sylvester Sieber, S.V.D., who served as editor 1959-1960; and to Loyola University of Chicago which has assisted the *Review* in many ways for the 21 years during which the editorial and business offices of the *Review* were located at that University.

---

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGICAL  
SOCIETY CONVENTION, AUGUST 28, 29, 30, 1961

St. Louis University and the Coronado Hotel, St. Louis, Missouri

*Monday, August 28*

9:30-11:30 a.m.

*Teaching Sociology*

Donald Barrett, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana

*Cultural Anthropology*

William T. Liu, University of Portland, Portland, Oregon

*High School Workshop*

Sister M. Chrysostom, O.S.F., St. Mary's Academy, Milwaukee, Wisconsin

1:30-3:30 p.m.

*Theology and Sociology*

Rev. Paul Facey, S.J., College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, Massachusetts

*Sociology of Education*

John E. Hughes, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana

*Student Section*

Mary Jo Huth, St. Mary's College, Notre Dame, Indiana

4:00 p.m.

*Convention Mass*

- 6:00-7:00 p.m. *Reception*
- 6:45 p.m. *Executive Council Dinner*
- Tuesday, August 29*
- 9:00-11:00 a.m. *Industrial Sociology*  
Rev. Raymond H. Potvin, Catholic University of  
America, Washington 17, D.C.  
*Sociology and Values*  
Sister Mary Edward, C.S.J., College of St. Cath-  
erine, St. Paul, Minnesota
- 11:15-12:45 p.m. *Business Meeting*
- 1:00-2:45 p.m. *Official Convention Luncheon—*  
*Presidential Address*
- 3:00-5:00 p.m. *Sociological Theory*  
Sister Marie Augusta, S.N.D., Emmanuel College,  
Boston Massachusetts  
*Intergroup Relations*  
Rev. Albert S. Foley, S.J., Spring Hill College,  
Spring Hill, Alabama
- 5:30 p.m. *Section on Teaching Sociology Meeting*
- Wednesday, August 30*
- 9:00-11:00 a.m. *Population*  
Thomas K. Burch, Marquette University, Milwau-  
kee 3, Wisconsin  
*Family*  
Lawrence L. Bourgeois, Loyola University, New  
Orleans, Louisiana
- 11:30 a.m.-1 p.m. *Executive Council Luncheon Meeting*
- 1:30-3:30 p.m. *Social Psychology*  
William H. Jarrett, Canisius College, Buffalo 8,  
New York  
*Sociology of Religion*  
Sister Mary Jeanine, O.S.F., Cardinal Stritch Col-  
lege, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
- 3:30 p.m. *Editorial Board Meeting*

Papers may be submitted directly to the chairman of the session.  
If there is uncertainty as to the appropriate session for a given paper,  
it may be submitted to the Chairman of the Program Committee, Thomas  
P. Imse, Canisius College, Buffalo 8, New York.

## BOOK REVIEWS

*Privately Developed Interracial Housing: An Analysis of Experience.* By Eunice and George Grier. Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1960. Pp. xii+264. \$6.00.

A first-rate report in non-technical language in a controversial area! This constitutes one of the special research reports to the Commission on Race and Housing. This particular report deals with privately developed interracial or "open-occupancy" housing. Within the space of approximately 250 pages are described the problems faced by the builders of interracial projects such as sites, financing, legal opposition, market controls, and promotion, and the success or failure of some 50 private interracial developments between the years 1946-1955.

Empirically oriented readers may not always agree with the conclusions drawn by the authors in this pioneering venture, but no one will deny the stimulating and provocative manner in which many myths held by John Q. Public about "open-occupancy" housing are herein tentatively exploded! More intensive and specialized research may verify or deny some of the conclusions reached, but the authors can rightly claim a major share of credit for encouraging the research which should follow the publication of this volume.

Case histories of successful and unsuccessful projects in all sections of the country recount the major difficulties of developing for profit private interracial housing. A general conclusion based on the findings seems to support the possibility of a growing trend toward such projects, aided and abetted by laws against discrimination in housing, a shift in federal housing policy which now encourages open-occupancy housing, and financial assistance from labor unions committed to non-discrimination.

Questions of methodology will inevitably be raised, but in an uncharted field the raising of intelligent questions seems of greater value than forcing raw data into a prepared mold of scientific jargon, replete with  $X^2$ 's, smoothed curves, and T scores.

An excellent introduction to a controversial field for the banker, real estate agent, public relations personnel, contractors, social agencies, minority group organizations, teachers of the social sciences, government officials, and especially for those who wish to argue intelligently about the problems of privately developed interracial housing.

Loretto Heights College

ROBERT H. AMUNDSON

*Property Values and Race: Studies in Seven Cities.* By Luigi Laurenti. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960. Pp. xix+256. \$6.00.

To Dr. Laurenti goes the credit of systematically destroying the myth that entry of Negroes into an all-white neighborhood automatically lowers property values. This myth, incorporated into the credo of realtors and property-owners, has been a decided factor in the segregation practices in our

cities. The first comprehensive analysis of the supposed correlation of race to property depreciation followed the formation, in 1955, of the Commission on Race and Housing. Dr. Laurenti's volume is a research report of the Commission.

To disentangle racial occupancy from other factors affecting property values, professor Laurenti selected test areas and control areas in San Francisco, Oakland, and Philadelphia. For securing price data, he had full access to the files of the multiple listing offices and other sources, as well as full cooperation of the real estate profession. To secure other samples, the author used previous studies made in Chicago, Detroit, Kansas City, and Portland, Oregon. These, summarized and evaluated, he incorporated into his "Studies of Seven Cities."

The findings will come as a surprise to many. Dr. Laurenti concluded, from his own research, that the odds are about four to one that neighborhoods infiltrated by nonwhites will keep up or exceed prices found in a comparable all-white area. He finds a similar characteristic of rising rather than falling prices in the Chicago, Detroit, and Kansas City studies. Portland presents the sole exception, but the methodology used appears defective.

Dr. Laurenti freely admits that his study is not comprehensive; the Commission could not afford the expense. He realizes the weakness of utilizing previous studies, as substitution; each study with its own methodology affords no basis for comparison with his own research. He considers his deductions valid if applied to recent and present trends, since the research data presented, except in an early Chicago study, cover the period of 1940-1955. Dr. Laurenti is content with presenting scientific evidence to belie a plaguing myth.

For the sociologist, interested in hastening the demise of the myth, and for the fearful property-owner, a perusal of Part I, which presents the approach and general findings within a compass of 65 pages, is sufficient and highly recommended. For the realtor faced with the problem of property values and race, the entire volume, including Part II with its "Detailed Analysis," should be on his "must read" list.

St. Mary's University

HERBERT F. LEIES, S.M.

*The Eighth Generation.* Edit. by John H. Rohrer and Munro S. Edmonson. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. Pp. xi+341. \$6.00.

In 1940, Allison Davis and John Dollard published their classic work, *Children of Bondage*. It was a study of the lives of 277 teen-agers who were eighth generation New Orleans Negroes. The present work presents a follow-up on the previous work. It was carried out by a research team composed of psychiatrists, psychiatric social workers, psychologists, analysts, a sociologist, an anthropologist, assisted by interviewers and graduate students. In all, there were 19 white and 11 Negroes who took part in the project. All of the data of Davis' and Dollard's report was available to them. Approximately twenty years after the previous study was made they set out to find 107 of the individuals, selecting those cases in which there was the most material in the first study. They were able to trace 90 people and actually interviewed 47,

and 20 of these, ten men and ten women, were singled out for intensive study. There can be no question of either the scientific competence of the authors or the quality of the intensive research that went into this study. Nevertheless, there might be some doubt as to whether 20 individuals can be considered a representative sample of a population of 200,000. In the first of several appendices the authors treat of their sample in relation to several indices to show its adequacy.

The approach used in the study was role identification. They found that they "could isolate a primary role identification for most individuals, and that such an identification was intimately related to the quality of integration of the individual's psychic functioning" (p. 299). Consequently, 5 chapters of the book are case studies arranged according to the various role identifications, namely, The Middle Class, The Matriarchy, The Gang, The Family and Marginality. No attempt was made to exhaust the field in regard to the patterns of identification but it was limited to those which are most frequently found among the New Orleans Negroes.

This work must not be looked upon as a popular treatment of the New Orleans Negro, but a scientific study of the relationship of the intra-psychic functioning of the individual and his psychologically real social world. There is the danger, particularly at the present time because of the recent Supreme Court decisions, of taking cases out of their scientific context and drawing invalid conclusions. It is interesting to note how the present study confirms the accuracy of the previous study in predicting the future lives of the various individuals.

This work must be considered an important contribution to the research studies in the behavioral sciences.

*St. Mary's Dominican College*

REV. JOHN G. MASTERSON, O.P.

*Children of Their Fathers. Growing Up Among the Ngoni of Nyasaland.* By Margaret Read. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960. Pp. 176+29 plates. \$4.75.

Much of what we read today related to Africa is perplexing. At times it is incomprehensible and disturbing. We as non-Africans are trying to understand the emerging African peoples? "Why do they act as they do?" we ask ourselves.

The reader of *Children of Their Fathers* may find a partial answer to his question. Margaret Read, British-born, Cambridge-educated, educator, sociologist, anthropologist, lived among the Ngoni, an African people of Nyasaland, for three and one-half years. Her objective in writing about the Ngoni is to record the results of her society-directed study made while among the Ngoni, one in which she made child rearing and child training within the child's society the focus. She has accomplished this. She tells how adults among the Ngoni train their children from babyhood through adolescence so that they will fit into Ngoni society, and how in doing this they perpetuate their cultural values.

But I believe that Dr. Read has done more than this. The real value of her book at the moment, I think, lies in that she presents an African culture that is practically intact. There are few studies made by trained observers that do just that. The culture of the Ngoni as described by Dr. Read is probably a fair sample of the patchwork of diversified cultures that make up much of that portion of the continent of Africa in which Africans live, that is south of the Sahara and north of the Union of South Africa. One can read into this sample the conflicts that are bound to arise when a well-integrated African culture experiences the impact of a non-African one, one which seems to be geared to destroy, or at least to disrupt, its culture, or possibly to substitute an inadequate one.

This informative and well-written book then lets the reader take a look at an African people within an African nation. Here are the Ngoni of Nyasaland with a self-sustaining, self-sufficient, and well-integrated non-Western way of life. They are aware of themselves as a distinct people with a distinct culture, but aware also of the many points that connect them with other peoples of Nyasaland and of neighboring African nations.

Although recently there has been felt a forceful growth toward Nyasaland African nationalism—and the Ngoni have felt the impact of this also—the Ngoni are determined not to relinquish their tribal rights to train and to educate their children in the Ngoni system. According to Dr. Read this system has group values and individual values which are solidly rooted in the Ngoni way of life. They have their minds firmly set in seeing that every Ngoni child learns them and lives by them. Group values center in family life, in village life, and in their thinking as a nation. Group values are: keeping together as a people; dominating but being paternally benevolent with those subject to their rule; and exercising mutual trust and aid between themselves as Ngoni people. Individual values should distinguish every true Ngoni man and woman. Individual values are: physical strength closely associated with physical courage; persistence and thoroughness in any task undertaken or assigned; skill in using speech; and wisdom which includes knowledge, good judgment, ability to control people and keep peace—wisdom is sharply contrasted with being clever.

The reader, I think, will better comprehend why an African may be drawn into a nationalist movement, and at the same time find it exceedingly difficult not to identify himself as a tribesman. A people's culture is not easily changed.

This book will be slightly improved, I believe, if in its second edition a map of Africa is added, one that will show the location of the Ngoni in Nyasaland. There is no Index, but there is a helpful "Contents."

*College of St. Benedict*

SISTER M. INEZ HILGER, O.S.B.

*The Religion of Java.* By Clifford Geertz. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960. Pp. xv+392.

Clifford Geertz in this book has adhered to the maxim that it is the scale that makes the phenomenon. Although he restricted his research site to a

single Javanese village, Modjukuto, he supports his local observations with the historical development and the political, economic and cultural ramifications of the religious behavior which is the specific object of his inquiry. One has the impression on reading the total report that Geertz sees and represents the religious phenomenon in something like true scale.

Any adequate summary or evaluation of this kind of study within the limitations of a review format is out of the question. For eighteen months the author lived with a Javanese family, learned the language, regularly attended the rituals and ceremonials which mark every phase of Javanese life—especially in the villages—and here reports in what appears to be elaborate and complete detail all that he observed.

There is some evidence of his tacitly comparing the "pluralism" of the Javanese religion(s) with the avowed pluralism of American religious forms and faiths. And, in fact, the relationship which exists among the three variants of Javanese Islam in the actual organization of their day-to-day life does suggest some parallel with the practical working out of the differences, dogmatic and ritual, in the Judeo-Christian continuum represented in American religious life.

One has no grounds on which to challenge either the authenticity of his descriptions of Javanese religious practices or the reliability of the numerous informants who interpreted for him the meanings of these practices. The three main religious subtraditions which he discriminates (the *abangan*, with heavy emphasis on ritual, and with largely peasant and lower class membership; the *santri*, whose members pride themselves on the orthodoxy of their interpretation of Islam; the *prijaji*, whose adherents are drawn chiefly from among the wealthy and educated civil servants, and who have been influenced in belief and attitude by the importation of Hindu-Buddhist doctrines) have running through them as a unifying thread the universal practice of *slametan*, the communal feast, used to celebrate any of dozens of significant occasions in the personal and national lives of the Javanese, symbolizing the mystic and social unity of all those who partake.

The ritual surrounding the *slametan*, and the importance attached to it, varies widely from group to group, and Geertz's investigation of these differences gives insight into much more than the purely religious aspects of Javanese life. In a civilization as ancient and complex as the Javanese, it is not easy to draw the line between the religious and the profane, and the author's competent attempt to do so has produced considerably more than a study of religion.

Immaculate Heart College

SISTER MARY WILLIAM, I.H.M.

*Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries.* A Report of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Princeton University Press, 1960. Pp. xi+536. \$12.00.

Major studies of the interrelationships between demographic and economic change have in recent years tended to focus on underdeveloped regions, loosely identified with Africa, Asia and Latin America. Concern for



the social and political future of the countries in question no doubt contributed to the trend. Yet within limits, levels of literacy, degree of modernization, extent of urbanization, and also the survival rates, vary significantly. Despite a tendency to lump such countries together, there is no single model applicable without modification to all their populations and economies, let alone to the interrelationships between the two. Nevertheless, they tend to have certain demographic characteristics in common: high fertility, medium declining mortality, youthful populations, and hence considerable potential for rapid population growth. Economically, their average real income is low as contrasted with more developed regions. Capital is short, skills undeveloped, and the state of technology less advanced than one finds in Western Europe or North America. However, the number of variables involved serves as a warning to the sophisticated against easy generalization about causation either of the poverty or the high reproductivity.

In affluent societies, analysis becomes even more complex, since the number of socio-economic and psychological variables is multiplied and with them the possibilities for interrelationships. And the more that fertility is consciously regulated, the greater the likelihood for interaction between the formally demographic and the social-psychological factors. Despite the potential pitfalls, the present symposium makes an admirable contribution to our knowledge of the interdependence between the relevant variables. It may reveal the reviewer's bias to suggest that on balance the first section of the book, with the more directly demographic papers, comes off better than does the latter section, which concentrates on economic analysis. The latter is uneven in quality and in approach to the subject matter of the symposium.

Gwendolyn Johnson of the United States and Clyde Kiser of the Milbank Fund contribute distinguished papers on differential fertility in Europe and in the United States, respectively. Of substantial length, each gathers together and analyzes an impressive amount of data and factors relating to fertility. The trend toward modal family size—somewhat larger in North America than in Western Europe—is factually illustrated. So too is the emerging hypothesis that birth and/or marriage cohort, reflecting attitudes and values internalized at a relatively early age, is more likely to influence completed family size than are economic or other conditions at a given point in time, barring the catastrophic occurrence which upsets all marriage and reproductive patterns.

In an introductory and integrating paper, Ansley Coale of Princeton's Office of Population Research successfully draws some relevant generalizations about population and fertility trends, without going beyond evidence provided in the symposium. He also contributes a longer paper in the relationship of population change to economic demand, prices, and the level of employment, which incorporates good economic as well as demographic analysis. And a paper by Simon Kuznets on population change and aggregate output is both readable and economically sophisticated. But this reviewer regrets that several later papers, on demand for food and services, become so involved in detailed econometric models that they overlook aggregates and oversimplify relationships between variables.

The symposium as a whole is eminently worthwhile for demographers,

sociologists, economists endeavoring to interpret the socio-economic variables affecting fertility, and in turn affected to some degree by it. The Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research has made a valuable contribution in calling the conference and in fostering publication. Yet, inevitably, one finds more unity of approach and consistency in analysis in Coale and Hoover's 1958 study on *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries*, than in the present symposium on trends and relationships within the developed regions. However, in view of the complexity of data, as well as variations between developed economies, the National Bureau symposium probably has gone as far in the analysis as would be fruitful or feasible at this time.

Fordham University

WILLIAM J. GIBBONS, S.J.

*Races of Mankind. Their Origin and Migration.* By Calvin I. Kephart. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1960. Pp. ix+566. \$6.00.

Packed between the covers of this volume is a mass of material dealing with 1) man's emergence as a biological being, 2) differentiation of racial types, and 3) their dispersion over the earth. As the author states in the Preface, the treatment is "factual rather than philosophical." Unhappily for the person who hopes to learn about this fascinating subject, too many of these "facts" no longer represent contemporary knowledge.

From the first 280 pages (three chapters) it is difficult to get an accurate picture of what is known of the subject at the present time. H. Osborne, George G. McCurdy, and G. Elliott Smith were authorities in their time, but their time has long since passed and many of their views are relegated to the inactive list. Yet the author relies on their works of 1915, 1926, and 1929, respectively, as well as others equally outdated (e.g. Keane, 1920, Coleman, 1925). To be sure, LeGros Clark, Carleton Coon and Helmut de Terra, all competent contemporaries, are mentioned in footnotes but there is little evidence in the text that their findings were incorporated. Not only do these chapters contain outmoded points of view and specific errors but some of the author's more basic and fundamental propositions are almost wholly untenable in the light of current knowledge. The very positive influence of environment on physique (pp. 54, 55, 94) and even on the germ plasm (p. 56), are examples. It is the mark of balanced scholarship to be able to use the ideas of earlier authorities as well as the most up-to-date ones, but some judicious selection is necessary to avoid charges of misuse. The author does not exercise this judgment.

A number of inferences are treated as facts. Do we know that primordial man was dark complexioned and quite hairy (p. 37)? or that his "deformed children were ruthlessly put to death" (p. 39)? What is the evidence for the "handsome" quality of the underlying stratum of east-central China (p. 91)?

The last 258 pages of the text have fewer inaccuracies although this is not say that the scholar specializing in any one area would not find things to refute. In these chapters the author traces the history and migration of various racial groups and tribal peoples, particularly with reference to Europe. The treatment is detailed.

Finally the author's admitted "racist" bias (viii) is reiterated in the text. If "history demonstrates that the commingling of members of advanced and retarded races results in illicit moral relations, with retrogressive effects on the higher race" (p. 89), does this have much to do with the genotype of the peoples involved? Can we attribute revolutions in Latin American countries, as the author implies, to mental and psychological characteristics of the American Indians which are inferior to those of the "Aryans" (p. 112)? In the light of contemporary developments in Africa, not to mention Southeast Asia, there is surely a certain emptiness in the statement that "owing to the unprogressiveness of the Indafrikan and his incapacity to govern competently, his territory is now apportioned among the European nations. . . . (p. 519).

Undoubtedly a great deal of time and effort has gone into the writing of this book. It is unfortunate this it does not represent a distillation or synthesis of the most up-to-date knowledge available on the origin and migration of the races of mankind. The book was published twenty-five years too late.

Seattle University

VIRGINIA WATSON

*Sociologist Abroad.* By George Simpson. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959. Pp. 189. Guilders 1050 (\$2.65).

This volume bears a rather enigmatic title. As a European, or more precisely Dutch publication, it suggests a content concerning the sociologist beyond Europe, at least beyond the Netherlands. Since its author is a distinguished American sociologist of Brooklyn College, it was expected that the book would offer an erudite and concise appraisal of the status, role, social function, and possibly some other aspects of the *sociologist abroad*, i.e., beyond "America." Contrary to these expectations, we actually find the text of a lecture series, which the author delivered as Fulbright professor at the University of Leiden, 1958-1959. Reportedly the general subject of the lecture series was "Issues in American Sociology" (and this title would have been more adequate to the book's content).

The very rich material here is well organized in four parts, dealing with 1) the development of sociology in America, 2) methodological issues, 3) certain selected fields of "American" sociology, and 4) the sociologist's values, role and philosophical orientation. The author's image of sociology is that of a discipline, necessarily founded on psychology, serving the purpose of knowing "how and why man acts as he does in the historico-cultural drama" (p. 142). There are five levels of sociological analysis, it is claimed, and a part of the general methodological difficulties in sociology is rooted in a failure to discern these levels and to use methods appropriate to the intended and/or needed level of inquiry. These distinct levels are: the reportorial, the descriptive, the explanatory, the interpretative, and the policy and ethical level (pp. 35-36). The last by itself indicates the author's unconventional conception of the nature and social role of sociology and of workers in the field. He classifies workers in sociology into three (actually four) categories: research technicians (who "hold out the supremacy of technique"), the subject-matter people, the theoreticians ("living in a conceptual wonderland"), and the ad-

ministrative sociologists (the human symbols of the bureaucratization of this discipline).

His image of the full-blooded sociologist is that of a permanent member of "an overground resistance movement subsidized by a society that knows it has not (arrived at) all the answers and that continually needs to be challenged" (p. 170). A "sociologist is a marginal man," a learned and constructive deviant character (pp. 174-175), a professional challenger of any *status quo*. His is a "transevaluating science" which asks embarrassing questions about the *status quo*, and in this capacity he and his science of sociology are indispensable to every democracy (p. 170). The author claims, very much in the vein of C. Wright Mills, that sociology in this country has already shown "a tendency to become frozen into American academic bureaucracy. . . ." (p. 169).

The chapter on the Sociology of Religion should be studied by every student of this discipline, in spite of the fact that its development is somewhat marred by some overworked thought patterns. Religion, for example, is featured here as "the opium of the new bourgeoisie" in America (p. 151). Although the author is nearly an orthodox Freudian scholar, it appears to be a significant concession to read: "Freud's mistake, I think, was in believing that religion could only be a consolation; he failed to see that it could be a revolutionary force" (p. 156).

In the final part which is the most original and stimulating, in answering the key problem, "What are the values inhering in science as a calling, in sociology as an occupation . . . ?" (p. 163), Professor Simpson codifies the relevant value-schemes which sociologists of a range of persuasions may agree upon. He persuasively concludes that a sociologist is by his avocation morally committed to orient himself positively and actively to values. The actuation of these values is a prerequisite of sociology's flourishing in a society. And sociology, as any science, due to its inherent values, is not politically neutral, but antagonistic to many things in many forms, e.g., anti-intellectualism, prejudice, authoritarianism. In general terms this includes "What is antithetic to the morality of science." And a sociologist as "a scientist must accordingly struggle against it" (p. 164).

As some consolation in the face of these thought patterns, there stands at the end of this provocative small book a careful account of the relevance of philosophy to sociology. This is specified in great detail. It is a wise, well-balanced chapter, excellent for educational usage, and ending with the inscription suggested for the portal of sociology: "Let no one enter here who knows no philosophy." This is a paraphrase of the inscription of Aristotle's Academy, except that it suggests philosophy instead of the original word, mathematics. Thus Leiden's *genus loci* has made itself felt.

This thought-filled book is a highly commendable, sophisticated checklist of twentieth century American developments and issues. It stimulates in a refreshing way that mode of reflection which makes the reader formulate for himself, or rethink his intellectual stand on each issue. Thus, it may render a valuable service to instructors, graduate students and seniors (especially when on the threshold of a "comprehensive").

Marquette University

BELA KOVRIG

*Theology of Culture.* By Paul Tillich. Edited by Robert C. Kimball. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. Pp. x+214. \$4.

Just as the theologian and philosopher must sooner or later dirty their hands with the grubby facts of reality if their interpretations of ultimate concerns are to have any practical meaning, so the empirical scientist of human behavior must eventually rise to the higher syntheses of *Weltanschauungen* if his study of reality is going to reach beyond the peripheral and ephemeral. Thus, it is valuable for the sociologist to come to grips with minds such as that of Professor Tillich, teacher of Systematic Theology for nearly four decades, but for whom "the problem of religion and culture has always been in the center of my interest."

This volume is an edition of fifteen articles and papers written from 1940 to 1957 and now co-ordinated into a comfortable quadripartite unity: Basic Considerations, Concrete Applications, Cultural Comparisons, and Conclusion. The first part, in which Dr. Tillich presents his views on the nature of religion, is least relevant to the social scientist's interests except for Chapter Four, "Aspects of a Religious Analysis of Culture." The previous three chapters grapple with time and space, philosophies of religion, and its meaning. "Religion is being ultimately concerned about that which is and should be our ultimate concern . . . God is the name for the content of the concern. Such a concept of religion has little in common with the description of religion as the belief in the existence of a highest being called God, and the theoretical and practical consequences of such a belief." Somehow Professor Tillich claims that he is giving us an existential, not a theoretical, understanding of religion. I hadn't suspected that I and so many other theocentric religionists were so isolated from the real order of existence!

When the author moves into his "Concrete Applications," however, we are the beneficiaries of some brilliant insights into the theological pertinence of such universal cultural phenomena as language, art, and symbolism, and such particularistic expressions as existentialism, psychoanalysis, and industrial scientism. Especially enlightening is Dr. Tillich's knowledgeable range over the *Geistesgeschichte* and personalities in existentialism and psychoanalysis.

The "Cultural Comparisons" include appraisals first of his earlier career in the Germany which had inherited the leading theological and philosophical learning of more than a century and yet bred Nazism's Hitler, and then of his American development away from his previous understandable provincialism; the cultural impact of religion in East and West; and an evaluation of Martin Buber. A final chapter, "Communicating the Christian Message," is superb in establishing participation as a preacher's prerequisite for communicating. Unfortunately the book lacks an index.

A reader must be richer for reading these essays, if he can separate the evidential from the purely speculative. The latter can lead to that very estrangement which Dr. Tillich tries to help man overcome, an estrangement from himself because that kind of "Thou-God" to which the author would lead him may not be found to respond to the searching "I."

Loyola Seminary

JOSEPH B. SCHUYLER, S.J.

*Ghana—The Road to Independence, 1917-1957.* By F. M. Bourret. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960. Pp. xiii + 246. \$5.75.

The story of the transformation of the Gold Coast Colony into the independent State of Ghana could be really fascinating. One can perceive in this story a rare specimen of long range social planning, since the British already started in 1919 to prepare the quite primitive population of the colony for independence, as if foreseeing that the era of colonialism was coming to an end. The British respect for tradition has played a salutary part in the process: the tribal institutions were not abolished, but gradually improved and adopted to the goal; and when, in 1957, independence was granted, these institutions were ingeniously incorporated into the new structure based on democratic principles. Of course, the political preparations were accompanied by corresponding steps in the field of education (Ghana possesses a rather high standard University) and of economics, where private enterprise, without being abolished, was submitted to mild and skillful planning. The tempo of the process was accelerated during World War II and its aftermath, when it became obvious that independence was to come earlier than originally planned. The transition to independence went on peacefully, with few minor exceptions.

In this book Mr. Bourret gives a lot of information about the particular steps of the process above, but does not succeed in making the reader understand what really happened to the people, perhaps because of emphasis on the details of the gradual transformation of the administrative structure of the nascent State. Therefore the reader can hardly find in the book any explanation of the fact that, from an almost filial devotion of the people of Ghana to England and her monarchy expressed almost on the eve of independence, Ghana has turned to become one of the pivots of the anti-Western camp among the new African States.

*Fordham University and Marymount College*

N. S. TIMASHEFF

*Worker in the Canoe: A Puerto Rican Life History.* By Sidney W. Mintz. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960. Pp. ix + 288. \$5.00.

Caribbean Series No. 2, Sidney W. Mintz, Editor, is a landmark in the use of the technique of life histories as a significant aspect of social anthropological research.

The work itself is carefully done, with a meaningful sequence, intermixing finely the life story with the author's interpretations, and it contains good photographs, a list of the characters portrayed in the book, and a glossary. As for style, the author has that priceless ingredient—humility—which not only reveals a worthy scholar, but also throws significant light on the methodological process itself. While there is a time lapse between the reviewer's years in Puerto Rico, and the current work of Mintz, it is remarkable how little, in some respects, have the pictures changed. It is not easy to work the Puerto Rican field because of the ideological clashes and conflicts which beset this beautiful island of the Caribbean.



The handling of the major crisis, Church vs. social betterment, is accomplished with patience, tolerance, and skill. Such a work could not be feasible had it not been for the author's capacity for genuine friendship with his subject, and it again bears out Redfield's point that it is not possible to separate the anthropologist from the man.

When we get away from axe-grinding, we find that the social anthropologist and many sociologists recognize that acceptance of Catholicism as one's Faith does not require the white-washing of one of the major problems of Christianity, the Church's concern with the social problems which confront it. The reader will find incisive remarks regarding such matters, especially on pages 96, 228, 247, and also the excellent hypothesis on page 266, which states that, "If a society is suddenly exposed to new values by another more powerful and invading society, it seems reasonable to assume that those persons who take up the new values with the greatest speed and efficiency stand the best chance for success." This reviewer holds that this is true, in the Puerto Rican situation, as it is equally true in the superimposing of one religious system upon another. One will accept the new, for this is progress, but one will hold on to the old, and finally a syncretism emerges which follows the absolutes of both systems, with the hope that same rapport can be reached.

Not since Winter's "Beyond the Mountains of the Moon" has it been so forcefully demonstrated that a life history can tell us a very great deal about a culture. As anthropologists see some of the theoretical implications of current sociology, and as sociologists come to understand the enormous problem of gathering ethnographic material, we can hope not only for the necessary traditional lines of delineation among the social sciences, but also the greater need for the interdisciplinary approach.

If we can keep our loves, and put aside our self-aggrandisement, we may yet have an interactive learning process which does not isolate, but which integrates. Written with sympathy and understanding, Mintz' work should be read for its method as well as its profound understanding of certain cultural facts.

Saint Louis University

ALLEN SPITZER

*Identity and Anxiety*. Edited by Maurice R. Stein, Arthur J. Vidich and David Manning White. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960. Pp. 658. \$7.50.

A basic problem of deep concern to each one today in his own life and at the same time one on which philosophy and the social sciences concentrate, moreover one which has even gained popular attraction (best-sellers have been written about!), is the "survival of the person in mass society." This is precisely the sub-title of the book under review, and expressed through these words in an appealing and revealing manner is the despair that the individual today feels and to which he, out of a false shame, hesitates to give vent. Since this theme is of such a fundamental and universal character, all the social sciences and philosophy have in one way or another dealt with it. The editors of "Identity and Anxiety," therefore, went through the writings of "all manners" of creative authors and their selection offers the widest possible range



of approaches to the basic problem. Yet, this enormously rich and diversified material has been organized in a systematic and meaningful sequence so that the reader can follow the line chosen by the editors (who did such a creative job that they deserve to be called authors) and go through the book from beginning to end, thus gaining a full-sized image of the problem. But, on the other hand, almost every one of the 41 pieces in this collection touches at the fundamental issue so closely that the reader will get the meaning and not be lost by starting with one of the larger essays which, through title or subject matter, may appear more familiar to him than others. In this case he will undoubtedly soon feel induced to turn to a more systematic study afterwards.

The book is divided into three parts. The first one, "Central Perspectives," brings selections which help to clarify the two focal concepts around which the problems of our day center: identity and anxiety. Five psychiatrists, one anthropologist, three sociologists and one philosopher present the issue. The article on the "Problem of Ego Identity" by Eric H. Erikson, the well-known child psychologist and psychoanalyst whose scholarship in analytic theory is uncontested, opens the book and establishes a conceptual frame of reference for the reader even though many of the other contributions are not directly related to the terminology and conceptual imagery of this author. But having once read the Erikson paper, the reader has his pace set, and he will then, through the prism of other specialists, see the same ideas emerging again and again, whether they appear by means of a study of cultural change (Mead), or of the stranger entering a group (Schuetz), or through analysis of anxiety and fear by experts like Rollo May, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, and Kurt Riezler.

The second part, "Sources of Identity and Anxiety in Mass Life," gives a broad survey of our modern mass society, as it awakens in us the question and quest for our own identity and produces the state of anxiety to which our failures to find ourselves leads us. Man and work, the man of science, man in politics, the situation of the teacher and the destiny of the humanities within our educational system, the changes of the family as a social institution, the religious crisis, man as a member of a sex, the impact of "total institutions"—in form, e.g., of military organization or of totalitarian regimes—thoughts on all these areas are presented here by (in the main) most remarkable and stimulating articles. It is impossible to list them all but mentioned ought to be the profound essay by the late Franz Neumann on "Anxiety and Politics," and the empathetic paper by the late Willard Waller on "What Teaching Does to Teachers."

In the third part, "The Evolution of Personal Styles in Mass Society," illustrations are given from widely differing fields of the chances of man to develop today, and in spite of the present-day trends, to develop a personal style. Philosophy of history, the nature of poetry, the analysis of the work of an individual poet (Wallace Stevens), and the genesis of individual thought are covered by searching authors who, through the character of their papers, invite the reader to help them rather than to accept their findings. The concluding essay by Martin Buber most significantly deals with "Productivity and 'Existence'" which in an ideal way summarizes the problem: it shows the alternatives of being or doing and the deeper form of acting which produces an

impact on our fellow men through being, i.e., our being ourselves. Last but not least there is an introduction by the editors which not only interprets the idea of the whole volume but also discusses some of the essential problems with which such an anthology of thought is confronted, as, e.g., the variety of vocabularies and the problem of the coordination of the terminologies of the many specialists among themselves and with the language of the "generalists" whose contributions are so important in this book.

A book like this serves as a most beneficial remedy for the unavoidable tendency in contemporary sociology toward ever increasing specialization and technicalization. It is one by which all sociologists can profit, the younger generation, which has never known anything but the present trend, as well as the older ones who are more consciously aware of the dilemma in which their science finds itself.

Marquette University

RUDOLPH E. MORRIS

*The Overseas Americans.* By Harland Cleveland, Gerard J. Mangone, John Clarke Adams. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960. Pp. xv+316. \$5.95.

Of 1,600,000 overseas Americans, two-thirds of whom are non-civilians, 244 foreign nationals from Yugoslavia, Iran, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Japan, and 200 from Taiwan, India, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Brazil (together less than 3 thousandths of 1 percent of the overseas population) were interviewed in order to gather material for this Carnegie Report. It is immediately evident that the project is rather a survey than a profound study, and that the subtitle on the book-flap is misleading to say the least when it claims that this book tells of the "work, the life, and the education of 1,600,000 of our citizens," whereas at best, as an empirical study, it merely "inches onward" towards an understanding of the tasks of these Americans.

As a book of sources and personal impressions the book reads well. Chapters on "Culture Shock," "Technical Skill and Belief in Mission," "Cultural Empathy," "Agenda for Action," and "Internationalization of College Programs," interested this reviewer most. The explanation that "mission" meant "making the most of a bad situation with grace and cheerfulness while attempting constructive remedies on the job itself," seemed to be the only practical "way out" for the American who finds himself confused concerning what America is or for what it stands (p. 134). It was encouraging to read that the absurd rationalizations of some of our "do-gooders," and our many contradictions which make up an enviable U.S. logic, have received the bad audience abroad they deserve.

Least interesting was the chapter on "Missionaries," chiefly because the rich treasures of Catholic Mission Apostolates were left unlocked for the far more superficial information supplies by the Missionary Research Library in New York City.

Despite the limitations of sources and time (two years) for the study, "Overseas Americans" can help to open our eyes to the light that shines from shores other than our own. The suggestion that our encounter with our neigh-

bors be intelligent, empathetic, positive, humble, and energetic is well taken. No one would dispute the need for some kind of internationalization of our college programs to add that professional touch so much needed for such an important task.

Canisius College

REV. CYRIL O. SCHOMMER, S.J.

Herbert Von Borch: *Die unfertige Gesellschaft* (The Unfinished Society—America: Reality and Utopia). Munich: R. Piper & Co., 1960. Pp. 374. No price indicated.

The author, as the Washington correspondent of an important German newspaper, but even more as an accomplished sociologist and disciple of Alfred Weber, is highly qualified to write a book designed to introduce his German readers to the reality of present-day America, which for him includes ample references to the past and a careful observation of the country's aspirations and pressures toward the future. As it stands, his brilliantly written essay is as much of interest to Americans and ought to be read by sociologists and all those to whom comparative culture studies are a real concern. It is perhaps less amusing but certainly more profound and analytical than the writings of Dennis Brogan on the USA. No foreigner, at any rate, no foreign sociologist, has made such a comprehensive survey of the situation in which we find ourselves today in the early sixties when we begin to realize that the USA has reached a turning-point in her history and in the development of her social system. Hence the book is eminently timely.

The introductory chapter, "Belated Farewell to the Eighteenth Century," sets the frame for the whole approach of the author: he defines the present situation. America has been *made*, has been an experiment, much different in this respect from all other nations which have emerged as products of historical processes and coincidences. But by now American society has become so complex that its developments and changes are no longer to be promoted by human intentions and goal-settings. We have become the "affluent society" (Galbraith) with an abundance in material goods and at the same time a body in which the individual is suffering from self-alienation. The spiritual-moral resources of this country, strong as they still are, have become less visible; the indifference of the individual toward basic issues, his self-complacent contentedness, which avoids challenges and prefers the *status quo*, covers the surface of our lives so much that the positive agents beneath are out of sight. But they are present. We are, according to the author, about to enter again a period of action and initiative. As to quantity, we have reached the climax and are able to maintain the highest possible production of the means of further production and of consumer goods. In the field of quality are now being concentrated the challenges and tasks set for our society. The author counts among them: self-corrections of our form of capitalism, greater depth of our educational goals which were until now too much geared to social adjustment, improvement of our media of mass communication, the defense of the human person within the overwhelming collective structures of which our society is composed. In all that, in the humanization of a rich and saturated

social world, we recognize that our society is still unfinished. And this is America's greatest hope.

The author discusses the main areas of American life in two parts: one he calls the "public realm," the other "the private realm." Both sections cover much ground and offer stimulating ideas. Space does not permit us to go into details. However it must be mentioned that the author's ideas on egalitarianism, education, leisure time and the lifting of the qualitative level of the masses deserve the attention of the sociologists even if they are imbued with the thinking of Riesman, Whyte and Packard. The last part, "Landscapes and Forms of Style of Life," gives the impressions and observations of Von Borch who has travelled through all parts of the country, including even Alaska.

Marquette University

RUDOLPH E. MORRIS

*Self-Developing America.* By Harold J. Ruttenberg. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. Pp. xiii+254. \$4.50.

Briefly put, this is a testimony of faith in the American industrial capacity to achieve goals that will overcome poverty in the U.S., Europe, and the world. Eventually this will release creative capacities that will permit us to build a new world of freedom. Standing firmly within his own rich Hebraic heritage and a deep faith in America, expressed in the image of Lincoln, Ruttenberg speaks out of experiences both as a coalminer as well as a corporation owner. Although short on theory he speaks with perception that can hardly be ignored.

Those who prefer their values to be of the more transcendent ilk might, perhaps, demur when the author speaks of the dignity of man. Yet, so perceptive are his arguments for "humanation", the bringing of all people into a full participation in the productive process and the release of their inherent creativeness, that only the most dogmatic would turn away. Many sage comments indicate that the author has achieved some of the creativeness to which he refers: automation is seen as a tool of management against workers—it dehumanizes people; labor-management relations ought to re-examine the values that have accrued as a consequence of twenty-five years of collective bargaining; America, to overcome a tendency towards a blind and parochial capitalism, must find the moral equivalent of war to release its creativeness.

College of St. Scholastica

ROBERT M. BARRY

*The Making of an American Community. A Case Study of Democracy in a Frontier Country.* By Merle Curti. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959. Pp. xii+483. \$8.50.

Trempealeau County, Wisconsin, during the period 1840-1880, is the setting for a thorough study related to objectivity in history writing and the significance of the frontier in the promotion of democracy—two topics of discussion among historians for some time. While it is a case study of an interpretation of Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier theory, many will find merit and importance in the combination of long accepted methods of his-

torical investigation with certain quantitative methods and concepts common to other social sciences. The book will be of special importance to students of history but it will also be of interest to other social scientists inasmuch as quantitative methods are applied to a large number of factors and interrelationships, problems and adjustments, which are characteristic of American democracy. The general reader will find interesting such chapters as those on early settlement, transportation, social status, and the development of systems of government and education.

There seems to be little evidence for using the term community to apply to conditions prevalent during the earlier years of the period under study except that the county is a convenient political unit. Trempealeau county was chosen partly because it was a relatively small unit which possessed several frontier characteristics, but of more importance was the fact that there existed an abundance of statistical and documentary material including newspapers, county records and collections of private papers. All of this material made it possible to study in almost unbroken sequence the progress toward democracy which is defined to mean "widespread participation in the making of decisions affecting the common life, the development of initiative and self-reliance, and equality of economic and cultural opportunity." The acculturation of immigrant groups, the patterns of acquisition and development of agricultural and village property, the interrelationship of economic and social status, the changes in school attendance and occupational classification are among the specific areas of study as the county moves from a fur trading and wood cutting frontier to a well populated and integrated agricultural community. For much of this the statistical material available is incorporated into charts and tables in an application of quantitative objective methodology.

The net result is both a type of community study with emphasis on historical investigation and an interesting pioneer effort in history. For the reader who does not know the state of Wisconsin, there are times when the legitimate emphasis on the frontier characteristics of the county become so interesting that a broader map would be helpful in maintaining a proper perspective.

Marquette University

JOSEPH W. MCGEE

*The Sociology of Colonial Virginia.* By Morris Talpalcar. New York: Philosophical Library Inc., 1960. Pp. vxi+371. \$6.00.

If this work is to be judged on its philosophy rather than on its sociological content, an indictment might well be handed down in view of such statements as these: "Mankind has never had a universal-eternal standard of values in terms of which a local-temporary way of life can be appraised. It is competently held that a code of ethics is authoritarian, and without rational foundation"—(p. IX). He further states:

*The absence of a common denominator in values, and their authoritarian derivation; the fact that a world view is basically emotional rather than logical, and is subjectively accepted as superior—all this results in the isolated (in space or time) ideological world-in-itself. Where contact between such mutu-*

*ally exclusive mental entities is unavoidable a meeting of minds on fundamentals is precluded, and one side must impose its will on the other—(p. IX).*

Talpalcar consequently denied any attempt to evaluate the social pattern, an unnecessary disclaimer in view of the accepted sociological position. He says, "Thus under such conditions objectivity can only describe—it has no way to evaluate"—(p. IX). He then proceeds to make value judgments—(pp. 66, 260).

Whereas, at one time he assumes the sociality of man to be distinct from his nature—(p. 261), he later states that "man is universally and eternally a social animal"—(p. 289).

Although the reader may readily take issue with the social philosophy held by the author as stated, the sociological analysis itself offers some worthwhile observations.

A detailed contrast between the earlier Puritan sponsored corporate farm estate based on free simple ownership and the later Cavalier proprietary estate with its feudal bent points up the nature of the European economic transition (transplanted in America) and the emerging character of modern capitalism, its functions, goals, and impact on the cultural pattern. One of the better features of this analysis is the picture given of the class structure and the relationships involved.

Recognizing the Old World influences, Talpalcar then traces the modifying effects of the virgin wilderness on the rudiments of government and defense, the limitations on social and economic organization, class elements, and the effects imposed on status by the economic conditions obtaining in the colony. All these local factors had an impact on the imported European culture pattern which together produced the sociological pattern peculiar to colonial Virginia.

Historical accuracy is violated in his sweeping generalization that labor in the pre-technology period, "had no human rights; it was universally regarded as economic resources, and it was included as within the meaning of 'capital'"—(p. 290). The author is apparently unaware of the medieval rights relationship existing between the apprentices and journeymen and the master in the guild system and of the whole Thomistic philosophy of human rights and the role of labor.

Exception might also be taken to such an exclusive generalization as, "man has a natural aversion to labor: labor in all its forms—including 'wage,' which is dissociated from land—was throughout pre-technology fundamentally forced . . ."—(p. 290).

The purist will wince at the cavalier violation of the minor amenities of grammar such as, the repeated use of adjectives for nouns and for the loose use of terminology. On the whole, however, it is a very readable account.

Marycrest College

SISTER MARY LOIS EBERDT, C.H.M.

*Understanding Organizational Behavior.* By Chris Argyris. Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1960. Pp. xii+179. \$5.00.

This book is more than a report of research, although it is that. It is a re-

port of research done within an explicitly stated theoretical framework chosen for its ability to integrate presently available, relevant, behavioral science research findings. The book is also, in a sense, a manual. It presents research findings in one industrial unit to show how theory and method are used in diagnosis, and follows with an attempt to show that the model of Plant X's social system can be used to make *a priori* predictions about Plant Y.

Argyris describes the organization as a living organism characterized by "the weaving together in one cyclical process of the master functions of maintenance and development." The scientist studying the living organism must understand the unique event as well as the generalized pattern; he must understand the parts, their relationship to each other, and the activity related to self-maintenance and development.

Using as his two basic variables, human beings and formal organizations, both conceived of as dynamic, goal-directed unities, Argyris describes the properties of each of the two unities. He outlines briefly the development of the human being in our culture, and the characteristics of formal organizations. The research findings reported here are largely concerned with the interaction between the two, with special emphasis on those aspects of the interaction which feed back and reinforce the total organization. Argyris' first proposition provides a teasing hint of this very interesting analysis: "There Is a Lack of Congruency between the Needs of Healthy Individuals and the Demands of the (Initial) Formal Organization."

The author set for himself a difficult task, and achieved a notable degree of success. He describes his approach as an immature one, and notes the difficulties inherent in attempting to study total organization. The reader will be aware of the immaturity and difficulties as he attempts to follow the theory and research reported here. But the attempt, although sometimes frustrated by lack of clarity (in this reviewer's opinion, both of language and thought), is nevertheless worthwhile. The organicism appears to be merely an unnecessary device for structuring the research of an industrial unit as a social system. This reviewer is not competent to judge either the completeness or accuracy of the descriptions of human development and the characteristics of formal organizations; both appear to be acceptable. The author gives very full descriptions of his methods and their limitations. The findings, even aside from their theoretical implications, will be of interest to the industrial sociologist. *Understanding Organizational Behavior* should prove a real stimulus to the growth of industrial sociology.

St. John Fisher College

EDNA M. O'HERN

*The Human Side of Enterprise.* By Douglas McGregor. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1960. Pp. x+246. \$4.95.

The author, Professor of Management at the School of Industrial Management at M.I.T., gives a critique of policies and practices in the management of human resources in American business and industrial organization. He examines these critically in the light of current social science knowledge about human nature and behavior in organizational settings.



Two theories form the focus of analysis. Three assumptions comprise Theory X, which underlies current organizational literature and management policy:

1. *The average human being has an inherent dislike of work and will avoid it if he can.*
2. *Because of this human characteristic of dislike of work, most people must be coerced, controlled, directed and threatened with punishment to get them to put forth adequate effort toward the achievement of organizational objectives.*
3. *The average human being prefers to be directed, wishes to avoid responsibility, has relatively little ambition, wants security above all* (pp. 33-34).

These assumptions rest primarily on armchair speculation rather than on the latest empirical research and are today wholly inadequate. They are the theoretical assumptions of the traditional managerial view of direction and control, with its emphasis on authority.

The assumptions of Theory Y, while not yet all finally validated, are far more consistent with the latest findings of the human sciences:

1. *The expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is as natural as play or rest.*
2. *External control and the threat of punishment are not the only means of bringing about effort toward organizational objectives. Man will exercise self-discretion and self-control in the service of objectives to which he is committed.*
3. *Commitment to objectives is a function of the rewards associated with their achievement.*
4. *The average human being learns, under proper conditions, not only to accept but to seek responsibility.*
5. *The capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of imagination, ingenuity, and creativity in the solution of organizational problems is widely, not narrowly, distributed in the population.*
6. *Under the conditions of modern industrial life, the intellectual potentialities of the average human being are only partially utilized* (pp. 47-48).

Management guided by Theory Y, maintains the author, makes for the effective integration of individual and organizational goals, and creates "conditions such that the members of the organization can achieve their own goals best by directing their efforts towards the success of the enterprise" (p. 49). Here the emphasis is on persuasion and discussion. The role of the manager may be described as that of the teacher, professional helper, colleague, consultant. With such enlightened management the organization will also better realize its economic objectives, because adjustments are made in significant ways to the needs and goals of its members. And if Theory Y seems socialistic, anarchistic, or even inconsistent with human nature to many of today's managers or with formal textbook principles of classical organizational theory, the reason is that it flies in the face of ingrained habits of thought and action that no longer can be squared with the social science findings of the last thirty years; thus they are at best only partially true, given today's political, social and economic milieu.

Professor McGregor in the second part of the book traces the implications and results of Theory Y in practice by applying it to performance appraisal, the administration of salaries and promotions, the Scanlon Plan, worker par-

ticipation, the managerial climate, staff-line relationships, leadership, management development, and the management team.

The presentation is insightful and quite convincing. However, there are a few inconsistencies, overstatements or idealisms. For instance, the author does not clarify whose ethics he is talking about (e.g., pp. 12, 13, 109, etc.). Who will deny that there is at least some inherent human tendency to avoid work? Even the most vital industry utilizing the new managerial principles would hardly be "a model for governments and nations" (p. 246).

The book is valuable for its brief statement of the latest recommended managerial procedures. As such it cannot be ignored in any industrial psychology or sociology class. Managers of all kinds of organizations and at all levels can reflect with profit on its contents.

St. John's University

REV. PAUL B. MARX, O.S.B.

*Hawthorne Revisited.* By Henry A. Landsberger. Ithaca: Cornell Social Science Research Center: Cornell University, 1958. Pp. x+119. \$3.50.

The Hawthorne experiments were conducted at the Western Electric plant in Chicago, between 1925 and 1932, by the Harvard University research group who founded the Elton Mayo school of industrial relations. The most comprehensive report of the experiments, "Management and the Worker", by F. J. Roethlisberger, was not published until 1939. Professor Landsberger has written an excellent summary of "Management and the Worker" which he uses for his re-analysis and criticism. The experiments were conducted from a central concept of social psychology and industrial psychology, and the published interpretations by the Mayo school were especially biased in this direction. Over the years, there has been a storm of criticism directed against the Hawthorne experiments by industrial relations researchers who do not rely solely on the psychological approach, or who are opposed to it. I believe John T. Dunlop is the most constructive critic of the Mayo school with his theory that there are three fields of interaction that must be explained: (1) interaction in the collective bargaining process; (2) The behavior of management as an organization, and the union as an organization; and (3) the conduct of the individual workers in the work situation (p. 42).

Professor Landsberger has demonstrated effectively that many of the criticisms of the experiments have been based on books which have *selected* material from the experiments, and that a study of the more comprehensive "Management and the Worker" does not justify this blanket condemnation of the experiments themselves. For example, the accusation that the experiments were pro-management can be disproved by reading Parts II and III of "Management and the Worker", which document the arbitrariness, favoritism, and callousness shown by management towards the Western Electric workers (p. 55). Returning to the more comprehensive industrial relations theory of Dunlop, the Hawthorne studies were conducted while labor unions were at a low level of influence, and years before the Western Electric plant was unionized. "Hawthorne Revisited" is critical of the experiments, but is in general friendly. Actually, the experiments marked an early stage in the study of industrial relations, and the obviously undisciplined approach was exploratory in nature.

Professor Landsberger discusses each of the three stages in the experiments: first, the observation period; second, the interview period; and finally the combination of observation and interview. The psychological bias, particularly of the interpretations in Part V, is mentioned, but so also is the fact that "Management and the Worker" contains many indications which show mutual support by informal socialization processes, evidence of the effect of external conditions such as insecurity during the depression period of the early thirties (which, incidentally, was neglected entirely in the Mayo interpretations), and a very sensitive commentary on the factors controlling the system of worker status. Professor Landsberger adversely criticizes some of the assumptions and later programs of the Mayo group, especially the counseling system which he considers unsupported by the researchers' own findings in "Management and the Worker". The final summary of the Hawthorne experiments cites them as a classic in industrial relations, still of heuristic value to industrial relations students, and the foundation of empiricism in industrial relations studies.

University of Notre Dame

LEONARD TOWNSEND MORSE

*A Modern Introduction to the Family.* Edited by Norman W. Bell and Ezra F. Vogel. The Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois, 1960. Pp. x+691. \$7.50.

We have here a book of readings which in its organization is heavily indebted to Parsonian theoretical conceptions. Teachers looking for a good academic orientation to the family might do well to look at this new publication. Those, however, who have oriented their courses to marriage preparation will not find this approach satisfactory. Also the title of this text should be taken literally for one will not find material here on dating, courtship, engagement, marital prediction studies, mate selection and the like. Nor will the instructor with an historical or demographic interest in the family find satisfaction in this text.

Prime emphasis is given to functional analysis. A good introductory essay by the editors is oriented toward Parts II, III and IV with a total of 44 readings. The readings in Part II consider the interrelationships between the family and the economic, political, community and value systems; in Part III, the readings deal with the adaptive, co-ordinative, integrative and pattern-maintaining functions taking place within the family itself; and in Part IV the readings pertain to the effects on personality development of these same functions. Part I, with 7 readings, serves as the Introduction and is devoted to the universality and variability of the human family with three readings given over to the Russian, Israel and Nayar cases which are used to question the universality of the family. This approach seems like a good pedagogical technique even if the writers conclude that the family is ultimately indispensable.

Obviously some would quarrel with the readings selected but to this reviewer they serve their purpose well enough. Less than a handful are found in other books of readings on the family. Three-fourths of the readings were originally published after 1950. Over twenty came from published books and

twenty-seven from a wide variety of journals in the fields of sociology, psychiatry, anthropology, economics and political science.

The editors anticipate some of the criticism of such a selected approach by saying that although their purpose is "to introduce a tentative theoretical conception which will systematically organize a wide variety of family phenomena, and to present selected readings within this conceptual context" (p. v), they add that "these readings do not prove that the conceptual scheme is the best possible but only illustrate its utility" (p. v). Taken in this context, this book can be highly recommended.

One final comment. Those who have been using the Harry Johnson *Sociology* will find in this new introduction to the family an excellent means of bringing about continuity between the introductory and family courses.

Chestnut Hill College

WALTER F. ZENNER

*Education for Child Rearing.* By Orville G. Brim, Jr. New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 1959. Pp. 362. \$5.00.

In a day when the rectory parlor and the principal's office offer so much proof of the lack of training of so many (especially younger) parents for the work of raising children, the present volume refreshingly outlines for us the many contributions which have been made to the theory and practice of parent education as well as the many areas of neglect in this same field. So often one realizes how unequipped many late-teen-age parents are for fulfilling one of their main duties in life. So often one wonders just how this lack of equipment is being remedied. Our book outlines all this in a gratifying manner throughout its nine deeply interesting chapters. It deepens its interest and value by the numerous and pertinent bibliographical references at the end of each chapter. In this book the Russell Sage Foundation has made another significant contribution to its "central theme (of) the development of ways and means for effective utilization of social science knowledge in the various fields of practice concerned with the welfare of the American people (p. 5)". If the family is the basis of our society, then anything that contributes to better family life definitely helps the welfare of our people.

All, however, is not perfect in this book. While recognizing the immense contribution made by religious groups to the subject, the author all but completely ignores what Catholics as such have done in this field. It is almost as if he were unaware of any specific Catholic effort in this regard. The various projects of the NCWC are completely ignored, and one looks in vain for mention of any specifically Catholic work on this subject. One objects, also, to the seeming impression that religion and religious training, in this as in so many other aspects, is merely another form of effort toward mental health improvement. Is it, perhaps, due to the attitudes and ambiguity of Catholics that so many writers seem unaware that religion has its own place in life, and that nothing else at all is really explainable if its relation to God and religion is ignored or overlooked?

Cambridge 39, Massachusetts.

CHARLES J. FABING

*Voting Research and the Businessman in Politics.* By Donald E. Stokes. Ann Arbor: Braun & Brumfield, 1960. Pp. 39. \$3.00.

Management officials have long been concerned about the nature and extent of political participation among employees and employers. In March, 1960, business men and social scientists met to examine research on such phases of public voting behavior. The tables and interpretations given here review some of the pertinent work, especially that done in the years 1953-1959. Three-fourths of the electorate identify with one of the two major parties (three to two favoring the Democratic party). The tendency to vote for a particular party starts in adolescence or early adulthood and involves a change of party vote only under the impact of *drastic* changes in one's life situation, e.g., the Civil War, Great Depression. Reviewing the annual elections from 1952 to 1958 the analysis suggests three classes of elections: 1) the maintaining one, 2) the deviating election (vote runs counter to party loyalty due to current issues), and 3) the realigning election (long term shift of party loyalties). The Eisenhower elections are evaluated as deviating rather than realigning.

More specifically the study finds that unions *do* have an impact on voting, if they take a strong stand, and this is equally true of many other groups. Catholics are considered to have become more assimilated to American culture and thus Catholicism has less influence than Jewish identification, when socioeconomic class is controlled. Catholics tend to vote Democratic, however, and especially so when the candidate is a Catholic (about 10% more). A review of the "right to work" election controversy in Ohio indicates that business should be very sensitive to public hostility resulting from its active participation in electoral politics.

This volume with its appendices detailing voting records by age, religion, trade union affiliation, income and sex (1948, 1952, 1956 elections), can be strongly recommended to all libraries and also to all who teach public opinion or phases of political sociology.

University of Notre Dame

DONALD N. BARRETT

*The Soviet System of Government.* By John N. Hazard. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (Revised Edition, 1960). Pp. xiii+262. \$4.00.

This portrayal of soviet government as it moves into the 1960's should be a rather significant, timely textbook for students in Russian studies, comparative government, social systems and in contemporary world affairs. The book was first published in 1957, and, since several important events took place after the appearance of the first edition (i.e., decentralization of Soviet industries, cessation of collective leadership, the removal of Zhukov as Minister of Defense, and the revision of law codes, etc.), the second edition has brought the book up to date.

The book, with its comparative-descriptive framework, is an assessment of the general structure and the function of the Soviet political system, the Party, and its auxiliary organizations. It is *comparative* insofar as Professor Hazard's discussion of the Soviet government is contrasted with the Western

system of democracy. It is *descriptive* in that he makes no attempt to draw the existing theory of political organization into his analysis and discussion of the Soviet system—its process and functions. The book is well-documented and the materials used have been carefully scrutinized. Since it appears in textbook form, footnotes are deleted and documentation is edited at the end of the main text.

The lack of analytic elements in this book does not seem to make the work less important. On the contrary, Professor Hazard's comparative discussion of the concept of the democratic functioning of a political system shows exactly how a functional subsystem of a society fails to coincide with the concrete structures and, consequently, their processes. It shows how similar functions are met and how structural differences are developed to insure an *ad hoc* concept of *democracy*. The comparison of functional similarities and structural variations may provide very useful source material for students interested in the theory of social organization. Professor Hazard ably demonstrates how a government can be democratic in pattern, but authoritarian and dictatorial in its substance.

The book discusses, in its order of presentation, the Marxist concept of democracy, the Communist Party, its auxiliary organizations and their functional contributions to the Party, the federal system, the collectivization, the army, and the judiciary system. It also presents an illuminating discussion of the struggle for power among the managerial and technical classes, and the concept of "counterweights" by which the rulers manipulate the gigantic machinery of the State and the Party, and which enables the leaders to maintain effective control and manage internal tensions.

University of Portland

WILLIAM T. LIU

*The Cross and the Fasces, Christian Democracy and Fascism in Italy.* By Richard A. Webster. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1960. Pp. 229. \$5.00.

For an Italian and a Catholic the title of this book is paradoxically both irritating and amusing. The content is a pleasantly written story but not history. It is a prejudiced approach to Catholicism and Catholic affairs in Italy. Employing a term used by European liberal and anticlerical newspapers to express a neutral approach to economic, political and social life, the approach may be called "Laic." This biased approach in itself prevents it from being the true history of Christian democracy in Italy. Every page of this book reminds the reviewer of the prose of *L'Espresso*, an Italian laic newspaper published in Rome. The language is beautiful, the endeavor respectable according to a newsman's approach, but to maintain that it is the true story of facts and people is another matter. The source material of *The Cross and the Fasces* is of dubious worth, unilateral, and excessively laden with quotations from local newspapers which, as a rule, do not furnish reliable material for a historical book.

Dr. Webster seems to be under the impression that the laic interpretation of Italian events is a neutral one. Nothing could be further from the truth. This

interpretation represents nothing less and nothing more than the traditional biased liberal view. Such a point of view is certainly not impartial and, what is more, is sorely lacking in objectivity.

Apparently the author prefers such preconceived notions of papal documents to the meaning of the documents themselves (pp. 7, 96-98). The Vatican struggle for political power in Italy and elsewhere (p. 185) seems to be a fixation on the part of the author. Any fair-minded Italian Catholic would deride this assumption.

The insinuation that the Jesuit writers of *Civiltà Cattolica* were "favoring the Italian expansion in Africa" (p. 126) and "anti-Semitism in Italy" (pp. 124F) is simply fantastic and false. This reviewer, a native Italian, happened in that era to have been an assiduous reader of *Civiltà Cattolica* and was personally acquainted with all the priests quoted by Dr. Webster. This reviewer knows the articles and the thinking of the men who wrote them. It is therefore not too strong to say that the conclusions drawn by Dr. Webster are absolutely at variance with the truth. Perhaps the author has difficulty in catching the nuances of the Italian language and, in wishful thinking, reads certain things into the context.

Chapter VII on Father Gemelli likewise is superficial and slanted. It is no exaggeration to say that the author grasps neither the philosophy of Catholicism nor the psychology of the Italian people in the complicated yet fascinating history of Italian politics. It must be said that "the population policy of Fascism" (p. 155) did not at all, as Dr. Webster maintains, "harmonize" with the morality of the Church. The more benign interpretation of the tenet of Dr. Webster would be to charge him with ignorance of the *mistica fascista* and of Catholic moral theology.

A naive lack of insight into the Italian political historical scene and events constitutes the main characteristic of this book. An unfair interpretation of the nature, purpose, and work of the Church in Italy is another feature of the book, and *a fortiori* prevents the author from writing objectively. Furthermore, he grossly underestimates the power of Communism in the peninsula and its tight grip on the socialists. One wonders how the author hopes to combine "the traditional human values of Liberalism and Socialism" (p. 184) and to merge them into a neutral democratic system of free enterprise.

Dr. Webster would do well to take a second and more careful look at the very nature of both Italian Liberalism and Italian Socialism in their real philosophy and practical political endeavors. This more profound investigation coupled with the use of more comprehensive sources of greater validity would present an entirely different history of "The Cross and the Fasces" as well as of "Christian Democracy in Italy."

College of St. Thomas

NINO MARITANO

*Les Temoins de Jehovah*. By Gerard Hebert, S.J. Montreal: Les Editions Belarmin, 1960. Pp. 341. (no price indicated)

To maintain that the devil is the founder of all religious and at the same time to demand freedom for its activities in the name of religion, is only one of the paradoxes involved in the organization known as Jehovah's Witnesses,



as Father Hebert brings out in this well-documented study of the movement. While the orientation of the book is historical and doctrinal rather than strictly sociological, any sociologist interested in studying the development of Jehovah's Witnesses, as religious sect and social movement, will find considerable information in the text for such an investigation, and an ample listing of material for further research in the thirty-two page bibliography.

Among other aspects of the movement, the reader is made aware of the appeal of its particular brand of millenarianism to a group which one authority cited calls proletarian; the charismatic nature of the early leadership; the emphasis on an unspecialized, unprofessional part-time ministry, and on a high degree of congregational participation. This situation is evidently, however, in a state of transition, if one may judge by the establishment of a training school for its "overseers" in 1959, and the comparative statistics of participation in the "Memorial" service, which indicate a decline from about 52% of those present in 1938 to slightly over 1% in 1959, an actual decrease in numbers as well as in percentage. Although the number of lower-echelon members seems to be increasing, the number of the "elect" is diminishing.

The first half of this book deals with the history and organization of the sect, the second half with its doctrine and a refutation of it; several appendices, including statistical tables of the membership, citations from original texts, and other background sources, as well as the bibliography, help to round out the picture.

*Ursuline College*

MOTHER M. ROSANNA, O.S.U.

*Zur Ethnischen Begründung der Todesstrafe Heute.* By Gustav Ermecke. Paderborn: Ferd. Schoeningh, 1959. Pp. 41. Paper DM 2.

Being an academic lecture (inaugural address presented on the occasion of the author's installation as Rector of the Graduate School of Philosophy and Theology of Paderborn), this treatise on the moral and ethical problems of capital punishment in modern society is rather comprehensive. It gives a good view of the breadth and depth of the argument in academic perspective with the purpose of helping to clarify the public discussion—heated, emotional, political though it may be.

The learned author is convinced that according to theology and ethics capital punishment is essentially permissible and justifiable, even in our age. He admits, however, that during human history capital punishment has been abused, administered for wrong reasons, on the basis of erroneous concepts of man, the state, punishment, reparation, deterrence. Yet none of these facts can change the validity of the principle involved.

Due to the horror and protest of the German people caused by the shameful abuse of the death penalty under the Hitler regime, the 1949 constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany abolished capital punishment. Within 10 years many voices were raised for a repeal, arguing that horrible crimes are now committed because the deterrent effects of capital punishment are absent.

The treatise addresses itself not so much to the general public, but to the

jurists and lawmakers as an aid in their decisions. Since we in the United States are certainly not unfamiliar with the argument on capital punishment, this address is of interest for the informed American public also. Quite a number of states have already legally abolished capital punishment; in the others the discussion of pro and con has never come to a standstill. One heinous crime committed causes a flare-up of the smoldering argument. Still, here as well as in Germany the tendency seems to point toward the understanding that, in spite of moral and ethical justification, modern society does not depend on death penalty to protect its very existence. Even though society may be justified to execute a member who through a crime has forfeited his right to membership in this society, it certainly cannot be bound and obliged to kill this former member.

It is interesting to learn in the course of this lecture that some of the most eloquent "abolitionists"—like the theologian Karl Barth—allow for occasional exceptions. Even Goethe is quoted (p. 10) to have said: "to abolish capital punishment is difficult; if we do, we must occasionally fall back on it." Whatever our own position, we might as well be certain of the philosophical and theological reasoning as it accumulated through the ages—and that is well presented in this brief lecture, considerably enlarged through footnotes and appendix for publication.

*Saint Paul 5, Minnesota*

TERESA MUELLER

*The American Funeral.* By Le Roy Bowman. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959. Pp. viii+181. \$4.50.

Progress is not the mortician's chief product. Still, the time is long past for changes in American funeral practice. In this excellent and concise sociology of the American funeral, Dr. Bowman tells us the reasons for the impelling need for change. The research for this study was thorough and many-sided with observation, interviews, group discussions, schedules and perusal of the literature. The written results are interesting, clear and cohesive.

The work is divided into four sections with a total of twelve chapters. Part I gives the setting and a description of a typical American funeral from a social interaction viewpoint. Part II sets forth the underlying social forces of Part I, with the focal point, the undertaker. Part III is analysis of the changes in the social structure and functions of the institution, the American funeral. Part IV discusses in a philosophical manner the meanings of funerals and is a call to reform American funeral practice into meaningful ceremonies. Appendices treat of donations to eye-banks, bequests of one's body to science, preparation of children for a knowledge of death; cremation, and sociological-anthropological theories of burial.

In summary, this study is well-balanced and challenging. The need for reform is felt; still, the author is in no sense a special pleader nor a soap-box crusader. The white horse he rides has a scholarly mien and has been nurtured with social facts. The implicit need for a religious ritual, noted in this book, overlooks the requiem liturgy of the Catholic Church. Another oversight is the neglect of canon law on the rights of the deceased about the choice of the location of the Church for the funeral (especially, canon 1223ff). Despite

these reservations, all sociologists and all pastors should read "The American Funeral."

Loyola College, Baltimore 10, Maryland

JAMES J. CONLIN, S.J.

*National Manpower Council - Education and Manpower.* By Henry David. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. Pp. xiii+326. \$5.00.

Since the advent of "sputnik", the United States has become increasingly concerned with the mental resources of its citizens. Its potential especially for scientific achievement has concerned her leaders.

This volume contains fourteen articles gathered primarily from the reports of the *National Manpower Council*, and edited by Dr. Henry David, the Executive Director of the Council. Dr. David grouped under four subheadings: Introduction to the Problem, Secondary Education, Vocational Guidance, and Higher Education.

That the problem admits of no simple panacea is well acknowledged (p. 12). The weaknesses of the present education system are noted and admitted (p. 27). "Know how is not passed from father to son. Knowledge and the skill to apply it are acquired rather than inherited characteristics" (p. 36). But this "know how" can be impeded by the over-institutionalization of the High School. "I am disheartened—though not in despair—about the prospects of secondary education" (p. 44).

The subject of our secondary education is one on which the Council feels that our thinking needs to be reviewed. Vocational education comes in for a scrutinization in Chapter VII. The trend towards vocational training grew from the '30's when young people used High School neither for College preparation nor as a preparation for work. High Schools were considered in the beginning as the means needed to prepare the youth of the country for higher and graduate education.

In the last pages of the book, a clearly defined picture is given us of where the primary and critical responsibility lies. It is on the secondary level where the greatest change and evaluation must take place. It is here that the available brain power is sorted, prepared, and channeled according to its abilities.

The book is timely, thought-provoking, and sometimes a bit alarming as it indicates our needs, delineates our weaknesses, and assesses our chances in a world of scientific advances.

It would seem to the reviewer that the *National Manpower Council* has rendered a great service in that if nothing else, it does make thinking people think of our education weaknesses. Dr. David's choice of material is the result of a learned background, and a rich experience in the field.

Seton Hall University

PAUL E. LANG

*Women and Work in America.* By Robert W. Smuts. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. Pp. xii+180. \$4.50.

Our search for understanding, ourselves as well as the rest of reality, prompts us to seek for uniformities. Sexual differentiation gives us a quite

patent set of social uniformities, and we keep trying to understand men and women in terms of more specific and derivative uniform characteristics. That we have a long way to go is evident in the continuing controversies a la Margaret Mead and Father Lucius Cervantes, S.J., the recent (and excellent) *Women in Wonderland* by Dorothy Dohen, and so on. The book of Robert Smuts under review is not so much a participant in the controversy as a report on one aspect of the Conservation of Human Resources Project established at Columbia University a decade ago. But it supplies that sort of readable, concisely delineated history of the facts which makes theoretical probing more fruitful.

The Project has already published several studies on the military, the Negro, the uneducated; this study of Mr. Smuts should be correlated with two reports of the related National Manpower Council on *Womanpower* and *Work in the Lives of Married Women*.

The author uses for his data mostly the United States Census Reports for 1890 and 1950, as well as other decennial reports, and various monographs, literary works and periodical articles on the American culture during the sixty year span. He combines well the evidence of the historical record and raw data of statistics. His four chapters cover the work done by women in its sameness and variation during the recorded period; a description of the working women themselves; the conditions and demands as well as the purposes and rewards of their work; and finally a rather well balanced, and hence properly inconclusive appraisal of what women's working tells us about the variously hypothesized distinctive qualities of women.

Perhaps the most valuable contribution of *Women and Work* is the author's carefully summarized correlations—and indications of causation, too—between patterns of female attitudes and behavior and the concurrent social conditions. This is invaluablely convenient for use in exemplifying social differentiation and stratification within a cultural milieu—including the healthy perennial, "male and female He made them."

Loyola Seminary

JOSEPH B. SCHUYLER, S.J.

*Communication or Conflict*. Edited by Mary Capes. New York: Association Press, 1960. Pp. xi+228. \$4.00.

Not all readers of this volume will agree with its editor's claim that conferences are "temporary communities"; some, moreover, may view as overly optimistic the prefatory statement that "meetings have begun to replace battlefields" as places where relations between groups are determined; most readers, it may be assumed, will nonetheless approve of *Communication or Conflict* as representative of a serious effort to advance our knowledge of the factors affecting small conference operations and effectiveness.

Sponsored jointly by the World Federation for Mental Health and the Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation, an unlikely international conference on international conferences was held at Eastbourne, England in 1956. Twenty-one European and American scientists and professionals with experience in organizing conferences were brought together for a week to consider factors in

group dynamics which might limit the effectiveness of conference procedures. Capes' work, subtitled, "Conferences: Their Nature, Dynamics, and Planning," contains in Part I the "working papers" prepared and presented to the conference participants prior to their meeting. Part II documents the knowledgeable and sometimes stimulating deliberations at Eastbourne. Part III describes, in five appendices, the conferences and conference techniques which "have been of value." Most sociologists will probably find the first part of Capes' volume unrewarding for being oversimplified restatements of known positions (Margaret Mead writes on "The Cultural Perspective"; Otto Klineberg urges "The Appreciation of Individual Idiosyncrasies"); and the last section too narrowly limited in scope (e.g., a description of the conferences for diplomats held at Clarens, Switzerland). All, however, who are interested in the advance of small group research can profit from the diversity and ingenuousness of the fifteen discussions to which more than half of the pages of this publication are devoted.

Touching on general problems, such as the kind of conference most appropriate to defined goals, conference manipulation, leadership, communication, and evaluation, the individual discussions are of considerable worth, especially where, as is usually true, questions considered are of an undeniable specificity. Among the questions for which answers are attempted: What are the pros and cons of conferences of one day, two days, a weekend, or longer? If a conference is moving toward unforeseen goals, what actions should and should not be taken by its sponsor? Other hints to the type of discussion reported by Capes are to be found in sections examining; the manipulatory or "therapeutic" functions of a steering committee; the modification of conferences when participants, for financial reasons, stay in different kinds of accommodations; and the disadvantages for multi-disciplinary conferences when two participants are from the same university. Few, possibly, of the many specific questions raised are answered completely; not one, certainly, is dodged.

Students of small group interaction will discover in *Communication or Conflict* a profitable experience. Although experiencing communication failure on the topic, "Training Needs for Conference Personnel" (Discussion XIII), the international conferees went considerably beyond mere satisfaction of sponsors' expectations in their treatments of conference evaluation and experimental research (Discussions XII, XIV). It may come as a surprise to some to learn that "the only conceivable form of religious observance that is cross-national, cross-religious, cross-class, cross-everything . . ." is, according to Mead, Silence (p. 63).

Catholic University of America

R. CLETUS BRADY

*Social Science in Nursing; Applications for the Improvement of Patient Care.*  
by Frances Cooke Macgregor. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960.  
Pp. 354. \$5.00.

*Social Science in Nursing* would be better named *Behavioral Science in Nursing* as the author limits her discussion to the relationship to nursing of three of the social sciences, sociology, psychology and anthropology. The sub-

title is perhaps explanatory of the functional nature of her approach. Allowing for the attenuated concept of social science, *Social Science in Nursing* is stimulating and informative reading for social scientists interested in the nursing profession and for nursing educators working for the integration of the two disciplines.

The author represents a progressive philosophy of patient-centered nursing, "the holistic approach," stressing the importance of the added knowledge to be derived from an increased familiarity with the behavioral sciences without de-emphasizing the importance of professional techniques.

The volume explores the contributions of social psychology, sociology, and anthropology to three areas of the nursing profession: patient care, interpersonal relations of staff, and student self-awareness.

Using the case history method familiar to nursing education, the first part of the volume demonstrates the need for social science in the health field. It presents an image of the nurse who is a technically proficient, emotionally adjusted unit of the professional team while exploring briefly the problems that this new image has created.

Part II comprises the greater part of the volume and is a discussion of an experimental program planned and executed at Cornell University New York Hospital School of Nursing. Nurses and social scientists who are likewise engaged in producing a course tailored to the limitations of a nursing school curriculum should find this section very stimulating. The thirty hours allotted to the program was devoted to basic conceptual material presented by the author, supplemented by guest lecturers, and a resourceful use of audio-visual aids. The conceptualization appears to be rather superficial but this may be due to the fact that the material is descriptive rather than analytical. As a blueprint for the development of so brief a course, the material is creatively and suggestively arranged.

The final section was the least satisfying to this reviewer. The various socio-psychological problems that arose in obtaining collaboration of the personnel involved were discussed but the solutions seemed inconclusive. The "limitless opportunities for cross-disciplinary undertakings between the two professions" envisioned by the author are not convincingly presented. If the author speaks for the nursing profession, the profession still lacks a clear image of the role of social science.

The bibliography is excellent, up-to-date and representative. For anyone interested in the integration of social science and the nursing school curriculum this volume is highly recommended. Its shortcomings reveal the difficulty of the problem and the author is to be commended for the insight that she provides for us.

Salve Regina College

SISTER MARY CHRISTOPHER O'ROURKE, R.S.M.

*Social Principles and Economic Life.* By John F. Cronin, S.S. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1959. Pp. xxiii + 436. \$6.50.

While Father Cronin intended the present volume as a revision and condensation of his earlier work, *Catholic Social Principles*, the condensation

left only half of the original material, whereas the revision involved the inclusion of so much new and more pertinent data, that he deemed it necessary to change the title while retaining its original purpose to offer an explanation of Catholic social principles in the light of contemporary American economic life.

Fortunately, the organization of this book is similar to the former in that each chapter is prefaced by excerpts from papal encyclicals and other authoritative sources which are then explained according to general and moral principles together with their application to more limited situations.

The author arranges his material in three divisions. First, he explains the social question in relation to the broad bases of human nature, gives the social teaching of the Church and evaluates other current philosophies. Next, he focuses on special fields, such as capital, labor, wages, property and the state. Finally, he discusses selected social problems such as international economic life, race problems and the rural community. He concludes with a highly important chapter which indicates how these social principles should flow over into positive social action.

Granted that the title justifies an emphasis upon the economic aspects, granted, too, the welcome addition of chapters on race relations and rural life, to this reviewer, the social problem is so much wider than his scope reveals, that regret must be expressed for lack of inclusion of such areas as family problems, crime, and juvenile delinquency.

On the positive side, for this book is excellent, one of the finest aspects is Father Cronin's ability to present with fairness both sides of a question and to indicate that the application of general principles to specific situations is far from easy. Too, his references and annotated reading list are highly valuable. Another asset is that the style is so clear and delightful, that all, students, priests, and laymen, who need to read this book in order to become clear about their Christian responsibilities, can do so with positive enjoyment.

*College of Saint Elizabeth*

SISTER LORETTA MARIA SHEEHY

*Sociology: An Analysis of Life in Modern Society.* By Arnold W. Green. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960. Pp. xiii+672. \$6.95.

Information-packed pages and a smooth literary style distinguish Arnold W. Green's *Sociology* and account for its perennial popularity. The third edition has two new chapters, "The Law and Social Control," and "The Law and Crime and Punishment." To partially compensate for this expansion, Chapter Nine in the second edition has been dropped. Slight changes, some of them several paragraphs long, update and sometimes clarify the text. Yet, as one might expect, most of the book is reprinted from the second edition. Like its predecessor, this edition will stimulate the imaginations of college freshmen with its profuse and appropriate photographic illustrations.

Professor Green tries to keep abstract sociological concepts to a minimum and is seldom concerned with precise formulation or definition of such concepts. This feature makes the book less usable than some others for the teacher



who emphasizes habits of sociological thought. The author's broad and diffuse approach is aimed at improving the student's understanding of American society without burdening him with analytical tools. Perhaps the utility of this attractive book would have been enhanced by a more explicitly sociological conceptual framework. As it is, the student will have to depend very much on his instructor to get the full benefit of Professor Green's careful composition and to relate together the many insights it provides.

Like most elementary textbooks in the field, this one is only moderately successful in its treatment of values and conservatively ambiguous in explaining norms. In all, however, it is quite representative of modern elementary sociology courses for unspecialized college freshmen. The review questions after each chapter are commendable, and the publisher also puts out a study guide prepared by Margaret B. Matson.

Seattle University

JOHN S. HARRINGTON, S.J.

*An Introduction to Social Psychology.* By William McDougall. New York: University Paperbacks: Barnes & Noble Inc., 1960. Pp. xxix+524. \$1.95.

What would warrant a book review twenty-two years after the author's death? In this instance the Paperback Revolution is the answer. The publishers are searching out studies that are considered classics in their field. And since McDougall's book went through twenty-three editions between 1908 and 1936 it must be granted some rating as a classic in Social Science.

Although scarcely known today, William McDougall made a serious contribution to the development of Social Psychology. Perhaps most important, he stimulated research by initiating a revolt against the static interpretation of mental life. McDougall conceded that this book was not essentially Social Psychology but "was designed to prepare the way for a treatise on Social Psychology." This fact is evident from the great emphasis placed on innate capacities as the source of all behavior. For McDougall, directly or indirectly, instincts are the prime movers of all activity. This approach is rejected by modern authorities since much of what McDougall, and the Instinctivists in general, ascribed to biological equipment is now considered to be due to acquired behavior. Since McDougall's day, anthropologists have supplied much evidence that different culture patterns produce great variation in human behavior. In current opinion so little of human behavior is considered as clearly inherited that the word instinct tends to be dropped out of the vocabulary of Psychologists and Social Scientists, with the result that McDougall and his school fade into the shadows.

One final suggestion—at this price most students can afford to have this book on their shelves as a historical item or source book.

St. Bonaventure University

COMAS GIRARD, O.F.M.

*Social Change in Rural Society.* By Everett M. Rogers. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1960. Pp. xi+490. \$6.75.

Traditionally, rural sociology has emphasized the applied aspects of the discipline. For this reason, there can be some ambiguity with regard to what

a beginning textbook in rural sociology should strive to accomplish. Should it focus primarily on the problems of rural society? Should it aim to help the student better to adjust to his work in a rural environment? Or should such a book consist of the basic principles of sociology applied to rural society?

Possibly because of this ambiguity, Rogers queried 77 colleges and determined, among other things, which students customarily take the beginning course and what was the preferred content of the textbook. It emerged that a common purpose of the rural sociology course is to study social change in rural society. Rogers utilizes the concept of social change when he delineates the principles of sociology and applies them to rural society. The same conceptual tool of change is used in studying the problems of rural life.

Some readers may find that they would like to do a little organizational shuffling in this book, particularly with regard to the relationship between "principles" and "problems." In some chapters, as in those on culture and personality, group relationships, social class, rural and suburban communities, and the rural family, church, and schools, the principles are emphasized, while the problems are handled in relation to the forces analyzed. In other instances, problems are handled as special topics.

In a general way, one can criticize parts of this text in that they are not sufficiently sociological, and others in that the "rural" is not sufficiently emphasized. An example of the former would be Chapter II, "Government Agricultural Agencies." Possibly this cannot be handled sociologically if the main intent is to describe the functions of the many state and federal agencies that deal with rural life and rural people. The chapter on the rural family, on the other hand, could appear essentially as it is in a general sociology text. It really is not a full treatment of the rural family and social changes unique to it.

While in most instances it can be said that this text deals with the usual rural sociology topics in an unusually good manner, there are two chapters that are particularly noteworthy. The one is Chapter 14, which deals with the process by which new agricultural ideas are differentially diffused among and accepted by farmers. Chapter 16 contains a good description of the roles rural sociologists play abroad. When this latter is added to the many references to their research and other duties domestically, students should gain a relatively complete answer to the question, "What does a rural sociologist do?"

Rogers writes clearly and well. I have the distinct feeling that after having studied this book students will conclude that rural sociology is important, is scientific, and is interesting. Can we ask much more?

*Iowa State University*

WILLIAM F. KENKEL

*Sociology and Social Problems*. Revised Edition. By Eva J. Ross. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1960. Pp. v+275. \$3.96.

High school teachers interested in a semester course in sociology will find many worth while and up-to-date features in this revised and enlarged edition. Although it travels in the same orbit, the text has been improved in a number of important ways: (1) the data cited in tables, graphs, and statistics

have been brought up-to-date, (2) the format, style, and organization of material have been improved to attain greater clarity of presentation and ease of reading, (3) new charts, diagrams, and well-selected pictures help the student to visualize the essential facts, (4) there has been some revision of the bibliographies, study questions, words to be mastered, and of the projects and activities found at the end of each chapter, and (5) an entire chapter is now devoted to the school group.

This text gives the student a well-organized overview of the basic concepts of sociology, and of the fundamental knowledge of social groups, customs, relationships, and institutions. All of the material, which is supported by Catholic principles, is divided into four parts: Part I, The Individual and Society, Part II: Basic Social Institutions, Part III: National Social Problems, and Part IV: World Problems. The treatment is fairly extensive, and, as the author suggests, should provide a basis for more detailed presentation and discussion for both students and teachers. This book certainly merits recommendation, as the author shows keen insight in the selection, presentation, and interpretation of the material.

*St. Mary's Academy*

SR. M. CHRYSOSTOM, O.S.F.

*The Sociology of Social Problems.* By Paul B. Horton and Gerald R. Leslie. Second edition. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1960. Pp. x+678. \$6.50.

As long as freshmen and sophomores are attracted to sociology departments by the social problems course, social problems texts will abound. Following the recent trend of attempting to place social problems in a theoretical framework of academic sociology, Horton and Leslie have outdone others in using three frames of reference—social change and social disorganization, value conflict, and personal deviation—to analyze fourteen social problems. The authors, noting that facts and figures as well as the problems themselves are subject to change over the years, stress the permanent value of a social problems course not only by inculcating the use of sociological theory as a basis for analysis but also by rather carefully defining what a social problem is, by enumerating some of the fallacies about and attitudes toward social problems, and finally by including a chapter on the interpretation of data. This orientation section of the text covers seventy-one pages and definitely is more comprehensive than the similar sections in, for instance, the Raab-Selznik and Bredemeir-Toby texts, which are mentioned merely because the reviewer happens to have them close at hand. Presented in this way, the social problems course should be both informative for the general student and allay the fears of the practical-minded sociology major that the emphasis on theory, methodology, and statistics in his other courses is not just so much speculation.

Although the Horton-Leslie text does not contain either adapted or integrated readings as do the two-above-mentioned texts, it is rather interestingly written. Moreover, instructors wishing to supplement the text with readings will be greatly aided by the copious footnotes and eighteen-page index.

Apropos after the conflict accompanying the recent election and also quite well done is Chapter 8, "Religious Problems and Conflicts." This chapter should broaden the outlook of Catholic undergraduates so that they see other areas of religious tension than that between Catholics and Protestants. The value-conflict approach is very well suited to this discussion of religious tensions in American society.

*The Sociology of Social Problems* is well worth being considered before the final choice of a social problems text is made.

St. John's University

TITUS THOLE, O.S.B.

*Social Problems in Our Time*. By S. Kirson Weinberg. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1960. Pp. viii+600.

A listing of the chapter headings of the book: Juvenile Delinquency, Adult Crime, Male Sex Offenses, Female Sex Deviance, Gambling, Alcoholism, Drug Addiction, Mental Health, Suicide, Age, Marital Conflicts, and Ethnic Prejudice, will readily reveal that the author emphasizes personality disorders. In fact, he admits that this book is, to a certain extent, a continuation of his previous work, *Society and Personality Disorders*.

Consequently, this text has emphases and approaches not readily evident in most of the current texts on social problems. Its use, as a textbook, would, therefore, be dependent on the instructor's preferences. Although the selection of the social problems treated may limit its use as a text, it should not limit its use as a supplementary text. Professor Weinberg does effectively emphasize the social processes, social and personal organization and traits as contributory and/or causal factors in social problems.

St. Louis University

CLEMENT S. MIHANOVICH

*The Social Welfare Forum*, 1959. National Conference on Social Welfare. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. Pp. x+277. \$5.00.

Sociologists cannot afford to miss the scholarly research papers in this significant selection from among many presented at San Francisco in the spring of 1959. Social Problems courses especially will be enriched thereby. Sociologists do not read enough of this kind of material. The changes that have occurred in the welfare field since 1945 make it all the more imperative for the sociologist to be ever alert to their implications. Unconvinced sociologists should examine this volume. Begin with the Presidential address by Robert H. MacRae, an exposition in classic style of the convention theme, "New Knowledge—Consequences for People." Ida Merriam's paper, "Are We Spending Enough for Social Welfare?" is a key to the committee's selections. Miss Merriam maintains that "Part of the reason for spending for social welfare is that in a modern, complex, urban economy we must do so if the society as a whole is to prosper." (p. 50)

An overall impression is that of competence on the part of the contributors. These papers are documented and factual examples of first-rate research

presented in forceful and graceful style. They exemplify social work professionals at a level which engenders high respect for the kind of scholarship this field has produced. These papers are a sort of report on the state of the profession and represent a growing maturity, progress perhaps toward a welfare state.

Two of the three papers on health insurance are alarming with respect to the deficiencies of organized medicine. The third, by a labor union man, repeats the others and is dictatorial in style. Most sociologists are unaware of the recent studies in the health field.

Three other more specialized reports of this memorable convention are available. The volume entitled *Community Organization, 1959* might be of most interest to sociologists.

La Salle College

BROTHER D. AUGUSTINE (McCAFFREY), F.S.C.

*Field Work: An Introduction to the Social Sciences.* By Buford H. Junker. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960. Pp. xvii+209. \$5.00.

For those interested in doing field work in the social sciences (and perhaps most of us should be more active in this area), here is a stimulating, challenging, understandable introduction to the problems and methods of empirical research. The author's own extensive experience in the field gives to his work a lucidity and coherence which is lacking in some other texts which aim at the same mark.

The author begins by explaining the nature of field work, the importance of observation, recordings, and reporting (which are well described as being more than just "busy work" or "ends in themselves"), an excellent description of how the observer is related to the situation through the social role which he plays, the adaptations which a field worker must make to the situation even though he knows generally what kind of information he is searching for, and, finally, some suggestions are presented from the experiences of those who encountered problems in their first attempts in the field. In a concluding chapter, the author wisely rejects the false dichotomy between empirical research and speculative theory, stressing the necessary interrelationship between the two.

Some readers may become impatient with the many lengthy excerpts in the body of the text, but this reviewer feels they are well chosen and should be read in their entirety. An excellent bibliography is appended.

Loretto Heights College

ROBERT H. AMUNDSON

*The American Social System.* By Stuart A. Queen, William N. Chambers and Charles M. Winston. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1956. Pp. xii+494. \$8.00. Text edition \$5.75.

No attempt is made in the book to survey the social science field or even to offer highlights of the various disciplines involved. A central theme of major importance—social control—is chosen and this is used as a focus for the whole

study. All the material covered, sociological, economic and political, is analyzed in so far as it sheds light on patterns of control in contemporary society and their relationship to subsidiary questions of personal choice and public decision.

A teacher using this text would particularly appreciate the authors' clear statement of their approach, their emphasis on the dual forces of choice and freedom, their lively method of presentation and cross-cultural approach. This last feature gives the student a breadth of vision without which any intelligent appraisal of America is impossible. An annotated bibliography appears at the end of each chapter and includes insightful popular material such as social novels.

Sections covered are of unequal value. The chapter on religion is weak, that on stratification strong. All would be enhanced by some, or more, discussion of the methods used by the social scientist to gather data. Sometimes the impression is given that the authors are more interested in the description than in the analysis of contemporary problems.

A student unfamiliar with the social field may at times be a little bewildered by the current problems as presented in this text but he will never be bored by it; and if he studies it carefully he will be well on his way to an intelligent understanding of the American social system.

*College of New Rochelle*

MARGARET M. BEDARD

*Social Work Year Book, 1957.* Russell H. Kurtz, Editor. New York: National Association of Social Workers, 1957. Pp. 752. \$7.50.

A careful examination of the Table of Contents will show that the organization of this one volume "encyclopedia" is, perhaps, its most important feature. Long appreciated by professionals in the field it is not too familiar to sociologists.

In the first part a brief history of welfare is followed by articles on the economic and the cultural context of social work. Part two, the bulk of the work, contains 68 topical articles, from Administration of Social Agencies and Adoption, to Volunteers in Social Welfare and Youth Services. A specialist was assigned to each article and in successive issues, this being the thirteenth, the material is kept current both as to content and bibliography. Part three is comprised of over 100 pages of directories of international and national, public and voluntary agencies. In each instance the name of the chief executive officer is given, also the number of members, a short statement of purposes and activities and the title(s) of any publication(s) as well as the subscription price if such there be.

A useful Appendix alphabetically lists the title and publisher of most, if not all, the periodicals of interest to welfare workers, including the title and publisher of this Review, the Catholic Charities Review, and at least two other Catholic sources. The Index is adequate.

*La Salle College*

BROTHER D. AUGUSTINE (McCAFFREY), F.S.C.

*The Neurosis in the Light of Rational Psychology.* By A. A. A. Terruwe, M.D. Transl. by Conrad W. Baars, M.D. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1960. Pp. xxii+200. \$4.50.

To those who function within the behavioral science fields, the dichotomy between Aristotelian, Thomistic psychological and modern dynamic psychiatry is only too apparent. In this work, however, Dr. Terruwe makes a notable attempt at rapprochement, recognizing the contributions of Freudian analytical techniques and attempting to refine and refocus some of his theoretical concepts in the light of rational psychology.

*There is only one pleasure appetite, in spite of the fact that its objects are many and varied. We may make a comparison here with Freud's idea of the libido, which represents the sum total of pleasurable instincts. But we cannot follow Freud when he reduces the libido to the sex urge—(p.13).*

Neuroses are the result of two factors: a desire arising in the mind and a force which opposes and represses this desire, which continues to influence functioning in the unconscious life and to manifest pathological symptoms.

Four basic emotions are distinguished along two axes of differentiation:

	Obtain Good	Avoid Evil
Positive	Energy	Courage
Negative	Despair	Fear

(p. 17)

The involvement of these, predominantly fear and energy, in the neurotic process leads to a new classification of neurosis which is based on traditional dynamic lines (i.e., obsessive-compulsive, hysteria) with refinement and differentiation of reactions following the distinctions developed in the rational psychology approach. This same influence is seen in the treatment program which again is based on analytical lines with elaborations resulting from the new theoretical framework.

Ending with a discussion of free will in the neurotic, the author has this to say:

*If repression takes place, this sensory object of the emotion cannot be subordinated to reason. For this object has become also the object of the repressing emotion which, having won out, will represent it as such to the intellect. Thus reason will direct it, not as the object of the pleasure appetite, but as that of the utility appetite. . . Obviously intellect and will have no influence over this activity—(200).*

Certainly there are areas which could be more fully developed. Two of the four basic emotions—courage and despair—are left largely undiscussed, and one wonders what is their role in neurosis. Likewise, the willing submission of emotions, when unrepressed, to the intellect, seems oversimplified at times. And finally, the author admittedly cannot place the role of the emotion, anger, within her schema as yet. Perhaps longer elaboration would clear up many of these difficulties, but the book as is certainly merits due consideration by persons within the field of psychology and psychiatry.

The Catholic University of America

JOAN BACKSCHEIDER



## PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

- Burgess, Ernest W. (ed.), *AGING IN WESTERN SOCIETY*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960. \$7.50.
- Casagrande, Joseph B., *IN THE COMPANY OF MAN*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960. \$6.50.
- Deutsch, Martin, *MINORITY GROUPS AND CLASS STATUS AS RELATED TO SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY FACTORS IN SCHOLASTIC ACHIEVEMENT*. Ithaca: Society for Applied Anthropology, 1960. \$1.50.
- Dunham, H. Warren, *SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY AND MENTAL DISORDER*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1959. \$5.50.
- Duncan, Beverly and Philip M. Hauser, *HOUSING A METROPOLIS—CHICAGO*. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960. \$7.50.
- Fuller, John L. and W. Robert Thompson, *BEHAVIOR GENETICS*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960. \$8.95.
- Katz, Alfred H., *PARENTS OF THE HANDICAPPED*. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1961. \$6.00.
- Mannheim, Hermann, *PIONEERS IN CRIMINOLOGY*. Chicago: Quadrangle Press, 1960. \$7.50.
- Mussen, Paul H. (ed.), *HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT*. John Wiley and Sons, 1960. \$15.25.
- Parmelee, Maurice, *THE HISTORY OF MODERN CULTURE*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1960. \$10.00.
- Solomon, Herbert (ed.), *MATHEMATICAL THINKING IN THE MEASUREMENT OF BEHAVIOR*. The Free Press, 1960. \$7.50.
- Verba, Sidney, *SMALL GROUPS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, A STUDY OF LEADERSHIP*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. \$6.00.
- Wolff, Kurt H., *EMILE DURKHEIM: 1858-1917*. Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1960. \$7.50.

University

Harper and

to Social  
haca: So

. Detroit

CHICAGO

ew York

Charles C

gle Press


HILD De

ck: Phila

UREMENT

OF LEAD

University



# THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

1960-1961

Honorary President

MOST REV. JOHN J. WRIGHT, D.D., *Bishop of Pittsburgh*

President

JACK H. CURTIS, *Marquette University*

President-Elect

SISTER FRANCES JEROME WOODS, C.D.P., *Our Lady of the Lake College*

Vice-President

GORDON ZAHN, *Loyola University (Chicago)*

Executive Secretary

RALPH A. GALLAGHER, S.J., *Loyola University (Chicago)*

Executive Council

LUCIUS CERVANTES, S.J., *St. Louis University*

JOSEPH FITZPATRICK, S.J., *Fordham University*

JOHN HUGHES, *University of Notre Dame*

SISTER M. INEZ HILGER, O.S.B., *College of St. Benedict*

HERBERT F. LEIES, S.M., *St. Mary's University*

PAUL J. REISS, *Marquette University*

Ex officio Members

Secretary: SISTER M. AQUINICE, O.P., *Rosary College*

Immediate Past President: JOHN L. THOMAS, S.J., *St. Louis University*

Chairman, Publications Committee: PAUL J. REISS, *Marquette University*

Chairman, Convention Program: THOMAS P. IMSE, *Canisius College*

## Committees

*Membership Committee:* John Hughes, Chairman, University of Notre Dame;  
Bro. Augustine, F.S.C.; Frank Cizon; Sr. Virginia, O.S.B.; Joseph Scheuer,  
C.P.P.S.

*Finance Committee:* Donald N. Barrett, Chairman, University of Notre Dame;  
Frank Cizon, Thomas K. Burch

*Research Committee:* Joseph P. Scheuer, C.P.P.S., Chairman, Fordham University;  
Margaret Donnelly, Lloyd Davis, William Kenkel, William Gibbons, S.J.

*Publications Committee:* Paul J. Reiss, Chairman, Marquette University;  
members of the Editorial Board of the *American Catholic Sociological Review*

*Awards Committee:* Lawrence Bourgeois, Chairman, Loyola University (New  
Orleans); Raymond H. Potvin, Alexander J. Humphreys, S.J., William Kenkel

*Committee on Nominations and Elections:* C. S. Mihanovich, Chairman, St. Louis  
University; John Kane, Gordon Zahn

*Convention Program Committee:* Thomas P. Imse, Chairman, Canisius College;  
Sr. M. Aquinice, O.P.; Sr. M. Rebecca, O.S.F.

*Convention Arrangements Committee:* Paul Hanlon, Chairman, St. Louis University;  
Sr. Felicia; Eugene Janson, S.M.; C. S. Mihanovich

*Convention Resolutions Committee:* Sr. M. Jeanine, O.S.F., Chairman, Cardinal  
Stritch College; Eugene Janson, S.M.

*Section on Teaching Sociology:* Paul J. Reiss, Chairman, Marquette University

*High School Section:* Sr. Mary Chrysostom, O.S.F., Chairman, St. Mary's Academy

*Section on Sociology in Seminaries:* Joseph Schuyler, S.J., Chairman, Loyola Semi-  
nary (N.Y.)

*Section on Intergroup Relations:* Albert Foley, S.J., Chairman, Spring Hill College

1961  
ANNUAL  
CONVENTION

THE  
AMERICAN CATHOLIC  
SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY

and Coronado Hotel

Saint Louis, Missouri

August 28-30

---

*Program*

Thomas P. Imse — Canisius College, Buffalo, N.Y.  
Chairman

*Arrangements*

Paul Hanlon — St. Louis University, St. Louis, Mo.  
Chairman

